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THE PROBLEM OF OMNIPOTENCE AND GOD'S ABILITY TO SIN
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M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Gareth B. Matthews
In this essay I address the contemporary discussion of
the problem of omnipotence and God’s ability to sin, or
POGAS. After some preliminary distinctions I distinguish
three versions of the problem. I argue that two versions
pose genuine problems for the the traditional Judeo-
Christian concept of God. One of these versions is shown
to be equivalent to the modal problem of evil. This
version of the problem relies on a standard definition of
omnipotence and the claim that there are some states of
affairs sjch that necessarily it is not morally permisible
for anyone to bring them about.
In the middle portion of the essay I look at several
proposed solutions to POGAS that involve the concept of
omnipotence. The radical omnipotence theory holds that an
omnipotent being can bring about any state of affairs
including impossible ones; it is rejected because the
intellectual cost is too high. Next I distinguish two
other approaches to redefining omnipotence. One appraoch
is a Thomist approach. This involves defining omnipotence
as the ability to bring about all metaphysically possible
states of affairs. To solve POGAS those in the Thomist
tradition further restrict those states of affairs that
an omnipotent being can be expected to be capable of
bringing about. Secondly, I address several Anselmian
understandings of omnipotence. An Anselmian understanding
of omnipotence is one which allows that there may be possi-
ble states of affairs which an omnipotent being cannot
bring about. However, an omnipotent being must be such
that it can do whatever it wills and such that nothing can
control it. These Anselmian solutions reveal a further
problem, the problem of necessary omnipotence, or PONO.
. 0N0 shows that, on a plausible understanding of omnibene-
volence, it is impossible for any being to be necessarily
omnibenevolent
. Finally I argue that both POGAS and PONO
can be solved by adopting an Anselmian understanding of
omnipotence as well as a revised understanding of omnibene-
volence which allows that morally significant alternatives
may involve only morally permissible options.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM DEFINED
The problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin
(henceforth known as POGAS) arises in a number of dif-
ferent ways. In this chapter we shall look at three
ways in which it might be presented. I shall argue that
the first way does not present a problem for the tradi-
tional J u de o -Ch r i s t i a n theist. The second way in which
the problem arises is more complex, but, I shall argue,
it does seem to present a problem for traditional Judeo-
Christian theism. Furthermore I shall show that a prob-
lem recently called "the modal problem of evil" by
Theodore Gulesarian is really another way of stating the
second version of POGAS. Finally I will distinguish a
third version of POGAS which is suggested by Peter Geach
in Providence and Evil .
I
Nelson Pike may be responsible for much of the
recent interest POGAS. His article "Omnipotence and
God's Ability to Sin" has spawned considerable
discussion of this topic. At the beginning of his paper
he neatly sums up the problem:
An omnipotent being is one that can do all things
possible. But surely, it is possible to sin. Men
do this sort of thing all the time. It would thus
appear that if God is perfectly good (and thus
impeccable) He cannot sin; and if God is omnipotent
(and thus can do all things possible), he can sin.
A virtue of Pike's statement of the problem is that it
places the problem before us clearly and simply; the
simplicity of the statement, however, masks the complex-
ity of the problem. In fact, Pike himself recognizes
that the topic is more complex than the above quotation
suggests. In Chapter II, I will discuss Pike’s version
of POGAS in some detail. However, before discussing
Pike’s particular version of POGAS we will examine
whether or not there is a genuine problem in holding
that one being is both essentially omnipotent and
essentially morally perfect. In much of the Judeo-
Christian tradition, it is held that God is both
essentially omnipotent and essentially omnibenevolent
(or morally perfect). Thus our investigation will
involve an element of considerable interest to
philosophical theologians.
In order to state the problem carefully we will
need to define a number of notions, including essential
property
,
omnipotent
,
and omnibenevolent
. The concep-
tion of essential property which we will use is one that
is widely used in contemporary philosophy. 2 It is as
follows:
D 1 . 1 . Pis an essential property of x =df Neces-
sarily, if x exists, then x has P
where x is an object and P is a property. In other
words, P's being an essential property of x means that
it is impossible for x to exist and lack P. In possible
worlds terminology it means that x has P in every world
in which x exists. It should be noted that I will use x
2
has P e ssentially interchangeably with P is an essential
property of x.
.
This definition is somewhat broader than another
common conception of essential properties - namely, the
Aristotelian notion of essential properties — from
which it must be distinguished. This distinction is
intended for clarification. There is no claim made here
as to which is the proper understanding of essentiality.
In a paper entitled "Essential Properties"^ Daniel Ben-
nett offers a discussion of essential properties which
stands in the Aristotelian tradition. Bennett says that
essential properties are properties that an object has
necessarily. But, he says, essential properties must be
more than necessary properties. He writes, "Essential
properties sort the entities of which they are true in
some fashion." 4 So essential properties are both neces-
sary and sortal. Furthermore according to Richard So-
rabji, for Aristotle "...the essence is, or includes, in
a way, a cause or explanation of the thing itself "
.
5 So
it seems that
D1.2. P is an essential property of x =df (i)
Necessarily, if x exists, then x has P, (ii) P is a
sortal property ( i.e. it is true of some but not
all objects) and (iii) P helps explain the exist-
ence of x
is closer to being a correct definition of an essential
property in the Aristotelian sense than Dl.l. (Two com-
ments should be made about D1.2. First, two crucial no-
tions -- sortal and explanation -- are left undefined.
3
For our purposes no precise discussion is necessary.
6
Secondly, I make no claim that D1.2 is a complete and
accurate definition of essential property for Aristotle.
In fact, for Aristotle, probably conditions (i), (ii),
and (iii) ought to be thought of simply as individually
necessary conditions of an essential property, but not
as jointly sufficient.^)
We can see that Dl.l is much broader than D1.2. A
property like b_eing self identical will be an essential
property of Ronald Reagan (and everything else) accord-
ing to Dl.l, but not according to D1.2. Being self
identical neither distinguishes Reagan from anyone else
(and hence is not sortal) nor explains his existence.
Since clauses (ii) and (iii) are not fulfilled by being
—
^ identical
,
it is not an essential property in the
Aristotelian sense. It will be important to keep in
mind that we are using the broader sense of essential
property given in Dl.l. However, it may also be worth
noting that if D1.2 is correct (or at least gives neces-
sary conditions for an essential property), then, given
clause (i) of D1.2, every property which is an essential
property according to D1.2 will also be an essential
property according to Dl.l.
A second notion which we must define is omnipo-
tence. Initially it may seem that omnipotence can fair-
ly be characterized as follows:
4
D1.3. x is omnipotent =df x can do anything.
Although some philosophers
— most notably Descar tes— have
accepted D1.3, it has generally been rejected in the
western philosophical tradition. D1.3 requires that an
omnipotent being be able to do things which are impossi-
ble. For instance, D1.3 requires that an omnipotent
being be able to create a round square. This is a
primary reason that most philosophical theologians have
rejected D1.3. Aquinas rejects D1.3 and offers a sub-
stitute in the Summa Theologica where he writes, "For
there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the
word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If,
however, we consider the matter aright, since power is
said in reference to possible things, this phrase, God
can d_o all things
,
is rightly understood to mean that
God can do all things that are possible; and for this
reason he is said to be omnipotent."®
In the above passage Aquinas rejects D1.3 and of-
fers a better definition of omnipotence. He suggests
something like
:
D1.4. x is omnipotent =df For any action a, if a is
possible, then x can do a.
A number of things need to be said about D1.4. First of
all, we should note the type of possibility that we are
talking about when we use the term possible . There are
a number of different types of possibility, each of
which is useful and legitimate in the appropriate con-
5
text. One type of possibility is physical possibility.
A state of affairs S is physically possible only if S’s
obtaining is consistent with the laws of physics. Thus
nix floating weightlesslv on Earth is not physically
possible. On the other hand my running a sub-seven-
minute mile is physically possible.
A second type of possibility is epistemic possibil-
ity. A state of affairs is epistemically possible for a
person P at a time t just in case, for all P knows at t,
S obtains. Thus a state of affairs S and its contradic-
tory not-S may both be epistemically possible for some-
one. For instance, Margaret Thatcher
' s preferring
-
hr im P JL° lobster and Margaret Thatcher ' s not preferring
shrimp t_o lobster are both epistemically possible for me
now. We should also note that what is epistemically
possible for a person may vary over time. If I learn
that Margaret Thatcher prefers shrimp to lobster, then
Margaret Thatcher ' s not preferring shrimp to lobster
will no longer be epistemically possible for me.
A third sense of possibility is metaphysical possi-
bility. A state of affairs S is metaphysically possible
if and only if there is some possible world in which S
obtains. Metaphysical possibility is not limited by
physical laws so my floating weightlessly on Earth is
metaphysically possible even though it is not physically
possible. Unlike epistemic possibility, metaphysical
possibility is unchangeable. If something is metaphysi-
6
cally possible at some time, then it is always meta-
physically possible. In D1.4 we use possible in the
sense of metaphysical possibility.
There is in D1.4 another term that seems to be a
modal term; D1.4 uses the phrase "can do". It would be
convenient if we could claim that the "can" of "can do"
simply means metaphysical possibility. Thus "x can do
A" would simply mean "there is a possible world in which
x does A". This understanding of "can do" is, however,
incorrect because there are many things that are meta-
physically possible for a person but which that person
can not do. For instance, it is metaphysically possible
that I be the first human on the moon. But Roing to the
—? on mil k_g. in 8 The first human there is not something
that I can do. Similarly, high- jumping seven feet is
metaphysically (even physically) possible, but it is not
something that I can do.
The precise meaning of "can do" is very difficult
to determine. It is not essential for our purposes,
however, to determine its exact meaning. We will,
therefore, leave it as an undefined primitive term. We
can say that
C. Necessarily, x can do A only if it is metaphysi-
cally possible that x do A
is true. If D1.4 is the correct definition of omnipo-
tence, then of omnipotent beings, and only of omnipotent
beings, is it correct to say that the set of actions it
7
can do is coextensive with the set of actions that are
metaphysically possible for it.
In the previous section I repeatedly talked of
—aphVSlCal pcaaihility in order to distinguish it from
epistemic and £h y s i c a 1 possibility. Since the phrase
"metaphysical possibility" is a bit cumbersome, hence-
forth I Will use "possibility" to mean "metaphysical
possibility
.
"
Finally, D1.4 defines omnipotence in terms of ac-
tion^ that a being can do. Yet according to some con-
temporary philosophers 9 there is a serious problem with
this characterization. For instance, saying something
—9 ^ d —n
1
y JDL Reagan p s an act i on which is possible. Yet
everyone (except Reagan) is prevented from being omnipo-
tent because they cannot say something said only by
Reagan. I® To avoid this difficulty many philosophers
have preferred to define omnipotence in terms of an
agent's ability to bring about states of affairs. We
will follow this contemporary convention. An agent A
brings about a state of affairs S if and only if either
A strongly actualizes S or A weakly actualizes S. A
strongly actualizes S if and only if A directly causes S
to obtain. Weak actualization is more difficult to
explain. An example might be helpful. Suppose Mary's
least favorite food is boiled ham. Mary's father weakly
actualizes the state of affairs Mary ' s choosing baked
8
ChlCken lf he o£fers her a choice between baked chicken
and boiled ham. Mary's father puts her in a situation
Where she has free choice but is such that a certain
counterfactual is true and insures that Mary will choose
baked chicken. More generally a person P weakly actual-
izes a state of affairs S if and only if P strongly
actualizes another state of affairs S' and it is the
case that S would not obtain if S' were not to obtain.
We are now able to define omnipotence in terms of states
of affairs as follows:
Di.4. x is omnipotent =df For any state of affairs
o, it S is possible, then x can bring about S.
The comments made previously about "can do" apply also
to can bring about." An omnipotent being can bring
about the state of affairs someone ' s saying something
sa a ^ °
-
n ^ y Reagan because it can cause Reagan to utter
the appropriate sentence. The state of affairs God '
s
aa y a
n
8 something said only b y Reagan cannot be brought
about by an omnipotent being, but this is no problem
because it is not a possible state of affairs.
A third notion which we need to explain is omnibene—
volence or moral perfection
. Intuitively, something is
morally perfect just in case it never does anything that
is morally wrong. There are, however, many things which
never do anything morally wrong because either they
never perform any morally significant actions or they
never perform any actions at all. For instance, a com-
9
puter never does anything morally wrong because it does
”0t P £rform any actions freely and hence is not morally
responsible for its actions. Similarly, an inanimate
object like a rock never brings about any state of
affairs and hence never does anything wrong. Clearly,
however, we do not want to regard either the computer or
the rock as being morally perfect. Intuitively, moral
perfection involves a positive element involving making
free choices. Perhaps, then, Omni bene vo lent
e
is a more
appropriate word for the property we are considering
since it includes the notion of volition.
Before defining omni bene volence
,
it is necessary to
state our primitive concepts and give some other defini-
tions. We will define omnibenevolence in terms of an
agent's ability to bring about states of affairs. So
our first primitive is the previously discussed notion
of can bring about." A second primitive concept is
that of an action's being morally wrong.
I
take it as
given that some actions are morally wrong. Just what
moral wrongness consists in is outside the scope of this
discussion. We should note at this point that bringing
about a_ state o f affairs is a type of action; so it may
be that there is a state of affairs S such that it is
morally wrong for an agent A to bring about S. I shall
say that an action A is morally right if and only if it
is not morally wrong to perform A. An action A is
obligatory if and only if it is morally wrong to refrain
10
from performing A. An action A is morally permissible
if and only if it is not morally wrong for an agent to
perform A.
We now introduce some definitions which will give
us a clearer notion of omnibenevolence than is generally
provided in discussions of POGAS. First, we introduce
the notion of alternatives. This a notoriously diffi-
cult notion to characterize.12 However, we can intro-
duce enough clarity and precision for our purposes. We
will discuss alternatives by way of an analogy to propo-
sitions
.
A relationship traditionally said to hold among
some propositions is that of being contraries of one
another. Propositions Pj_ and P 2 are contraries of one
another just in case it is possible that P
]_
be true and
it is possible that P 2 be true but it is impossible that
the conjunction of P
]_
and P 2 be true; furthermore it is
also possible that the disjunction of P
]_
and Po be
false. Similarly, we will suggest that some states of
affairs are contraries of one another. States of af-
fairs S
]_
and S 2 are contraries of one another just in
case (i) it is possible that S
]_
obtain, (ii) it is
possible that S 2 obtain, and (iii) it is impossible that
both S i and S 2 obtain at the same time. That is, Sj's
obtaining precludes S 2 's obtaining. We should note that
more than two states of affairs can be contraries of one
1 1
another. For instance, states of affairs S lt S 2 , and S 3
are contraries if and only if it is possible that Sj
obtain; it is possible that S 2 obtain; it is possible
that S 3 obtain; it is impossible that both S
L and S 2
obtain at the same time; it is impossible that both S
^
and S 3 obtain at the same time; and it is impossible
that both S 2 and S 3 obtain at the same time. Using this
notion of contrary states of affairs we can offer a
definition of a set of alternatives.
D1.5. S is a set of alternatives =df S is a set of
states of affairs such that the members of S are
contraries of one another.
D1.5 is not, in fact, a very restrictive definition of a
set of alternatives. Unlike many definitions of sets of
alternatives, it is not relativized to either persons or
times. It is, however, somewhat restrictive. It is not
the case that every set of states of affairs is a set of
alternatives. Some sets of states of affairs will have
members which can obtain in the same world. Other sets
of states of affairs may have members which are
impossible
.
One might object that D1.5 is too broad as a defi-
nition of a set of alternatives; it does not, one might
hold, correspond to our ordinary intuitions about alter-
natives. Our ordinary intuitions about alternatives
seem to require that an alternative be something that a
person can do if it is to be regarded as a genuine
alternative. For instance, consider a person, Tom, who
12
is driving a car, C, and the following states of
affairs :
Si. C's being stopped
5 2 C's being turned to the right
5 3 C's flying to the moon
S 1 and S 2 clearly are alternatives for Tom. And S 3 does
not seem to be an alternative for him because he cannot
bring about S 3 . According to D1.5, however, S X , S 2 , and
S 3 make up a set of alternatives. So D1.5 is an inade-
quate definition of alternatives.
This charge is problematic. It is illegitimate in
that the objection to D1.5 essentially relies on a
person-relative notion of alternatives. But D1.5 is not
a definition of a person-relative notion of alterna-
tives. Perhaps, then, the objection is that on our
ordinary intuitions alternatives are person-relative.
In this sense the objection is legitimate. In fact, I
think that intuitively we have a notion of alternatives
in the broad sense of D1.5 and also in a narrower,
p e r s o n- r e 1 a t i v e sense. And it seems that the narrower,
p e r s o n - r
e
1 a t i v e sense is the sense that is important to
moral evaluation. Accordingly we offer another defini-
tion to capture this narrower sense.
D1 .6 . S is a set of alternatives open to a person P
=df (i) S is a set of alternatives and ( i i ) every
member of S is such that P can bring it about.
While S
,
S 2 > and S 3 in the example above constitute a
13
set of alternatives, they do not constitute a set of
alternatives open to Tom since he cannot bring about S 3 .
It is often held that a necessary condition for the
existence of moral good is the possibility of moral
evil. Similarly a necessary condition for the existence
of moral evil is the possibility of moral good. For
instance, such a claim is a major feature of the free
will defense. Not all sets of alternatives open to a
person have some morally permissible members and some
morally impermissible members. Some sets of alterna-
tives open to a person may have only morally impermissi-
ble members and others may have only morally permissible
members. Sets of these latter two sorts are not rele-
vant for determining whether or not a person is omnibe-
nevolent. It seems unreasonable to attribute turpitude
to a person if he or she does not have an option that is
morally permissible. Similarly it seems unreasonable to
attribute benevolence to a person if he or she does not
have an option which is morally impermissible. We inco-
rporate this intuition in the following definition:
D1.7. S is a morally significant set of alterna-
tives open to a person P =df (i) S is a set of
alternatives open to a person P, ( i i ) At least one
member of S, s'
,
is such that it is morally permis-
sible for P to bring about s'
,
and (iii) at least
one member of S, s' '
,
is such that it is not moral-
ly permissible for P to bring about s''.
Only morally significant sets of alternatives open to a
person are relevant for determining whether or not that
person is omnibenevolent
.
14
Before offering a definition of omnibenevolence,
we need to introduce one more technical term. Since we
are using sets of alternatives there may be morally
significant sets of alternatives open to a person P
which are proper subsets of other morally significant
sets of alternatives open to P. P could, then, bring
about a state of affairs which is not a member of some
morally significant set of alternatives open to her.
Undoubtedly
,
this situation would cause problems for
determining whether or not P is omnibenevolent
. To
avoid this problem we offer the following definition:
D1.8. S is a complete morally significant set of
alternatives open to a person P =df (i) S is a
morally significant set of alternatives open to P,
and (ii) P must bring about some member of S.
Only complete morally significant sets of alternatives
open to a person are relevant for determining whether or
not that person is omnibenevolent.
We are now in a position to define omnibenevolence:
D1.9. P is omnibenevolent =df (i) There is a com-
plete morally significant set of alternatives open
to P, and (ii) for every complete morally signifi-
cant set, S, of alternatives open to P, P brings
about a member of S only if it is morally permissi-
ble for P to bring about that member of S.
It is clear that we need both clauses of D1.9. If we
had only clause (ii), then any person who has no alter-
natives will be regarded as omnibenevolent. Clearly
without clause (ii), we lose the intuition of always
doing what is right. D1.9, then, incorporates several
15
First of all
of our intuitions about omnibenevolence.
D1.9 requires free choice of a being if it is to be
omnibenevolent. Secondly, it says that a being must have
the option of doing evil as well as doing good. Final-
ly, D1.9 says that a being must always choose something
that is morally right if that being is to be regarded as
omnibenevolent
.
Before explicitly stating POGAS-A, we should note
one other assumption we make which may be controversial.
Namely, we will assume that the word "God" is a predi-
cate which names a property rather than a proper name.
It is clear that we frequently use the word "God" as if
it were a proper name. For instance, many western
theists maintain that
(a) God created the universe
is true. In (a) God seems to be used as a proper
name. There are also, however, occasions on which "God"
seems to function as a predicate. For instance, many
theists also claim that
(b) There is only one God
is true. In (b) "God" clearly seems to be used as a
predicate. I will regard sentences like (a) as abbre-
viations for something like
(a') The person who is God created the universe.
In (a') "God" again functions as a predicate. This
assumption that "God" is a predicate is not uncontrover-
sial, but nothing in our discussion depends essentially
16
on our position. If someone objects to our position, he
or she can recast the arguments in terms of divinity,
replacing "is God" with "is divine". Theists, of
course, hold that someone is God. We will follow the
Judeo-Christian tradition and use "Yahweh" as a rigid
designator of the person who is God.
If there is any problem of omnipotence and God's
ability to sin it arises because of several assumptions
that Judeo-Christian theists want to make. We will
investigate whether or not one can claim that the
defender of the traditonal Judeo-Christian concept of
God is committed to some sort of logical inconsistency.
The claim will be that these assumptions — which we
will call (A1)-(A4) -- are inconsistent. That is, if
POGAS is genuine, (A1)-(A4) will yield some sort of
contradiction. Given our previous definitions we can
state ( A 1 ) — ( A 4 ) as follows. I will state each assump-
tion in English and then formally. The first premise
i s :
(Al) There is a being such that necessarily it is
God
or
(Al) ( Ex ) ( i ) Gxi
where 'Gxi' means 'x is God in world i'. As we shall
see in Chapter II, this premise is essential to any
version of POGAS. If one allows that different beings
have the property of being God in different worlds
17
omnipotence and omniscience will not cause any problems.
Moreover, (Al) is an assumption that many theists make.
In the western tradition, of course, it is Yahweh who is
God. When we instantiate (1) we will use the constant
g to refer to Yahweh. The second premise is:
( A 2 ) Necessarily if anything is God, then it is
omnipotent
o r
(A2) ( i ) ( x ) (Gxi Oxi )
where ’Oxi' means 'x is omnipotent in world i'. The
third premise is:
(A3) Necessarily, anything which is God is omni-
ben evolent
o r
( A3 ) (i)(x)(Gxi ^ Mxi )
where Mxi means x is omnibenevolent in world i'.
POGAS, however, needs some premise which involves some
morally impermissible state of affairs. Let us start
with a fairly weak claim. Perhaps, the fourth premise
should be
(A4) There is a state of affairs S such that for
any person P it is not morally permissible for P to
bring about S
o r
(A4) (Ex){Sxd & (y)( Pyxd)}
where 'Pxyi' means 'it is permissible for x to bring
about y in world i' and where ' d ' is a constant desig-
nating the actual world.
18
Perhaps, then, premises (A1)-(A4) are inconsistent;
perhaps they will yield some sort of contradiction. We
Will designate as POGAS-A the claim that ( A 1 ) -( A4 ) are
inconsistent. The argument proceeds in the following
way. From an instantiation of (Al) and from (A2) we can
infer :
(A5) Necessarily, Yahweh is omnipotent
o r
( A5 ) ( i )Ogi .
And from (Al) and (A3) we can infer:
(A6) Necessarily, Yahweh is omnibenevolent
o r
( A6 ) ( i )Mgi
.
From our definition of omnipotence, D1.4, we assert
( A 7 ) Necessarily, any omnipotent being can bring
about any possible state of affairs
o r
(A7) ( i ) ( x ) ( y ) (Oxi ( Syi d Bxyi ) )
where 'Bxyi' means 'x can bring about y in world i'. (It
should be recalled that the ’can’ of 'can bring about'
is not simply metaphysical possibility; 'can bring a-
bout' is a primitive term.) From our definition of
omn i b en e vo 1 enc e , D1.9, we can assert:
(A8) Necessarily, any state of affairs brought
about by any omnibenevolent being is such that it
is morally permissible for that being to bring it
about
or
(A8) ( i ) ( x ) ( y ) ( Mxi Z?((Syi & Ax y i ) ;> Px y i ) )
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where 'Axyi' means 'x brings about (or actualizes) y in
world i'. Consider a state of affairs which might serve
as an instantiation of (A4), for instance:
S 5 : Mother Theresa's being insulted by someone
From (A4) we can get
(A9) It is not morally permissible for anyone tobring about S 5
o r
(A9) ( y ) ( Sad & Pyad)
where 'a’ is a constant referring to S 5 . From (A5)
( A7 ) , and ( A9 ) we can infer
(A10) Yahweh can bring about S 5
o r
(A10) Bga.
(A10), however, does not really cause any problems.
Since no one holds that an omnipotent being does bring
about every state of affairs it can bring about, it may
be that Yahweh (as well as any other omn i bene vo 1 en
t
beings) avoids bringing about S 5 . Perhaps in those
situations where Yahweh does bring about S 5 (i.e. in
other possible worlds) it is morally permissible to
bring about S 5 . Furthermore, there is no way to infer
(All) Yahweh brings about S 5
o r
(All) Agad.
(All) would lead to a contradiction, but it does not
follow from the assumptions that we started with, (Al) -
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(A4). The problem is that (A4) is not strong enough.
In order for POGAS to be a genuine problem for the
traditional theist one needs to claim that some states
of affairs are necessarily such that it is impermissible
for anyone to bring them about.
II
There is a second version of POGAS — POGAS-B -- which
incorporates a stronger version of (A4). Theodore Gulesar-
ian presents POGAS-B (though he does not recognize it as
such) in a paper entitled "God and Possible Worlds: The
Modal Problem of Evil". 1Zf In this section I will first of
all set up POGAS-B in a parallel to POGAS-A, showing that a
contradiction arises if we strengthen (A4). Then I will
try to show that Gulesar ian 1 s "modal problem of evil" is
really equivalent to POGAS-B.
The first three premises are the same as the first
three premises of POGAS-A. They are
(Bl) There is a being such that necessarily it is God
o r
(Bl) ( Ex ) ( i ) Gxi
where 'Gx' means 'x is God in world i'
. The second pre-
mise is :
(B2) Necessarily if anything is God, then it is omni-
potent
o r
(B2) (i)(x)(Gxi Oxi)
where 'Ox' means ' x is omnipotent in world i'. The third
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premise is:
(B3) Necessarily, anything which is God is omnibenevo-
o r
(B3) (i)(x)(Gxi ^ Mxi)
where Mx ' means 'x is omnibenevolent in world i'. As we
noted earlier (A4) is inadequate and needs to be strength-
ened. The way in which we will strengthen (A4) is to claim
that there are things which are wrong for anyone to do
under any possible circumstances. Thus our interpretation
of the fourth premise is:
(B4) There is some state of affairs S such that neces-
sarily it is not morally permissible for anyone tobring about S
o r
( B 4 ) ( Ex ) ( i ) ( y ) ( Sx i &* Pyxi)
where Sxi" means 'x is a metaphysically possible state of
affairs in world i' and 'Pxyi' means 'it is morally permis-
sible for x to bring about y in world i' . The first pre-
mise is widely held in the western theological tradition,
particularly the Anselmian tradition. The second and third
are part of the explanation of what it is for something to
be God. The fourth premise bears considerable intuitive
force. There are some things which seem such that under no
circumstances would anyone be permitted to bring them a-
bout. The argument starts out just as in POGAS-A. From an
instantiation of ( B 1 ) and from (B2) we can infer:
(B5) Necessarily, Yahweh is omnipotent
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o r
(B5) (i)Ogi
where g is a constant referring to Yahweh. And from (Bl)
and (B3) we can infer:
( B6 ) Necessarily, Yahweh is omnibenevolent
o r
( B6 ) ( i )Mgi
.
From our definition of omnipotence, D1.4, we assert
( B7 ) Necessarily, any omnipotent being can bring about
any possible state of affairs
o r
( B7 ) (i) (x)(y)(Oxi ^(Syi^Bxyi))
where 'Bxyi' means 'x can bring about y in world i'. Again
we note that the 'can' of 'can bring about' is not simply
metaphysical possibility; 'can bring about' is a primitive
term. From our definition of omnibenevolence, D1.9, we can
assert :
(B8) Necessarily, any state of affairs brought about
by any omnibenevolent being is such that it is morally
permissible for that being to bring it about
o r
( B8 ) (i) (x)(y) (Mxi z> ( (Syi & Axy i ) r> Pxy i )
)
where 'Axyi' means 'x brings about (or actualizes) y in
world i'. Consider a state of affairs which might serve as
an instantiation of (B4), for instance:
S ^ : Innocent children being tortured.
From (B4) we can get
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( B9 ) Necessarily it is not morally permissible foranyone to bring about S6
o r
( B 9 ) (i)(y)(Sai & Pyai)
where ’a' is a constant referring to S6. From (B7) and
(B9) we know that we can infer
(BIO) Necessarily, Yahweh can bring about S6
o r
(BIO) ( i )Bgai
In our discussion of the primitive concept ’can bring
about' we noted that
(Bll) Necessarily any state of affairs which a person
can bring about is such that it is possible that that
person bring it about
or
(BID (D(x)(y)((Syi & Bxyi) ^ (Ej)Axyj)
is true. From (B9), (BIO), and (Bll) we can infer
( B 1 2 ) It is possible that Yahweh bring about S6
o r
(B12) (Ej)Agaj.
From ( B6 ) , (B8), (B9) and (Bll) we can infer
(B13) It is possible that it is morally permissible
for Yahweh to bring about S6
o r
(B13) (Ej)Pgaj.
But from (B9) we can also infer
(B14) Necessarily it is not morally permissible for
Yahweh to bring about S6
o r
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( B 1 4 ) (i)'Pgai.
But ( B 1 3 ) and (B14) clearly contradict one another, so at
least one of our premises (or definitions) must be false or
incorrect
.
In "God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem of
Evil" Theodore Gulesarian argues that it is impossible that
any being exist necessarily and be essentially omnipotent,
essentially omniscient, and essentially omnibenevolent
.
This is basically the Anselmian concept of God; such essen-
tial properties must belong to a being that is "that than
which nothing greater can be conceived." According to
Gulesarian this conception of God is inconsistent. Gule-
sanan’s argument, however, is not itself especially per-
spicuous. He does not explicitly recognize that his modal
problem of evil is a version of the more traditional prob-
lem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin. Part of the
reason that he does not recognize this relation is that his
argument is more sophisticated than the more familiar
POGAS-A. Another part of the reason he does not recognize
this relation, however, is that his argument is unclear.
Thus in this section of this chapter, I will try to sort
through Gulesarian's argument. I will present two rather
literal interpretations of his argument and argue that each
fails. The first, and most literal, interpretation fails
because Gulesarian's position turns out to be nothing new.
It is simply the traditional problem of evil and hence is
subject to all of the usual responses as, for instance, the
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free will defense. The second interpretation fails be-
cause one of his crucial assumptions is false. After
rejecting these first two interpretations, I suggest a
third, counterfactual interpretation of Gulesarian's argu-
ment. This third interpretation, I argue, is simply a
version of POGAS-B.
Gulesar ian says that four relatively intuitive pre-
mises are inconsistent. He states them as follows 15 :
(1) Necessarily, there is something that is omni-
scient, omnipotent and morally perfect.
(2) Necessarily, for every world W and every being x,if W is actual and x is omniscient, omnipotent, and
morally perfect, then x allows W to be actual.
(3) Necessarily, for every W and every x, if x is
omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect and x al-
lows W to be actual, then it is morally permissible
for x to allow W to be actual.
(4) There is a possible world W such that necessari-
ly, for every x, if x is omniscient, omnipotent, and
morally perfect, then it is not morally permissible
for x to allow W to be actual.
From (1) - (4) Gulesarian hopes to show that there is a
world, w, such that it is both morally permissible and not
morally permissible for an essentially omniscient, omni-
potent, and morally perfect being to allow w to be actual.
The argument is not, however, as clear cut as Gulesar-
ian seems to think it is. In particular, it is not clear
just what he means by 'actual' in his premises. Consider
first a very literal interpretation of his premises. Where
' 0 x j ' means 'x is omnipotent in world j', 'Kxj' means 'x is
omniscient in world j' and ' M x j ' means 'x is morally per-
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feet in j' (1) can be symbolized as follows:
(la) (i) (Ex) (Oxi & (Kxi & Mxi)).
(la) is a principle that an Anselmian would be comfortable
with. Where
’ A
j
’ means ’j is actual' and 'Lxj' means 'x
allows j to be actual' (2) can be symbolized as:
(2a) (l) ( j) (x) ( (Aj & ( Ox j & (Kxj & Mx j ) ) ) => Lx j ) .
It should be noted that (2a) does not seem to depend on
talking about an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect
being. If a world is actual and something exists in that
world, it allows that world to be actual. For instance,
the actual world is actual and I exist in it so it follows
that I allow it to exist. (2a) is an uncontrover sial
premise. Where Pxj' means 'It is morally permissible for
x to allow j to be actual ' ^ (3) can be symbolized as
follows
:
(3a) (i)( j)(x)((Oxj & (Kxj & (Hxj & Lxj))) 2) Pxj).
(3a) is more interesting than (2a). It is also true that
if I allow a world to be actual, it is morally permissible
for me to allow it to be actual. However, it is morally
permissible for me because I am powerless to prevent it.
Thus an instance of (3a) is trivially true of me. The
situation is different with regard to an omnipotent, omni-
scient, morally perfect being. Since it is omnipotent
presumably it could prevent a world from becoming actual.
Thus allowing a world to be actual is a morally significant
act for an omnipotent being. So (3a) is not a trivial
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claim. Finally (4) can be symbolized as:
(4a) (Ei)(j)( x ){[Oxi & (Kxi & M x i ) ] ^ Pxi}.
Gulesanan wants to derive a contradiction from (1) -
(4). It seems, however, that he will be unable to do so.
Suppose we consider a world, w^ which is such that it is
not morally permissible for an omnipotent, omniscient,
morally perfect being to allow it to be actual. That is,
(5) (j)( x ) {[Oxw
x & (Kxw x & Mxwj)] 3 -px Wl }.
Trom instances of (1) and (5) we can infer
(6) Pgw^
where g is a constant referring to an omnipotent, omni-
scient and morally perfect being. Perhaps Gulesarian hopes
to infer from (la), (2a), and (3a) that
(7) P g w
^
is true. This, however, he cannot do without raising
serious problems. From (2a) and (3a) we can infer
(8) {Aw-^ & [Ogw-^ & (Kgw-^ & Mgw
i ) ] }
D Lg w
^
.
Gulesarian wants to infer the consequent of (8) because if
he does so he can easily infer (7) from it and an instance
of (3). But to derive the consequent of (8) he must claim
that
(9) Aw
:
is true. But (9) just says that w^ is the actual world.
If (9) is not true, then Gulesarian cannot derive (7) and
hence cannot derive a contradiction. His argument, on this
interpretation, depends on the claim that the actual world
is a world such that necessarily it is not morally permis-
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sible for an omnipotent, omniscient, moraly perfect being
to allow it to be actual. But that claim is simply the
traditional problem of evil.
On this first interpretation, then, Gulesarian needs
to claim not only that there is a world such that no omni-
potent, omniscient, morally perfect being would be permit-
ted to let it be actual but also that the actual world is
just such a world. Many traditional defenders of (1) would
reject the implicit assumption that (9) is true. One would
expect a standard free will defense against this version of
the argument. So the first interpretation of Gulesarian
fails
.
Gulesarian, I think, would also reject the first in-
terpretation and its implicit assumption that (9) is true.
He does not want to include the actual world among those
which an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being
would be morally prohibited from actualizing. Gulesarian
suggests that amoral worlds — that is, worlds devoid of
free moral agents — which are on the whole more evil than
good are the sort that an omnipotent, omniscient, morally
perfect being would be morally prohibited from actualizing.
Consider, then, a second interpretation. The second
interpretation makes use of the claim that every possible
world is actual relative to itself. That is, every world w
is such that _w i s actual is true in w. Where ' A i j ' means
'i is actual relative to j ' or ' i is actual in j ' we can
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express this claim as
(10) (i)Aii.
We also claim that a world is only actual relative to
itself. The second interpretation of Gulesarian continues
as follows. The first premise remains the same, that is,
(la). Where 'Lxij' means ' x allows i to b actual relative
to j’ the second premise reads:
(2b) (i)(j)(x)
{ [Aji & ( Ox j & (Kxj & Mx j ) ) ] Lx j i } .
Where 'Pxij' means 'it is morally permissible for x to
allow 1 to be actual relative to j' the third premise is:
(3b) (i)(j)(x){[ Lx j i & ( Ox j & (Kxj & Mx j ) ) ] 3 Px j i )
.
The fourth premise now reads:
(4b) (Ei) ( j)
(
x ) { [Oxi & (Kxi & Mxi ) ] Z> ~Pxij}.
Choosing an arbitrary world, w
2 , we can infer from (4b)
that
(11) (j)( x ){[ Ox
w
9 & ( Kxw 9 & Mxw 2 ) ] ^ Pxwoj).
From (la) we can infer that there is a being, d, in w 0
which is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. That
is, we can infer that
(12) 0dw 2 & (Kdw 2 & Mdw 2 )
is true. From (11) and (12) we can infer
(13) Pdw 2 w 2 .
In order to derive the contradictory of (13) we need
(14) Aw 2 w 2 .
But (14) clearly follows from (10). Every world is actual
relative to itself. From (12), (14) and (2b) we can infer
(15) Ldw 2 w 2 .
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And from (12), (15), and (3b) we can Infer
(16) Pdw2W2.
Thus (la), (2b), (3b), (4b) and (10) are inconsistent.
This interpretation, however, is no more successful
than the first interpretation of the argument. This inter-
pretation fails because (4b) is false. Since it is a
necessary truth that every world is actual relative to
itself, even an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect
being cannot control which worlds are actual relative to
themselves. Since for every possible world an omnipotent,
omnscient, morally perfect being cannot prevent it from
being actual relative to itself, it is morally permissible
for that being to allow those worlds to be actual relative
to themselves. So (4b) is false and the second interpreta-
tion is unsound
.
A third interpretation of Gulesarian's position is a
counterf actual one. Perhaps Gulesarian is arguing that for
any world w if an omnipotent, omniscient morally perfect
being were to allow w to be actual, then it would be moral-
ly permissible for that being to allow w to be actual.
But, he maintains, there is at least one world, w', such
that it would not be morally permissible for an omnipotent,
omniscient, morally perfect being to allow w' to be actual.
Cou n t e r f a c t ua 1 claims are notoriously difficult to
evaluate, but the work of Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis
has made such evaluations easier^
. Both Stalnaker and
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Lewis use possible worlds to evaluate counter f actuals
.
According to Stalnaker possible worlds are ordered with
regard to their similarity to a base world. The ordering
will vary according to which world one takes to be the base
world. If the actual world is the base world, then there
is an ordering of possible worlds based on their similarity
to the actual world. A counterf actual conditional is true
in the actual world if the nearest world (that is, the
world most similar to the actual world) in which the ante-
cedent of the counterfactual is true is such that the
consequent of the counterfactual is also true. If the
nearest world in which the antecedent is true is such that
the consequent is false, then the counterfactual is false.
In order to evaluate a counterfactual interpretation
of Gulesar ian ' s argument we need to specify what counter-
factual situation Gulesarian has in mind. That is, we need
to state carefully Gulesarian ' s argument using counterf ac-
tuals . The first premise will remain the same — that is,
(la). The second premise is:
(2c) ( i ) ( x ) { [ Oxi & (Kxi & Mxi)]^[Ai > Lxi]}
where > is a connective indicating a counterfactual con-
ditional. So (2c) reads, "For any world i and object x, if
x is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect in i, then
if i were actual, then w would allow i to be actual."
(2c), like (2a), is not dependent upon reference to an
omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. It is true
of any object in any world that if that world were actual,
32
then that object would allow that world to be actual. The
third premise of the counter factual interpretation is:
(3c) ( i ) ( x ) { [ Oxi & (Kxi & Mxi)]r>[Lxi > Pxi]}.
(3c) reads, "For any world i and object x, if x is omnipo-
tent, omniscient and morally perfect in i, than if x were
to allow i to be actual, then it would be permissible for x
to allow i to be actual." Like (3a), (3c) should be under-
stood as a significant moral claim. Whereas it would be
permissible for me to allow a world to be actual because I
cannot (in general) prevent worlds from becoming actual, an
omnipotent being can prevent any world from becoming ac-
tual, so it is a morally significant claim that is made in
(3c). The fourth premise is:
(4c) ( Ei ) ( x ) { [Oxi & (Kxi & Mxi)]o[Ai > ~Pxi ]
)
(4c) reads There is a world i such that for any object x,
if x is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect in i,
then if i were actual, it would not be morally permissible
for x to allow i to be actual."
From (la), (2c), (3c) and (4c) it is easy to derive a
contradiction. From (la) and (4c) we can derive
(17) Pawj
where (17) reads "It would not be permissible for a being a
to allow wj to be actual." And from (la), (2c) and (3c) we
can derive
(18) Paw
^
where (18) reads "It would be permissible for a being a to
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allow
»; to be actual." We should note that we also know
from (la) that
(19) Oawj & (Kaw
1 & Maw 1 )
is true. So we have shown that there is a world w
}
such
that it both is and is not morally permisible for an omni-
potent, omniscient and morally perfect being to allow it to
be actual.
It is not clear, however, that the counter factual
interpretation of Gulesarian's argument is sound. In par-
ticular (4c) is dubious. Gulesarian recognizes that a
theist might object to the claim that there is a world such
that if it were actual, then it would not be morally per-
missible for an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect
being to allow it to exist. So, he argues that (4c) is in
fact plausible.
In order to discuss Gulesarian's argument for (4c), we
need to introduce a notion that he discusses. A world w is
amo r a 1 just in case no free creatures exist in w. It is
important to note that there can be free beings i n an
amoral world as long as they are not created. So amoral
worlds are compatible with the existence of God, since God
is not a creature. Gulesarian then states the first pre-
mise of his argument for (4c), "It is reasonable to hold:
(Cl) if a n amoral world i s more evil than good
,
then neces-
sarily it is morally impermissible for any [omnipotent,
omniscient, morally perfect] being to allow it to be ac-
tual." Given our counter fac tual interpretation of his
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argument, (Cl) can be stated more precisely as
(20) For any world w, if w is amoral and more evilhan good then for any omnipotent, omniscient moral-ly perfect being b which exists in w, if w wer ; ”cuai, then it would not be morally permissible for bto allow w to be actual.
or
~Pxi)] }
){(F1 & E±):> (x)[((0xi & Kxi ) & Mxi ) ) ^ (Ai >
where 'Fi' means 'i is an amoral world' and 'Ei' means 'i
is more evil than good.' Gulesarian claims that (20) is
reasonable." There is, however, an argument that one can
give in support of it. Namely, one can use an argument
that is normally used in stating the traditional problem of
evil. Necessarily, if a being is omniscient it will know
about all the evil that occurs in a world; necessarily, if
it is omnipotent, it will be able to stop the evil from
occuring; and necessarily if it is morally perfect, it will
want to prevent any evil that it can properly prevent. A
being b properly prevents some evil e from occurring if and
only if in preventing e, b does not prevent a greater good
from occurring or cause a greater evil to occur. Further-
more, necessarily, if a being knows an event could occur,
is able to prevent it, and wants to prevent it, then it
will prevent that event from occuring. So, necessarily an
omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being will prevent
any evil from occurring that it can properly prevent. To
the traditional problem of evil, the theist responds that
it is possible that there is some evil which an omniscient,
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omnipotent, morally perfect being cannot properly prevent.
For possibly evil is the result of the free actions of
creatures with free will. This response is the heart of
the free will defense. The free will defense, however,
does not apply to the argument for (20). (20) stipulates
that we are discussing amoral worlds -- that is, worlds
which do not contain free, conscious creatures. So it is
not possible that the evil in these worlds is caused by the
free actions of free creatures. Thus for any amoral world
w and any omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being b,
b will properly prevent all evil in w. This argument
supposes that the evil in an amoral world is properly
preventable, but such an assumption is uncontrover sial
.
The second premise in Gulesarian's argument is that
there is an amoral world which is more evil than good. He
writes :
...Think of a world, we will call it [beta], in which
the only sentient beings whose existence is contingent
are nonrational animals of various sorts — or are
sentient beings a good deal like the higher nonration-
al animals in our world — all of which suffer long
spontaneous bouts of excruciating pain, and spend the
few hours between bouts barely doing what is necessary
to survive. We can draw the picture as detailed as we
like: in this world, mutations do not take place, so
the species to which these animals belong do not
evolve. Perhaps they exist for an infinite stretch of
time. And during this eternity they never experience
anything we would call pleasure — only relief from
pain. Pain-avoidance and other innate drives would be
the only factors motivating their behavior. Such a
wretched world as [beta] clearly seems to be logically
possible, yet one that no divine being would permit to
become actual. y
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So we can reasonably attribute to Gulesarian the claim:
(21) ( Ei
)
(Fi & Ei).
From (20) and (21) we can infer
(4c) (Ei)(x)([0xi & (Kxi & Mxi)]u[ Ai > ~Pxi]}
Gulesarian argues at some length that (21) is true.
His argument is basically an inductive one. He says that
(22) A rabbit, r 1? is living a miserable life
for instance, seems possible. Furthermore
li ves^
W ° ra bbits, and ^ , are living miserable
also seems possible. So he thinks that
(24) Rabbits r
:
... r (n > 0) are living miserablelives
is also possible. In addition he also thinks
(25) Rabbits r
l ...
r
n
(n > 0) are the only sentient
creatures that exist
is possible. Gulesarian holds that (24) and (25) are
compossible and consequently that
(26) Rabbits r-^ ... r
n
(n > 0) are the only sentient
creatures that exist and they are living miserable
lives
is possible. If (26) is possible, then (21) is probably
true. Gulesarian admits that he does not have a sound
deductive argument for (21). But he holds that considera-
tions like (22) - (26) lend support to (21).
There are at least two responses that the traditional
theist can make regarding Gulesarian ' s contention that (21)
is true. The first is that (21) is false because God's
presence in a world guarantees that that world is more good
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than evil. So while (26) is possible, the world (or
worlds) in which (26) is true are nonetheless more good
than evil. This contention by the traditional theist is
not entirely implausible. Traditionally God not only per-
forms good actions, but his existing is also regarded as an
infinitely good event. The traditional theist can thus
reject (21) because it is impossible that (21) be true, and
consequently he or she can reject (4c).
Gulesar lan claims that a rejection of (4c) is implaus-
ible. He writes, "If the traditional theist rules out that
[beta] is a possible world on the grounds that it is not
morally permissible for an [omnipotent, omniscient, morally
perfect] being to actualize [beta], then he must say that
there are r^o possible amoral worlds that are more evil than
good... Moreover, in denying [(4c)], he is committed to
saying that there is not even one possible world w amoral
err o_t h e r w i s e
,
such that, necessarily, every [omniscient,
omnipotent, morally perfect] being has the moral obligation
to prevent W from being actual... Surely these consequences
are too implausible to be worthy of belief." 20
Gulesarian's argument for (4c) is, however, more com-
plicated than we have thus far indicated. Gulesarian sug-
gests another principle from which (with considerations
like (22) - (26)) (4c) will follow. The principle he
suggests is
( 27
)
If each of the maximum creatable portions of an
amoral world is more evil than good, then necessarily
it is morally impermissible for any omniscient, omni-
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lly Per£eCt bein 8 t0 allow chat world to
(27) makes use of the notion of "maximum creatable por-
tions" of worlds. Gulesar ian defines this notion as fol
lows :
T is a maximum creatable portion of W =df (i) W
^haJ
U
r
e
f Ik
and (ii) W includes the state of affairstn t (if there were an omnipotent x then x would havethe power to weakly cause T, and for every T', if Wincludes T then, if x were to have the power toweakly cause T' then T would include T').**
First of all, we need to note that a state of affairs S
i ncludes a state of affairs S’ just in case necessarily S
obtains only if S' obtains. The relation of inclusion is a
necessary one; that is, if S includes S', then necessarily
S includes S'. The fact that inclusion is a necessary
relation raises some questions about the way that Gulesar-
lan states his definition. At the end he says that "T
would include T'" which is puzzling since either T includes
T or T does not include T'
. Whether or not there is an
omnipotent being cannot influence the logical relations
between states of affairs. Furthermore there are some
problems when one looks at how Gulesarian defines "weakly
causes." He defines it as follows:
x weakly causes T =df
(i) T is an actual state of affairs, and
(ii) not every world includes T, and
(iii) there is a T' such tht x causes T' and if T'
were notactual then T would not be actual
.
In this definition he takes "x causes T' as an undefined
primitive in which he acknowledges that "...we are to
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assume that if x causes T then T is an actual state of
affairs and not every world includes T. He also notes that
Necessarily, if x causes T then x weakly causes T 24
is true. The problem with this definition is that it makes
problematic what he means when he talks about a being
having the the power to weakly cause a state of affairs.
Strictly speaking, a being could only have the power to
actualize a very limited number of states of affairs,
namely those that are actual states of affairs. It seems
that it would be incoherent to claim that a being could
have had the power to actualize the state of affairs the
P-etroil: ^istons the 1986 NBA championship because
that state of affairs is not an actual state of affairs.
The point of these comments is not to say that Gulesarian's
definitions are incorrect but rather that they are poorly
stated
.
Perhaps we can state Gulesarian's insight more clearly
in our own terms. It seems that his expression "weakly
causes is meant to be equivalent to our expression "weakly
actualizes. The first two clauses of his definition are,
I think intended to indicate that an agent can weakly cause
only contingent states of affairs. Necessary states of
affairs are uncaused. The third clause of his definition
indicates that weak causation is causation done through an
intermediate state of affairs; it is indirect. In his
definition of a maximum creatable portion of a world, the
second clause is very difficult to understand. The first
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p t, which reads if there were an omnipotent x then x
would have the power to weakly cause T"
,
is meant simply to
state the relation between omnipotence and maximum creat-
able portions of worlds. He indicates that a necessary
condition of being an omnipotent being is the ability to
weakly actualize the maximum creatable portion of a world.
The second part of clause (ii), which reads "for every T',
if W includes T_|_ then, if x were to have the power to
weakly cause (T then T would include T'
,
is meant to indi-
cate that some contingent states of affairs may not be
included in the maximum creatable portion of a world. For
instance, the state of affairs Reagan ' s freely not running
lor Resident may be a state of affairs that an omnipotent
being cannot weakly actualize. It may be that the counter-
factual conditional "if given the choice, Reagan will free-
ly run for president is true, in which case even an omni-
potent being cannot weakly actualize Reagan '
s
freely not
running for president
. Since Gulesarian is interested
in amoral worlds (that is, worlds without any morally free
creatures) this last consideration is somewhat irrelevant.
For our purposes, then, a maximum creatable portion of a
world w is a state of affairs which includes all the con-
tingent states of affairs in w. Furthermore it seems that
there is only one maximum creatable portion per possible
world and that each maximum creatable portion is included
in exactly one possible world.
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Suppose, then, that there is a world, w, in „ hich (26)
is true. As we indicated eariier, w is more good than evil
because God exists in w. However, the maximum treatable
portion of w, M, seems to be more evil than good. Since the
maximum creatable portion of w contains only contingent
states of affairs, it does not contain the state of affairs
God ex isting
,
which is a necessary (or impossible) state of
affairs. By hypothesis the only relevant moral considera-
tions regarding M are mentioned in (26). So it seems that
M is more evil than good. From (27) and (26) we can infer
( Ac ) .
The situation, then, is that there is a state of
affairs -- the maximum creatable portion o
f
w -- which (4c)
tells us is necessarily not morally permissible for God to
bring about. That is, we have an instance of (B4) from
POGAS B. Since the state of affairs the maximum creatable
portion o_f _w is included in only one possible world and it
is impermissible to bring it about in that world it is
necessarily impermissible to bring it about. Yet, if God
is omnipotent, it is possible that God bring about that
state of affairs. So it is possible that God bring about a
state of affairs which it is not permissible for him to
bring about. That is, it is possible that God perform an
action which is wrong. This, however, conflicts with the
claim that God is necessarily omnibenevolent
. Furthermore
we can note that the first premise of POGAS-B, ( B 1 ) , en-
tails the first premises of Gulesarian ' s argument, (la).
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In addition (2c) is entailed by (B2) for an omnipotent
being is such that if a world were actual, then it would
allow it to be actual, and (3c) is entailed by (B3), since
an Omni benevolent being is such that if it were to allow a
world to be actual it would be morally permitted to do so.
Gulesarian’s puzzle, then, reduces to the more traditional
problem of omnipotence and God's ability to sin.
We should recall that the discussion immediately above
arose out of a response to Gulesarian which claimed that
God s presence in a world assures us that the world is more
good than evil. If one finds unacceptable the claim that
the presence of God in a world guarantees that that world
is more good than evil, we can still show that Gulesarian's
argument is equivalent to POGAS-B. There is a second
response to Gulesarian's claim that (21) is true. (21) is
based on the claim that
(26) Rabbits r^ ... r
n
(n > 0) are the only sentient
creatures that exist and they are living miserable
lives
is possible. (26) is based on the claim that
(24) Rabbits r-^ ... r^ (n > 0) are living miserable
lives
and
(25) Rabbits r-^ ... r
n
(n > 0) are the only sentient
creatures that exist
are compossible. It is not clear, however, that (24) and
(25) are compossible. The traditional theist might hold
that in those worlds in which (24) is true, the misery is
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crea-
caused by the free actions of morally responsible
tures. I am assuming, with Gulesarian, that rabbits are
not morally responsible creatures. If they were, a version
of the free will defense could be used to respond to his
claim that (26) supports (21). So in those world where
(25) is true, God is the only morally responsible being.
(I am assuming that necessarily God is the only uncreated
morally responsible being.) On this view, then, for (26)
to be possible, there must be a world in which God is
responsible for the misery of the rabbits. This again
raises POGAS-B. It seems that if God is omnipotent, then
it possible that he actualize the state of affairs corre-
sponding to (26). But the state of affairs corresponding
to (26) is but another instance of (B4); that is, it is a
state of affairs such that necessarily it is impermissible
for anyone to bring it about. But if God does so, he is
morally responsible for some evil. Once again we can see
the relations between the premises of POGAS-B and Gulesar-
ian s initial premises, and so once again we have a version
of POGAS-B. So either way, Gulesarian' s puzzle reduces to
POGAS-B.
Thus despite some difficulty in interpreting just what
Gulesarian intends, we can see that the modal problem of
evil is a fairly sophisticated presentation of POGAS-B.
Gulesarian wants to claim that there are some states of
affairs — for instance, the maximum creatable portions of
amoral worlds — which are such that necessarily it is
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impermissible for anyone Co bring them about. Yet an
omnipotent can bring them about and hence it is possible
that an omnipotent being do something morally impermis-
sible. This, however, conflicts with essential omnibenevo-
lence. And so we have a conflict between essential omnibe-
nevolence and essential omnibenevolence.
Ill
There is yet another version of POGAS POGAS-C
which we must note. It is presented by Peter Geach in
Providence and Evil and is a temporal version of POGAS.
In order to state Geach's temporal version of POGAS we need
to introduce the concept of temporal necessity. Some
states of affairs, though metaphysically possible, are
temporally necessary. For example, a state of affairs
which obtained in the past is temporally necessary; the
past is unalterable. Similarly, a state of affairs which
presently obtains is unalterable. Furthermore, some future
states of affairs for instance, some of those entailed
by past states of affairs — are inevitable and hence are
temporally necessary. So states of affiars which are ei-
ther unalterable or inevitable are temporally necessary.
These states of affairs may not be metaphysically neces-
sary, but they are, in Geach's terms, "unpreventable .
"
We can now proceed to Geach's argument. He writes:
If God has promised that Israel shall be saved, then
there is nothing that anybody, even God, can do about
that; this past state of affairs is now unpreventable.
But it is also necessary in the same way that if God
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has promised then he will perform; God cannot doanything about that either - cannot make himself
Necessarily
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We can state his argument as follows.
It
,
ls temporally necessary that God promises tong about the state of affairs Israel ' s being saved
(C2) It is temporally necessary that if God promisesto bring about a state of affairs S, then S will
obtain at some time.
( C3 ) Therefore
,
it is temporally necessary that Is-
r
-
a e ^
—
-
being saved obtain at some time.
(Cl) is true because God's promising to save Israel occur-
red in the past and is hence temporally necessary. In
defending (C2) we see that Geach’s argument is a version of
POGAS
.
One might defend ( C 2 ) by an appeal to the following
principle
:
(G) If any person P promises to bring about a state of
affairs S, then P must bring about S.
The modal term must in (G) is ambiguous, allowing for at
least three readings. Two readings of (G)
(Gl) It is metaphysically necessary that if P promises
to bring about S, then P will bring about S
and
( G 2 ) It is temporally necessary that if P promises to
bring about S, then P will bring about S
are clearly false. While (G2), and presumably (Gl), would
with an additional, trivial premise like
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the^ ^obtains'at sLe
^ S at S °" a
entail (C2), neither is of any use to the defender of
Geach. Obviously (Gl) and (G2) are both false because it
is possible to break promises. A third reading of (G) is,
however, more useful; the term "must" is read as indicating
a moral obligation; so we have
^
pro
^
ises to bring about S, then P is morallyobligated to bring about S. y
In fact, Geach seems to think that (G3) is necessarily
true, that it is essential to promising that one has a
moral obligation to keep one's promises. Furthermore,
from our definition of omni benevolence
,
we know that if a
person is omnibenevolent
,
he or she never violates any of
his or her moral obligations. That is, in more precise,
albeit somewhat pedantic terms:
(C5) It is metaphysically necessary that if a person Pis omnibenevolent, then it is temporally necessary
that if P is morally obligated to bring about a state
of affairs S, then P brings about S at some time.
From the supposition that necessarily God is omnibenevolent
and ( C 5 ) we can infer
( C 6 ) It is temporally necessary that if God is morally
obligated to bring about a state of affairs S, then
God brings about S at some time.
From ( C 4 ) and (C6) we can infer, by hypothetical syllogism
(C7) It is temporally necessary that if God is moral-
ly obligated to bring about a state of affairs S, then
S obtains at some time.
From ( C 7 ) and (G3) we can infer (C2) again by hypothetical
syllogism. We can see then that omnibenevole
tial to the defense of (C2).
nee is essen-
(C3) clearly follows from (Cl) and (C2). (C2), howev-
er, indicates that the state of affairs Israel's being
~ V6d 1S " 0t ° pe " t0 God
' 1 srael
’ s being saved is inevi-
table. But, Geach holds, according to the standard concep-
tion every metaphysically possible state of affairs is open
to an omnipotent being. So Israel's not being saved is
open to God. And thus we have a contradiction.
It seems, then, that given the definitions that we
have developed of omnipotence and omnibenevolence -- D1.4
and D 1
. 9 respectively — a problem does arise regarding the
consistency of those two perfections. The problem,
however, is not a simple as Pike seems to suggest. In
fact we showed that Pike's version of the problem is not a
genuine problem. Rather the problem arises if one holds
that there are some states of affairs such that necessarily
it is morally wrong for anyone to bring them about.
Premise (B4) of POGAS-B is required for the logical problem
of omnipotence and God s ability to sin to arise. It is to
something like (B4) that Gulesarian implicitly appeals in
his modal problem of evil. We also noted that there is a
third version of POGAS which arises; this third problem is
a temporal problem. The primary focus of the rest of this
essay will be on POGAS-B; however, we will on occasion take
note of POGAS-C.
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CHAPTER II
PIKE'S RESPONSE
In "Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin" Nelson Pike
offers a version of POGAS which is, in some ways similar to
POGAS-A. He also offers a response to his version of the
problem. in this chapter we will, first, explicate Pike's
version of the argument. We will also show that the prob-
lem does not arise the way Pike thinks it does. Then,
returning to POGAS-B, we will consider Pike's proposed
solution. We will argue that it does not solve POGAS-B.
Thirdly, we will note an assumption that Pike makes which
does solve the problem, but which is incompatible with much
of the western theological tradition. Finally, we will
discuss a recent attempt by W. R. Carter to show that Pike
is committed to something like POGAS-A or POGAS-B.
I
Pike restates the problem of omnipotence and God's
ability to sin more carefully in the following passage:
We can now formulate the problem under discussion in
this paper more rigorously than above. God is omnipo-
tent. When read hypothetically, this statement formu-
lates a necessary truth. On the analysis of 'omnipo-
tent' with which we are working, it follows that God
(if He exists) can bring about any consistently de-
scribable state of affairs. However, God is perfectly
good. Again, when read hypothetically, this statement
formulates a necessary truth. Further, an individual
would not qualify as perfectly good if he were to act
in a morally reprehensible way. Thus, the statement
'God acts in a morally reprehensible way' is logically
incoherent. This is to say that 'God sins' is a
logical contradiction. Hence, some consistently de-
scribable states of affairs are such that God (being
perfectly good) could not bring them about. The prob-
lem, then, is this: If God is both omnipotent and
th
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As in our discussion in Chapter I of POGAS-A we can see
that Pike s version of the problem is inadequate because he
fails to distinguish between being able to bring about a
state of affairs and in fact bringing about a state of
affairs. Pike uses two premises that we used in Chapter I,
name 1 y ,
(A2) Necessarily, if anything is God,
omnipotent then it is
and
(A3) Necessarily, if anything is God, then it is
morally perfect
.
Following from his concept of omnipotence Pike notes that
(1) Necessarily, if anything is God, then it canbring about any logically possible state of affairs
or
(1) (i)(x)(y)(Gxi ^ (Syi ^ Bxyi))
is true. From his concept of moral perfection he notes
that
(2) Necessarily, any agent who brings about a state
of affairs which it is not morally permissible to
bring about is not morally perfect
or
(2) ( i ) ( x ) ( y ) ( ( ( Sy
i
& Axyi) & Pxyi) Mxi)
(It is not clear that Pike thinks that (2) follows from his
concept of moral perfection; he may regard it as an addi-
tional premise. But it is easy to show that (2) follows
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from ( D 1 . 9 ) . ) In the quotation above, Pike uses the ex-
pression "acts in a morally reprehensible way." The most
natural understanding of acting in a morally reprehensible
way is that one brings about a state of affairs that it is
not morally permissible to bring about. It is plausible, I
believe, to in interpret Pike as holding that acting in a
morally reprehensible way involves something like
(A4) There is some state of affairs S such that it isnot permissible for anyone to bring about S
which appeared in Chapter I. From ( A4) and (2) it seems
that Pike concludes
(3) There is some state of affairs that God cannotbring
. about
o r
(3) ( Ex ) ( y ) ( Sxd & (GydD ~Bxyd))
is true where
'
d
' is a constant designating the actual
world. (3) is clearly inconsistent with (1). So, if this
version of the problem is correct, the ordinary concept of
God is inconsistent.
It is clear, however, that this version of the problem
is incorrect; (A4) and (2) do not yield (3). (2) involves
only those states of affairs an agent does in fact bring
about. Similarly, (D1.9) (our definition of omnibenevo-
lence) only involves those states of affairs which an
agent in fact brings about. So from (A2), (A4) and (2) all
that we can infer is
(
3
'
)
There is some morally impermissible state of
affairs that God can bring about, but does not bring
about
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or
( 3 ') (Ex)(y)((Sxd S ~Myxd ) & [Gyd (Byxd & ’Ayxd)])
SO it seems clear that this version of the problem does not
yield the conclusion that the ordinary conception of God is
inconsistent
.
If my interpretation of Pike is correct, then no
solution is necessary since no contradiction has been gene-
rated. In a curious sort of way, this is basically the
conclusion that Pike also reaches. Pike writes of the
problem that it "...appears to be sophistical. We are
tempted to dismiss it with a single comment, viz., it
involves an equivocation on the modal element in the state-
ment 'God can (cannot) sin.' In the long run, I think (and
shall try to show) that this single remark is correct ." 2
The equivocation on the modal term, according to Pike, is
between can' understood as metaphysical possibility and
’can' understood as 'can bring oneself to do something'.
In Pike s scheme, there are three relevant senses of 'can'.
The first, can^
' ,
is the 'can' of metaphysical possibili-
ty. The second, can2 1
,
is the 'can' of ability, or 'can
do
. The third, 'can-}', is the 'can' of disposition. A
squeamish person may be such that he canj touch a snake; he
can2 touch a snake; but he can-} not touch a snake. In
Pike's language, he cannot bring himself to touch a snake.
He is strongly disposed not to touch snakes. This is
similar to our solution to Pike's version of the problem in
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that
' can
3
' tells us about what in fact occurs. It is
consistent with (3'
)
to claim
(3 ) There is a state of affairs S such that Cnrican
3 not bring about S. God
Pike's solution is different enough from our solution,
however, to show that he sees the problem differently from
the way we see it. In fact, Pike seems to see the problem
as a de re- d_e dict^ problem. Briefly, it seems that Pike
thinks that
(4) God cannot sin (or God cannot be not morallyperfect) y
can be interpreted in three ways. First there is a de
d ic t o reading
(4a) Necessarily whoever is God is omnibenevolent
o r
(4a ) ( i ) ( x ) ( Gxi 3 Mxi ) .
Pike thinks (4a) is true. A second reading is a de re
reading
:
(4b) Whoever is God is necessarily omnibenevolent
or
(4b) ( x ) ( Gxd 3 (i)Mxi).
Pike thinks that (4b) is false. It is possible for an
omnipotent being (for instance whoever is God) to bring
about an evil state of affairs. So an omnipotent being
will not be essentially omnibenevolent. A third reading is
(4c) Yahweh cannot bring himself to sin.
Pike thinks that (4c) is true and that it is probably the
claim theists want to assert in (4). His solution to the
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to reject (4b). He
problem is to hold (4a) and (4c) but
'ms that God is not necessarily omni bene volen t in the de
re sense of that claim. It is metaphysically possible that
the being which is God (i.e. Yahweh) sin. Pike's claim is
simply that Yahweh does not sin and that Yahweh's character
prevents him from sinning. There are, however, possible
worlds in which Yahweh does sin.
The question which then arises for us is whether or
not Pike's solution will help to solve POGAS-B. I think we
can see clearly that Pike's third sense of 'can'
--can^
does not help. That is, Pike holds that
(4c) Yahweh cannot bring himself to sin
is the claim that the theist intends when he or she asserts
that God cannot sin. Presumably, however, this is a cha-
racteristic like omnipotence or omniscience— of whoever is
God . That i s
,
(5) Necessarily, whoever is God cannot bring himself
to sin
or
(5) ( i ) ( x ) ( Ey ) ( ( Gxi & ~Pxyi) ^>~Txyi)
is true, where 'Txyi' means 'x can bring himself to do y in
world i'. From an instantiation of
(Al) Something is necessarily God
o r
(Al) ( Ex ) ( i )Gxi
and (5) we can infer the de re claim
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o r
(6) There is someone such thatbring himself to sin
necessarily
,
he cannot
(6) (Ex)(i)(( y )( Pxyi ~Txy i ) )
We have not discussed in any detail the
able to bring oneself to do something,
seems to be clear:
notion of being
This much, however
5
( 7 ) Necessarily
,
if
of affairs S, then P
bring about S
a person P brings about a state
can bring himself or herself to
o r
(7) ( i ) ( x ) ( y ) ( Ax y i Txyi) .
From an instantiation of (B4) - the claim that some states
of affairs for instance, someone's torturing babies
, are
such that necessarily it is impermissible for anyone to
bring them about -- (7), and an instantiation of (6), we
can infer
(8) Necessarily, Yahweh does not torture babies
o r
(8) (i) Agti.
where ’ g ’ is a constant referring to Yahweh and ’ t ’ is a
constant referring to the state of affairs someone 1 s tor-
turing babies
. But from an instantiation of (Al) and (A2)
and our definition of omnipotence, D1.4, we can infer
(9) Possibly, Yahweh does torture babies
o r
(9) (Ei)Agti
.
(8) and (9) clearly contradict one another. Thus it seems
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that Pike's distinction does not help to solve POGAS-B. We
Still end up with an inconsistency.
Immediately, we can see where the problem arises. The
first premise of the puzzle as stated in Chapter I is the
de re claim
(Al) Something is necessarily God.
From (Al) and (4a) we can derive the additional de re claim
(10) Something is necessarily omnibenevolent
o r
(10) (Ex ) ( i ) Oxi
.
(10) is incompatible with Pike's solution. Essential to
Pike s solution, then, is that he reject (Al). Pike does,
in fact, consciously reject (Al). He writes that one of
his assumptions is that "... any individual who occupies
the position or who has the value-status indicated by the
term 'God' might not (logically) have held that position
or had that status." 3
It is clear that Pike's rejection of (Al) is the key
to the solution of the problem of omnibenevolence and God's
ability to sin. As we have noted, from (Al) and (A3) (or
(4a)) we can derive the de re claim, (10), which Pike says
is false. To reject (Al), however, is to fall outside of
much of the tradition of western theology. We gain an
important insight, then, by examining Pike's solution,
namely, that the problem of omnipotence and God's ability
to sin arises only in those theological traditions — like
the Anselmian tradition — which hold that God exists
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necessarily and has all of his great-caking attributes
essentially
.
II
W. R. Carter has recently claimed that the theist
cannot rationally reject (Al) and, consequently, Pike's
solution is inadequate/ Carter's claim is that the pro-
perties traditionally included in the concept of God entail
that whoever is God is essentially God and exists necessar-
ily. That is, that (Al) is true. Carter's claim, if
correct, is a significant one. For it shows that (Al) is
more than an assumption on the part of the traditional
theist. Carter's claim shows (Al) follows from the tradi-
tional understanding of the concept of God. His claim also
seems to show that the traditional concept of God is con-
tradictory. Thus if Carter is correct the traditional
concept of God may be incoherent.
In order to see clearly how Carter proceeds we need to
further refine the way we predicate properties of objects.
In particular, we must add temporal indices to the proper-
ties. Until now we have simply predicated a property of an
object at a world. For instance, Yahwe h i s omnipotent i
n
w^
,
where w-^ is a world. To understand Carter's argument
properly we need to add a temporal index; for instance,
Ya h we h i s omnipotent a t _t
^
i n w^
,
where t is a time and w^
a world. Carter's argument is a reductio . Initially he
grants Pike's rejection of (Al). That is he suggests that
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we suppose that
(11) It is not the case that thereis necessarily always God
i s something which
or
(11) ( Ex ) ( i ) ( t ) Gx t
i
is true. From (11) we can easily infer
ilways^od
3 " 0t thS that necessar ily Yahweh is
or
(12) (i)(t)Gjti.
From (12) we can infer
(13) It is possible that Yahweh is not always God
o r
(13) (Ei)~( t )Gjti.
Carter notes that Pike must accept (13); to reject (13) is
to claim that Yahweh is necessarily God. From (13) we know
that there is some possible world in which Yahweh is not
God. Carter asks that we consider such a world. He re-
minds us that on Pike's account bringing about a morally
impermissible state of affairs is enough to disqualify a
being from being God. That is,
(14) Anytime any being sins it is not God at that time
or
(14) ( i ) ( t ) ( x ) ( y ) { ( Axy ti & Pxyti)z> ~Gxti).
Carter then asks us to consider a world in which a being
ceases to be God because it sins. That is, Carter suggests
that we consider a world in which the following claim is
tr ue :
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or
(15) At 1
1
Yahweh is God and
Yahweh sins in w^
at a later time, t
2 ’
05) (Gjtjwj 4 (Ex) [ (t
L <
t 2 4 Ajxt 2w 1 ) 4 ‘Pjxt-jw,]}.
From (14) and (15) we know that
(16) At t
2 Yahweh is not God in
or
(16) G j 1 2 w ^
is true. Carter continues his argument by appealing to
other properties traditionally regarded as part of the
concept of God, namely, omniscience and omnipotence. If
Yahweh will sin at t
2 , then since Yahweh is omniscient at
fc
l
Yahweh knows at t
l
that he will sin at t
2 . But if one
knows that one will sin in the future and one is capable of
preventing the prohibited action (of which Yahweh, being
omnipotent, is capable) and one does not prevent that
action, then one sins at the earlier time. Carter writes,
"One surely is guilty of some sort of moral failing in the
event that one realizes one is about to act maliciously
(say)
,
it is within one s power not to so act, and yet one
proceeds to act maliciously." ^
Perhaps an example would be helpful here. Suppose
General Augusto Pinochet sends out orders to arrest a
Catholic priest working among the peasants of Chile. Pino-
chet knows that when the priest is arrested he will be sent
to prison; and that he, Pinochet, will go to the prison and
personally supervise the brutal torture of the priest.
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Moreover, Pinochet knows that such torture is wrong; he is,
however, so consumed by hatred for the priest that he will
go ahead and torture the man. If Pinochet were somehow
externally compelled to torture the priest, we might be
reluctant to hold him morally responsible for the torture.
Furthermore, in these circumstances, we would not say that
he is now evil because of something which he will do over
which he has no control. But since he is the national
leader he is capable of preventing the torture of the
priest. Since he knows it will happen and he does not
prevent it from happening, we would regard him as now being
evil. His j_n tention is itself morally reprehensible.
Carter, then, is endorsing the following principle:
(C) For any being B, state of affairs S and times t
and t such that t is prior to t', if (i) B brings
about S at t’, (ii) it is not morally permissible for
B to bring about S at t
' ,
(iii) at t, B knows that he
will bring about S at t* and that it is not morally
permissible for B to bring about S at t', (iv) at t, B
is able to prevent B's bringing about S at t' and (v)
B does not prevent B's bringing about S at t', then B
is morally reprehensible at t.
By hypothesis, the first two conditions of (C) are fulfill-
ed, since Yahweh is God at t-^
,
he is both omniscient and
omnipotent at t^ and hence clauses (iii) and (iv) of (C)
are fulfilled. Again by hypothesis, clause (v) is fulfill-
ed. So by principle (C) Yahweh is morally reprehensible at
1
2
and so
(17) Yahweh is not God at t^ in w^
or
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(17) Ggt^w-^
is true. (An addrtional assumption here is that since
Yahweh is morally reprehensible at t^ he is not morally
perfect at tj.) (17) clearly conflicts with our assumption
(14) that Yahweh is God at tj. Furthermore since tj is an
arbitrary time prior to t 2> we know that at all times prior
to t 2 Yahweh is morally reprehensible and is not God at any
time prior to t 2 . Since (17) and (14) contradict one
another Carter concludes that "...Pike's thesis that the
requisites for the divine office are consistent should be
rejected." ^
There are a number of ways that one might respond to
Carter's claim that Pike's solution to POGAS is inadequate
(or perhaps more appropriately, that Pike's solution is
irrelevant). One line of attack might focus on principle
(C). For instance, if one stands in the utilitarian tradi-
tion, it is not at all clear that (C) is true. The act of
intending to do some evil might, in some cases, be morally
acceptable because then one's evil deed has fewer evil side
effects than performing the deed unintentionally. (C),
however, does have a certain plausibility, especially in
the Christian tradition. Thus I will leave (C) unchalleng-
One reason that one can leave (C) unchallenged is that
there is a decisive objection which can be raised against
Carter's argument that the nature of God is internally
inconsistent. Although there is a relatively interesting
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conclusion which one can draw from Carter's argument, the
conclusion which he draws is much too sweeping. The con-
clusion which one ought to draw from Carter’s argument is
that a claim like (15) is impossible. It is impossible
that a being be God at one time and cease to be God at a
later time as a result of moral failing. Omm bene volence
is a property that a being can have at one time and lose at
a later time through a moral failing. Similarly omnisci-
ence is a property a being can have at one time and lose at
a later time through an epistemic failing. There are many
properties like this and we could call them temporally
-
U
-
nStable Properties. 8 Carter has shown only that being God
is not a temporally unstable property. Rather it is what
we can call a temporally stable property. A temporally
stable property P is a property such that if there is a
time t such that an object o has P at t, then for any time
t
f later than t, if o exists at t', then o has P at t'.
There are, of course, many temporally stable properties;
for instance, having visited Disneyland in 1972 and being
_t
I*
P
first human t o walk o n the moon
. What Carter's argu-
ment shows, then, is that if Yahweh is at some time God,
then Yahweh is God forever. His argument does not show
that (Al) follows from the tradtional concept of God.
Carter's claim is too strong.
We have seen that Pike's proposed solution to POGAS is
unsuccessful. The notion of being unable to bring oneself
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do something is an interesting notion; but if one holds
that (Al) is correct, POGAS-B is not solved. It is clear
that one way to solve POGAS-B and POGAS-C is to deny (Al),
deny that there is someone who is necessarily God. If
one denies (Al), then there is no need for any further
solution for there is no problem. However Pike's noting
that God may be unable to bring himself to sin is helpful
one for understanding how it is that God is trustworthy
because he is sinless. Finally we noted that Carter's
argument that the traditional theist is logical compelled
to accept (Al) is flawed. Hence one possible solution to
POGAS-B and POGAS-C is to deny (Al). However, many theists
have wanted to maintain that (Al) is correct. In the rest
of this essay we will examine solutions to POGAS-B and
POGAS-C which do not call (Al) into question.
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CHAPTER III
THE RADICAL OMNIPOTENCE RESPONSE
Most responses to POGAS-B have involved revising our
definition of omnipotence. We will examine three approach-
es to omnipotence that are taken. The first approach I
will call the radical omnipotence theory. This theory has
been held by some philosophers, but, so far as I know, none
of them have specifically addressed POGAS-B. The second
type of approach I will call Thomist solutions. These
types of solutions involve arguing that certain states of
affairs are impossible and hence are not the sort of thing
that one can expect even an omnipotent being to bring
about. I will discuss two of these proposals in Chapter
IV. The third type of approach I will call Anselmian
solutions. These approaches all genuinely modify our un-
derstanding of omnipotence. They argue that there are some
things that an omnipotent being cannot do because it is
perfect. I will discuss three of these solutions in Chap-
ter V.
In Chapter I we noted that the most commonly held
definition of omnipotence is
D1.4. x is omnipotent =df for any state of affairs S,
if S is possible, then x can bring about S.
We then made use of D1.4 in developing POGAS-B and POGAS-C.
One possible response to POGAS-B and POGAS-C is to argue
that D 1 . 4 is too restrictive; that D1.4 places unwarranted
restrictions on an omnipotent being. In this section.
then, we will consider an unrestricted definition of omni-
potence and discuss whether or not it will help to solve
POGAS-B and POGAS-C.
Very few philosophers or theologians have adopted an
unrestricted definition of omnipotence, but many philoso-
phically unsophisticated thinkers do adopt such defini-
tions. Occasionally, however, sophisticated theologians
and philosophers do adopt such a definition, and perhaps
the two most famous examples are Descartes and Martin
Luther. Descartes, for instance, writes in a letter to
Mersenne, "The mathematical truths which you call eternal
have been laid down by God and depend on him entirely no
less than the rest of His creatures. Indeed to say that
these truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if
here were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject him to the Styx
and the Fates. Please do not hesitate to assert and pro-
claim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these
laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his king-
dom. 1 Descartes seems to be arguing that there are no
limits to what God can do; God is not bound by metaphysical
2necessity."- One might understand Descartes' claim as
D2
. 1 . x is omnipotent =df For any state of affairs
S, x can bring about S.
On the surface D2.1 does not seem to help at all in
solving POGAS-B and POGAS-C. For if D 1 . 4 yields a problem,
surely D2.1 will also yield a problem since anything an
omnipotent being can bring about under D1.4 can also be
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brought about under D2.1.
There is, however, a solution which suggests itself to
us after we reflect on D2.1. It should be noted that this
proposed solution is not something which is proposed by
Descartes. As far as I know, in fact, Descartes nowhere
specifically addresses POGAS. There is, in fact, some
reason to think that Descartes would reject this sort of
solution, so I again emphasize that this should not be
regarded as a Cartesian solution. Instead I shall refer to
it as the radical omnipotence solution.
Initially D2.1 itself looks incoherent. Consider some
impossible state of affairs, S, for instance o 1 s being a
square £ircle . Since S is impossible, there is no possible
world in which S obtains. Yet D2.1 says that an omnipotent
being can bring about S; that is, D2.1 says that there is
some possible world in which an omnipotent being actualizes
S. Clearly we have an inconsistency here. The radical
omnipotence theorist, however, is not without a response.
He may respond by pointing out a widely held but unproven
assumption, reject that assumption and then argue that the
objection to D2.1 fails because it equivocates.
The widely held but unproven assumption upon which the
objection to D2.1 lies is that the appropriate modal system
is S 5 . That is, we assume that if some state of affairs S
is necessary, then necessarily, S is necessary and we
assume that if a state of affairs S is possible, then
necessarily S is possible. An important corollary of this,
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for our purposes, is that if a state of affairs S is i mp0 s-
sible, then necessarily S is impossible. That is, if S is
impossible in the actual world, then in every possible
world S is impossible. The acceptance of modal system S5
is probably one of the most widely agreed upon aspects of
contemporary philosophy. Yet there are philosophers who
reject S5. In Reference and Essence Nathan Salmon offers a
counterexample using what he aptly calls the Four Worlds
Paradox (FWP).3 FWP can be stated using an
mg the trans world identity of an object, for instance, a
table. (FWP might almost be thought of as a transworld
version of the problem of the Ship of Theseus.) FWP can be
generated from two commonly held modal assumptions and a
number of other uncontr over sial assumptions. The first
modal assumption is one that Salmon would, I think, be
willing to regard as a truth fundamental to our modal
thinking. The first modal assumption is
(1) If a table
_t is made from a hunk of matter m(according to some specific plan _P, by some individual
A etc.) in a world _w, then necessarily if a table is
made from m (according to P, by i_ etc.), then that
table is identical with
_t.
o r
(1) (x)(y)(y ' ) {(i)[Txyi ( j ) ( x ' ) (Tx ' y j x = x')]}
where Txyi means 'x is a table made from matter y in
world i ' .
^
(1) is an intuitively plausible modal claim.
Suppose Connie makes an end table out of old oak stump from
some plans that she found in her most recent issue of
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Popular Me chanics
. For convenience, let’s give that table
a proper name; we will call it Vic. While we may not have
many intuitions about transworld identity, one which many
have is that in any situation in which Connie uses that
very stump and follows those same plans the product is Vic.
Bein^ made Co nnie from that stump according to those
plans may not be a necessary condition of being Vj c
, but it
does seem to be a sufficient condition for being Vic.
Salmon also notes another modal intuition that many
people share. It is that an object could have come into
being made from matter slightly different from the matter
from which it in fact did come into being. For example,
the sheet of paper on which this is written might have been
cut such that it was one micron wider. If this were the
case, then this sheet of paper would have originated with
some more molecules than it did in fact originate with.
But intuitively it would seem to be the very same sheet of
paper. With regard to an example involving a ship (rather
than a table or a sheet of paper) Salmon writes, "Suppose
for the sake of argument than any ship of this particular
plan and structure is such that it could have originated
from a different set of planks as long as 98% of them are
the same and only 2% are different, but that a change of 3%
or more in the original material must yield a distinct
ship." b Rather than specifying that 98% of the planks must
be the same, I shall say that some relation R holds between
two hunks of matter x and y which overlap to the degree
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such that one object could be made from either x or y. It
is important to note that Rxy, like the relation havine 98%
— planks as. is symmetric and reflexive, but it is
not transitive. If x is made from 98% of the same planks
as y and y is made from 98% of the same planks as z, it
does not follow that x is made from 98% of the same planks
as z. Similarly Rxy is not transitive. In (2) let 'Rxy'
mean ’x and y stand in the relation such that one object
could be made from either x or y.' Salmon’s second modal
intuition, then, can be stated as follows:
(2) ( i) ( x ) ( y )
(
y ' ) [ (Txyi & Ryy') ^(Ej)Txy'j].
We are now able to state FWP
. I n order to do so we
need to make several additional uncontrover sial assump-
tions. The first is that there is a world w
}
where a table
a is made from some hunk of matter b; that is,
( 3 ) Tabw i
.
We also assume that b is related to two other hunks of
matter c and d such that
(4) R be
( 5 ) Red
and
(6) ~R bd
are true. Finally we assume that there is another possible
world,
2 > such that a distinct table e is made from d in
W
2 ; that is
,
( 7
)
Tedw2
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and
( 8 ) a £ e
are both true. From ( 3 1IJ;, (4) and (2) we can infer that a
is made from c in some other world w 3 ; that is,
( 9 ) Tacw^
.
From (5), (7), and (2) we can show that there is a world w 4
m which e is made from c; that is
( 10 ) Tecw^
.
Now we can see that a problem arises. (8), (9), and (10)
tell us that there are two distinct objects in different
worlds made from exactly the same material. But from (1),
(9), and (10) we can infer that
(11) a = e
is true. (11) clearly contradicts (8). Thus from the
intuitive assumptions (1) and (2) we can derive a contra-
diction.
Salmon thinks that there is a solution to FWP which
preserves our modal intuitions that (2) and (1) are true.
He solves FWP by claiming that the accessibility relation
between possible worlds is not transitive. If the accessi-
b i 1 i t y relation between possible worlds is not transitive,
then we cannot derive the contradiction between (8) and
(11). Before discussing Salmon’s claim that the accessi-
bility relation between worlds is not transitive, it is
important to note that FWP does not arise if the accessi-
bility relation is not transitive. In order to derive
(11), we need to know that
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(12) Aw
1
w 4
is true, where 'Axy' means 'y is accessible from (or pos-
sible relative to) x.' The only way to infer (12) is by
using the transitivity of the accessibility relation. This
can be seen by revising (1) and (2) to include the access!-
bility relation. The revised (1) is:
(1’) (i)(x)(y){Txyi D ( j ’ ) [ A i j ' (x ' ) (Tx ' y j ' =>x =x')]}
(2) is revised to
:
(2 f ) (i)(x)(y)( y ')[(Txyi & Ry y
' ) 3(Ej)(Aij & Txy'j)].
From (7), (4), and (2') we can infer that
(13) A w 2 w ^
is true. Furthermore we assume from the beginning that
(14) Aw^ W 2
is true. In order to derive (11) we must use (1’). From
(
1
'
)
and (
3
) we can infer:
(15) [Aw|W^ o(x)(Txbw
/t
o x = a)].
In order to derive (11), then, we must affirm the antece-
dent of (15); that is, we must affirm (12). If the access-
ibility relation is transitive, we infer (12) from (14) and
(13). But if it is not transitive — as Salmon claims —
we have no way to affirm (12). Thus we no way to argue for
(11) and FWP does not arise.
Salmon, of course, does not merely assert that the
accessibility relation between worlds is not transitive.
Following Hugh Chandler,^ Salmon argues for this claim
using (2') and the second part of his analysis of the R
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relation. Not only is (2') true, but also, according to
Salmon, a table could not be made from material signifi-
cantly different from that material from which it origi-
nated. We can state this as follows:
z^x)]}
l)(X)(y)(y,){(TXyi & ~ R yy’ ) ^>Cj)[Aij 0 (z)(Tzy’j 3
Consider, again, our assumptions (3), (4), (5), and (6).
From (3), (4) and (2’) we can infer:
(17) Aw
1
w^ & Tacwcj.
From the second conjunct of (17), (5) and (2') we can
infer :
(18) Aw^w
^
& Tad w^
.
From (3), ( 6 ), and (16) we can nfer:
(19) A Wl w 6 D(z)(Tzdw 6 Da £ z).
Suppose, for reductio
. that
(20) Aw^w^
is true. From (19) and (20) we can infer:
( 21 ) Tadw^D a £ a .
From the second conjunct of (18) and (21) we can infer
( 22 ) a 4 a.
But (22) is clearly false, so our assumption, (20), is
false. But if the accessibility relation between worlds is
transitive, then ( 20 ) will follow from the first conjunct
of (17) and (18), respectively. So the accessibility rela-
tion between worlds is not transitive.
If Salmon is correct in claiming that the accessibili-
ty relation between worlds is not transitive, then we must
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reject (S5) and (S4) as appropriate modal systems. Two
options which remain are system T — in which the accessi-
bility relation between worlds is simply reflexive -- and
system B -- m which the accessibility relation is both
reflexive and symmetric. For our purposes it does not
matter which alternative we adopt. The radical omnipotence
theorist now can respond to POGAS-B by arguing that there
is a modal equivocation in our understanding of omnipotence
and necessary omnibenevolence. In order to see this equi-
vocation we need to make a distinction between possible
worlds and accessible possible worlds. The notion of poss-
ible worlds we will take as primitive, but we can at least
say that possible worlds are the sort of entity in which
states of affairs obtain or fail to obtain and in which
propositions are true or false. Accessible possible worlds
are those possible worlds accessible from a given possible
world
.
For our purposes it does not matter which alternative
to ( S 4 ) and (S5) is chosen. We will arbitrarily choose T.
We know that the following definitions are true in T. A
state of affairs S is possible in a world w if and only if
there is a world W such that W is accessible from W and S
obtains in W
. A state of affairs S is impossible in W if
and only if there is no world W such that W is accessible
from W and S obtains in W
. A state of affairs S is
necessary in W if and only if every world W‘ which is
accessible from W is such that S obtains in W‘ . Thus far T
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is not different from (S4) and (S5) in the way that it
defines various modal terms. But it is important to note
that these modal notions are all relative to worlds. In T,
unlike ( S 5 ) , we are not guaranteed that all worlds are
accessible from one another. We do know that each world is
accessible to itself; that is, the accessibility relation
is reflexive. With regard to other worlds, however, the
modal system is silent about their accessibility. Presum-
ably philosophical reflection (or some other process) will
reveal whether or not a world is accessible from the actual
world. In T, the fact that the modal notions are world
relative is very significant.
The radical omnipotence theorist is now in a position
to respond to POGAS-B. The major claim can be introduced
by making a distinction between absolutely necessary states
of affairs; absolutely impossible states of affairs; abso-
lutely possible states of affairs; and their world relative
counterparts in T. Absolutely necessary states of affairs
are those which obtain in every possible world; absolutely
impossible states of affairs are those which obtain in no
possible world; absolutely possible states of affairs are
those which obtain in some possible world. The claim of
the radical omnipotence theorist is that there is only one
absolutely necessary state of affairs -- namely, God 1 s
existing -- and only one absolutely impossible state of af-
fairs -- namely, God 1 s not existing . All other states of
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affairs are absolutely possible. 7 The radical omnipotence
theorist may hold that those states of affairs which are
necessary relative to the actual world — for instance, the
law of non-contradiction, truths of mathematics, etc. --
obtain and are necessary simply because God actualized them
in the actual world and in all possible worlds accessible
from the actual world.
The radical omnipotence theorist can now state the
equivocation which flaws the statement of POGAS-B involving
radical omnipotence, that is, D2.1. The "can" of "can
bring about in D2.1 is the "can" of absolute possibility.
Thus it does not imply that for every state of affairs S
there is some world W such that W is accessible from the
actual world and an omnipotent being B brings about S in W.
The radical omnipotence theorist may claim that D2.1 should
be understood to claim that for any state of affairs S,
there is some absolutely possible world W in which B brings
about S; D2.1 should be understood as allowing that W may
not be accessible from the actual world.
On the other hand, the modal term in (B6), our claim
that it is impossible for God to sin or that God is ne-
cessarily omnibenevolent
,
must be understood in its world
relative sense. That is, the radical omnipotence theorist
claims that there is no world accessible from the actual
world which is also a world in which God sins. Those
states of affairs which are necessarily impermissible for
anyone to bring about are states of affairs which an omni-
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potent, necessarily omnibenevolent being brings about in
worlds which are not accessible from the actual world.
Thus it is necessary that God is omnibenevolent although it
is not absolutely necessary that God is omnibenevolent.
Similarly, it is necessary that God is omnipotent, but is
not absolutely necessary that God is omnipotent. There are
possible, though not accessible, worlds in which God is not
omnipotent. On this view God can bring about — in terms
of absolute possibility — any state of affairs. For in-
stance, he can bring about o 1 s being a_ s q u a r e circle. This
state of affairs is not possible relative to the actual
world, but God could bring it about. God is absolutely
omnipotent
.
II
This solution, however, has numerous drawbacks. The
major one is that it requires one to reject the law of non-
contradiction in its absolute form; it may hold for all
accessible worlds, but not it in some inaccessible worlds.
Rejecting the law of non-contradiction conflicts with some
of our basic intuitions about the logical structure of the
world. For instance we are forced to hold that God's being
omnibenevolent and sinful is absolutely possible and such a
claim seems incoherent. The radical omnipotence theorist
can hold that such a state of affairs appears incoherent
only because God created us in a world in which the law of
non-contradiction holds. Such a response, however, is
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ultimately unsatisfying. It is, for most, too high an
intellectual price to pay for solving POGAS-B.
This discussion of the radical omnipotence solution to
POGAS-B is helpful for two reasons. The first reason is
that we take seriously a response to our problem that is
frequently encountered in discussions with philosophically
unsophisticated inter locuters
; we show that the response of
the radical omnipotence theorist entails the rejection of
an extremely fundamental intuition. Secondly, our discus-
sion here of the radical omnipotence solution to POGAS-B
will allow us to introduce another alternative in Chapter
V, namely an Anselmian type response based on the rejection
of (S5). This Anselmian alternative rejects ( S 5 ) as the
proper modal system. But it is not committed to rejecting
the absolute necessity of the laws of logic, truths of
mathematics and other intuitively necessary truths.
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CHAPTER IV
THOMIST RESPONSES
A more common response among philosophers involves
restricting the definition of omnipotence. In this section
we wiil look at a sophisticated contemporary definition of
omnipotence defended by Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso in
"Maximal Power". ^ In explaining their definition we will
look at some other attempts to define omnipotence. Second-
ly/ in this section we will see how Flint and Freddoso use
their definition to offer a solution to POGAS-C. Thirdly,
we will argue that Flint and Freddoso' s revised definition
of omnipotence fails to resolve POGAS-B. Finally we will
note a distinction that helps explain the failure of Flint
and Freddoso's solution.
Flint and Freddoso develop their definition of omnipo-
tence by means of five conditions of adequacy that they
claim a successful definition of omnipotence must fulfill.
The first condition is that the definition must be stated
in terms of an agent's ability to bring about states of
affairs, rather than in terms of an agent's ability to
perform actions. This condition is fulfilled by our cur-
rent definition of omnipotence; also, the motivation for
this condition is discussed in Chapter I. It should be
noted that the relation br ing ing about a_ state of af f ai rs
includes both strong actualization and weak actualization.
Flint and Freddoso's second condition of adequacy is
" that an omnipotent being should be expected to have
the power to actualize a state of affairs £ only if it is
logically possible that someone actualize £, i. e . only if
there is a possible world W such that in W someone actual-
izes £." This condition, too, is fulfilled by our current
definition. It should be noted that Flint and Freddoso
explicitly assume that states of affairs are tensed. This
is not to say using Plantinga’s terminology — that all
states of affairs are temporally indexed. It is only to
claim that every state of affairs is either past, present,
or future
.
The third condition required by Flint and Freddoso is
a rather vague one. It is "... that no being should be
considered omnipotent if he lacks the kind of power which
it is clear an omnipotent agent ought to possess . To see
why this condition is necessary, we should look at a defi-
nition of omnipotence offered by Ronald Nash. Nash endors-
es a definition of omnipotence which takes omnipotence to
mean that "... God can do anything that is an absolute
possibility (i.e. is logically possible) and not inconsis-
tent with any of his basic attributes."^ The major problem
with a definition like this is that it potentially allows
many clearly non-omnipotent beings to be counted as omnipo-
tent.
Consider, for example, the infamous Mr. McEar. One of
Mr. McEar ' s basic attributes is that he is capable only of
scratching his ear. He is, furthermore, able to scratch
his ear. All actions other than scratching his own ear are
83
Thus al-
mconsistent with one of his basic attributes,
though he is only able to scratch his ear, Mr. McEar is, by
Nash's definition, omnipotent. Flint and Freddoso's third
condition is meant to avoid such problems. Mr. McEar
should not be regarded as omnipotent.
The fourth condition is that any definition of omnipo-
tence must be relativized to time. While our definition of
omnipotence satisfies the first three conditions, it does
not satisfy the fourth condition. In order to satisfy the
fourth condition the definiendum should say "A person P is
omnipotent at time t." Flint and Freddoso's argument for
this fourth condition depends upon the very plausible claim
that past events are unalterable. It is metaphysically
impossible that a past state of affairs obtain and subse-
quently fail to have ever obtained. The claim of Flint and
Freddoso is that just as being limited by metaphysical
necessity and impossibility in no way prevents an agent
from being regarded as omnipotent, so also being limited by
temporal necessity and impossibility in no way prevents an
agent from being regarded as omnipotent.
An example might help to explain this condition. Con-
sider the following state of affairs:
(R) Reagan's having uttered a falsehood.
(R) has obtained in the actual world. Now consider another
state of affairs
(R ) Reagan's never having uttered a falsehood.
jU
(R
r
) is a metaphysically possible state of affairs. Ac-
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cording to D 1 an omnipotent being can bring about (R*).
Given that (R) has already obtained, however, even an
omnipotent being ought not be required to be able to bring
about (in the actual world) (R*).
We have noted that this condition requires that the
definiendum of a definition of omnipotence be relativized
to time. (Implicitly the definitions have, all along, been
relativized to worlds.) The important issue now is to
indicate how the definiens will accomodate this condition.
Flint and Freddoso suggest something like the following
principle
:
(0) An omnipotent being can bring about a state of
affairs S_ at a time
_t in a world W only if S istemporally possible at
_t in W.^
(°)> of course, introduces a new technical term — "tempo-
rally possible. Temporal possibility can be understood as
follows
:
(T) A state of affairs S_ is temporally possible at a
time
_t in a world _W if and only if there is a world W'
such that (i) to and W share the same history and (ii)
someone brings about S_ in W',°
( ^ ) involves the troublesome notion of two worlds sharing
the same history.
A natural way to try to explicate the notion of two
worlds sharing the same history is:
(H’) Worlds _W and W 1 share the same history at _t if
and only if for any state of affairs S_, if S_ obtains
in W at _t or has obtained in _W prior to _t, then S_
obtains in W 1 at Jt or has obtained in W 1 prior to t_.
Clearly, however, (
H
T
) is unsatisfactory. Every state of
affairs — past, present, or future — either obtains or
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fails to obtain. Thus, according to (H ’ ) all future states
of affairs which obtain in W prior to t (or at t) also
obtain in VC prior to t (or at t ) . So W and WJ_ have
exactly the same future. W and VC share the same history,
the same present, and the same future. They are, then, the
same world. Consequently (H') is unsatisfactory.
Flint and Freddoso suggest an alternative to (H').
Their understanding of worlds sharing the same history
depends on a distinction between temporally independent (or
immediate) states of affairs and temporally dependent (or
non-immediate ) states of affairs. They write, "The basic
insight involved is that what is temporally independent
. .
.
at any given time can be specified in terms of the present
tense ... states of affairs which obtain at that time."^
It is important to note that temporal independence is a
relation among a state of affairs, a time and a possible
world. We can define it as follows:
(I) For any state of affairs S_ and time t_ and world
W, S_ is temporally independent at _t in W if and only
if ^ is a present tense state of affairs and obtains
at t_ in W.
We shall say, following Flint and Freddoso, that a state of
affairs S_ is immediate at time t_ in world W if and only if
S_ is temporally independent at _t in W. The state of af-
fairs Its being the case that Kirk Gibson i s hitting a_ home
run could be an immediate state of affairs at 7:35 pm,
September 25, 1985. It is a present tense state of af-
fairs. On the other hand Its being the case that George
Bush will be elected president could not ever be an imme-
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diate state of affairs because it is a future tense state
of affairs
.
Flint and Freddoso describe temporally dependent
states of affairs in the following passage: "All non-
lmmediate, or temporally dependent, states of affairs that
obtain at a time t obtain only in virtue of the fact that
the appropriate immediate states of affairs did or will
obtain at moments other than t ." 8 For example, consider
the future state of affairs:
(f) Its being the case that George Bush will be
elected president.
If (f) obtains now, it obtains only because at some future
time, the immediate state of affairs
(f ) George Bush's being elected president
obtains. Similarly the past state of affairs
(g) George Bush s having been elected vice-president
obtains now because the immediate state of affairs
(g ) George Bush's being elected vice-president
obtained at some time in the past. We define temporal
dependence as follows:
(D) For any state of affairs
_S, time _t, and world W,
S is temporally dependent at _t in W if and only if
obtains at
_t in _W and there is an immediate state of
affairs S
'
and a distinct time t ' such that _S obtains
at _t in W in virtue of the fact that S ' obtained or
will obtain at t_^_ in W.
Following Flint and Freddoso, we shall say that a state of
affairs is non-immediate just in case it is temporally
dependent
.
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we must introduce in
The final technical term which
order to explain what it means for two possible worlds to
share the same history is that of a submoment
. Flint and
Freddoso write, "Our claim is that for any moment t in a
world W there is a set k of immediate states of affairs
which determines what happens in a temporally independent
This set k is called a submoment. Every instant
of time is such that there is some submoment associated
with it in each world. The submoment of a time t in a
world W is the set of immediate states of affairs which
obtain at t in W. Using this notion of a submoment we can
define Flint and Freddoso's notion of two worlds sharing
the same history:
(H) Worlds 1/ and share the same history at t if
and only if W and _W share exactly the same submoments
obtaining in exactly the same order prior to t.
It is clear that two worlds can share the same history at a
time
_t and not be identical, for the temporally dependent
states of affairs which obtain at _t in those worlds may be
very different; that is to say, they may have very differ-
ent futures
.
We are now in a position to propose a new formulation
of the definition of omnipotence:
D1.4a. A being 13 is omnipotent at a time _t in a world
W =df for every state of affairs _S such that S_ is both
metaphysically and temporally possible, 13 can bring
about S at t in _W.
D1.4a, however, is not satisfactory either, according
to Flint and Freddoso. It does not, they claim, adequate-
ly account for the way in which an individual's free choice
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may place limitations on the power of an omnipotent being.
Consider, for example, a situation in which someone -- say,
Carol -- is in a position to freely decide whether or not
to take her infant daughter for a walk. Carol can actual-
ize either
Sy. Carol s freely taking her daughter for a walk
or
S 8 : Carol's freely refraining from taking her daugh-ter for a walk. *
Clearly no one other than Carol can strongly actualize
either Sy or Sg
,
for these states of affairs involve free
actions. (Flint and Freddoso here explicitly assume a
libertarian account of freedom; that is, an action is done
freely just in case there is no prior causally sufficient
condition for that action.) No one can strongly actualize
the free actions of another. Nor can anyone have the power
to weakly actualize both Sy and Sg
. A person can determine
whether or not Carol is in the situation to choose between
Sy and Sg. But since she freely chooses, no second party
can determine which state of affairs will be brought about.
That is, a counter factual such as
(1) If Carol were in circumstances C, she would freely
choose to take her daughter for a walk
would, like all propositions, be either true or false. A
second party can strongly actualize that Carol is in cir-
cumstances C. But if (1) is true, that second party cannot
weakly actualize Sg . If, on the other hand, (1) is not
true, then the second party cannot weakly actualize Sy;
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the second party can put Carol in C. But if (1) is false,
then it is not the case that if she were in C she would
bring about Sy. So no being other than Carol has the power
to actualize both Sy and Sg.
Our proposed definition of omnipotence, D1.4a, would,
however require that an omnipotent being have the power to
actualize both Sy and S
g , and D1.4a must, therefore, be
rejected as an adequate definition of omnipotence. Sy and
Sg are both metaphysically and temporally possible for an
omnipotent being at some time prior to Carol's decision.
Yet no being except for Carol can bring about both Sy and
Sg, so no being outside of Carol is even potentially omni-
potent. If there is another free being besides Carol, then
she, too, can be eliminated by an argument which parallels
the one above. The only possible worlds in which there may
be omnipotent beings are those in which there is only one
free being. Since the actual world contains multiple free
beings
,
if D1.4a is correct it follows that there is no
omnipotent being in the actual world.
However, an omnipotent being ought not be required to
have the power to bring about both S 7 and Sg, for, Flint
and Freddoso write, a second party's lack of power to bring
about both Sy and Sg "... results solely from the logically
necessary truth that one being cannot causally determine
how another will freely act...." 10 Thus the fifth and
final condition of adequacy for any definition of omnipo-
tence is that it take into account the fact that the free
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actions of others limit which states of affairs an omnipo-
tent being can bring about.
Flint and Freddoso take considerable care to state
carefully the fifth condition. The fundamental concept
that they start from involves counterf actual propositions
like (1). They call these sorts of propositions counter-
f actuals of freedom. A counterf actual of freedom is any
proposition which can be expressed by a sentence of the
form If individual essence P were instantiated in cir-
cumstances C at t and its instantiation were left free with
respect to bringing about state of affairs S, then the
instantiation of P would freely bring about state of af-
fairs S. ^ (Since strictly speaking there are no possible
persons, Flint and Freddoso characterize c oun t e r f ac t ua 1 s of
freedom in terms of individual essences. They write, "...P
is an individual essence if and only if (i) there is an
individual x who has P essentially and (ii) there is no
possible world in which there exists an individual distinct
from x who has P. An individual x will thus be said to be
an instantiation of individual essence P just in case x has
i o
P." ) They use counterf actuals of freedom to define what
they call a world-type
. A world-type is a set of counter-
factuals such that for any counterf actual of freedom, C,
either C or C is a member of the set. Less formally a
world-type is a description of which free decisions free
beings make in different circumstances.
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Flint and Freddoso speak of world-types rather than
simply of worlds because the free decisions of free beings
may not differ among some worlds. For instance, two worlds
may differ in their physical laws rather than in the deci-
sions that free beings make. So two or more worlds may
share the same world-type. Furthermore, some world-type
will be true and others will be false. A world-type, WT
,
is true if and only if every proposition which is a member
of WT is true
.
Flint and Freddoso go on to note that any agent has
some control over which world-type is true 13
,
for by her
decisions in any situation she can determine which counter-
factual of freedom is true in a world. For instance,
Carol, in our example above, determines by her decision
regarding S
y and S g whether (1) or
(2) If Carol were in C, then she would refrain from
walking her baby
is true. If she performs S
y , then (1) is true; but if she
chooses Sg, then (2) is true. Any agent has control over
the truth value of only a portion of the counter f actuals of
freedom in a world-type. The agent has control over the
truth value of only those counterf actuals of freedom which
involve his or her free actions. There will be many count-
erfactuals of freedom over whose truth values one has no
control, namely, those involving the free actions of other
agents. According to Flint and Freddoso, an agent has
control over the truth value of a counter fact ual of freedom
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because he determines by his actions whether that counter-
factual of freedom is true.
They then define a world-type-f or-x
. A world-type-
for-x, WTx, is a subset of a world-type, WT
, containing all
and only those elements of WT such that x has no control
over their truth value. Using this notion of a world-type-
for-x we can introduce another type of possibility, which
we will call free-possibilitv. 14 A state of affairs, S ,is
f reely-possible for a person p in a world W just in case
there is a world-type-f or-p
,
WTp, and there is world W*
such that (i) Wtp is true in both W and W*
,
and (ii) S is
not a member of WTp. Less formally, a state of affairs is
freely-possible if it is not a state of affairs that is
solely under the control of some other free being.
Flint and Freddoso then offer a definition of omnipo-
tence which incorporates this fifth condition of adequacy.
D1.4b. P is omnipotent at t in W if and only if
for any state of affairs S and wor ld-type-f or-P
,
WTp,
such thgt S is not a member of WTp, if there is a
world jjT such that (i) WTp is true in both W and W*
,
(ii) W scares the same history with W at t, and (iii)
at t in W someone actualizes S, then P can bring
about S at t in W.
In less formal terms D1.4b says that a being is omnipotent
at a time t in a world W just in case it can bring about
any state of affairs that is metaphysically, temporally,
and freely possible for her at t in W.
D1.4b is successful in defending against POGAS-C.
POGAS-C involves the claim
(C3) It is temporally necessary that Israel ' s being
saved obtain at some time.
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Any state of affairs inconsistent with the claim made in
( C
3
) is temporally impossible. If these other states of
affairs — for instance, Israel's never being saved — are
temporally impossible, then according to D1.4b an omnipo-
tent being cannot be expected to bring them about.
D1.4b does not, however, solve POGAS-B. It seems that
states of affairs which it is necessarily morally impermis-
sible for anyone to bring about such as
S 6 innocent children being tortured
may be metaphysically, temporally, and freely possible for
an omnipotent being. is, it seems, metaphysically pos-
sible. Unfortunately some persons in the actual world
bring about
. It also seems that is temporally pos-
sible; it is a temporally independent state of affairs.
Nor is S
^
a counter factual of freedom. S 6 is not part of
the wo r 1 d
- 1 y pe- f o r- Yahwe h . So is freely possible for
Yahweh
. Thus it seems that Yahweh can bring about a state
of affairs like S^. If is the sort of state of affairs
which is properly an instantiation of (B4) -- the claim
that there are some states of affairs such that necessarily
it is morally impermissible for anyone to bring them about
— then, Flint and Freddoso's proposed solution does not
solve POGAS-B.
At the least it seems that Flint and Freddoso's propo-
sal is incomplete. They need to show that all necessarily
morally impermissible states of affairs are either meta-
physically, temporally or freely impossible. This they
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have not done. At worst Flint and Freddoso's proposal does
not solve POGAS-B.
In addition, there are other reasons for rejecting
Flint and Freddoso's proposal. There are three problems
that can be raised with regard to D1.4b. The first is that
it is contradictory. Consider the following two material
conditionals
:
(3) If 7 + 5 = 12, then Sy obtains
and
(4) If 7 + 5 = 12, then Sg obtains.
Since Flint and Freddoso assume a complete isomorphism
between propositions and states of affairs, there are
states of affairs corresponding to (3) and (4) respective-
ly. We will refer to these states of affairs by the num-
ber which refers to the corresponding proposition. Since
(3) and (4) by definition are not counter f actuals of free-
dom, they are not, for some omnipotent being B, members of
the wor ld-type-f or-B
. Furthermore, they are both metaphys-
ically and temporally possible, and Carol brings them about
in some possible world which shares the same history with
the actual world, so the third condition of D1.4b is ful-
filled. So by D1.4b, B can bring about both (3) and (4).
But if he can bring about both (3) and (4) it would seem
that he is required to be able to bring about both Sy and
Sg. Since the antecedent of each conditional is necessari-
ly true, the truth value of each conditional depends upon
the truth value of the consequent. But according to the
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final condition of adequacy for a definition of omnipotence
B is not required to be able to bring about both S
? and S g .
So D1.4b seems both to require that B be able to bring
about both s 7 and Sg and not to require that B be able to
bring about both S
? and S g . D1.4b, then, is contradictory.
A second problem for D1.4b is that the notion of
having control over the truth value of a counter factual of
freedom is rather incomplete. They are not at all clear
about what that means. They seem to think that one con-
trols the truth value of a counterf actual of freedom simply
by freely acting in a certain way. Their only explanation
of this concept comes by way of a single example; they
write, Now any free being will have some say in determin-
ing which world-type is true. For example, since Jones is
free to decide whether or not to write that letter to his
wife, it is up to him whether the true world-type includes
[If Jones were in C at t, he would freely decide at t to
refrain from writing a letter to his wife] or its nega-
tion. ^ In this example it seems that controlling the
truth value of a counterf actual of freedom depends upon the
action of Jones.
Consider, then, a counterf actual of freedom such as
(5) If John were seven feet tall now, he would freely
dunk a basketball.
(5) is a counterf actual of freedom. Yet suppose that John
has not grown in several years and is now 5'8" tall. It
seems unlikely that John will ever find himself in the
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circumstances described in the antecedent of ( 5 ). if a
person determines the truth value of counterf actuals of
freedom by the actions she performs, how is it that (5)
acquires a truth value?
It has a truth value and yet Flint and Freddoso, so
far as I can tell, have no way of explaining how it is that
(5) gets its truth value. It would seem odd if the way in
which (5) acquired its truth value were significantly dif-
ferent from the way in which other counterf actuals of
freedom acquire their truth values. At any rate such a
distinction would require an explanation. This second
problem does not show, of course, that D1.4b is incoherent.
Rather it is intended to show that it is incomplete; the
central concept of having control over the truth value of a
proposition needs more explanation.
We can also see another problem raised by the notion
of controlling the truth value of a counter factual of
freedom. There is an important sense in which all counter-
factuals of freedom are under the control of an omnipotent
being. Surely, it is correct that no second party can
strongly actualize the free actions of individuals. Per-
haps it is, as Flint and Freddoso claim, logically impos-
sible to do so, and hence one ought not require an omnipo-
tent being to do so. An omnipotent being may not be able
to bring about every free state of affairs, but there is an
important sense in which that being has control over those
states of affairs. Surely an omnipotent being can prevent
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them from obtaining. The ability to prevent states of
affairs from obtaining is a way of controlling which states
of affairs obtain. This is significant with regard to
POGAS-B because the moral status of a being may be deter-
mined by what it fails to do as well as by what it does.
Flint and Freddoso's proposal then is to be rejected for
two reasons. First, it does not solve POGAS-B. Second,
there are significant areas in which it is incomplete.
II
Laura L. Garcia presents what I shall call an epistem-
ic version of the Thomistic response. Rather than trying
to prove that certain states of affairs are impossible and
hence beyond the capability of an omnipotent being, she
argues that it is not irrational to believe that such
states of affairs are impossible. In "A Response to the
Modal Problem of Evil" 16 she responds to the paper by
Theodore Gulesarian which was discussed in Chapter I. In
Chapter I we indicated that Gulesarian’s modal problem evil
was equivalent to POGAS— B. In her paper, Garcia tries to
defend the traditional view that God is necessarily exist-
ent and is essentially omniscient, omnipotent and omnibene-
volent. Her strategy is to grant that this view of God is
inconsistent with the existence of necessarily morally
impermissible states of affairs. She argues, however, that
it is not absurd to reject the existence of such states of
affairs. She argues, that is, that the traditional theist
can rationally reject premise (B4) in POGAS-B. After pre-
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seating Garcia’s position, I shall argue that there are, i
fact, good epistemic reasons for accepting (B4) and hence
for rejecting one of the other premises of POGAS-B.
Garcia proceeds by presenting and evaluating Gulesar-
ian
' s claim that
mL»P, 1S possible chat there are a great many con-
an !® f
’ e
^
1
K
t1 " 8 bel " gS ca P ab le of being consciousd ali such beings are amoral and lead miserable
there
’ a re^
that theSS ^ thS ° nly contin 8 ent beings
is epistemically more plausible than:
) It is possible that (6) necessarily, there is
something that is omniscient, omnipotent, and morallyperfect
.
]
(Also we should note two things. First the emphasis on
possible in (6’) is Garcia’s, not mine or Gulesar ian ' s
.
Second, the naming of sentences in this section follows the
naming used by Garcia who is following Gulesarian. This is
done to make quotation easier.) Gulesarian claims that (C)
is firmly based on our modal intuitions, while (6’) is not.
(C) is epistemically similar, he says, to claims like:
( a ) ft is possible that there are a great many con-
tingently existing beings capable of being conscious
and all such beings are amoral and are now conscious
of something
.
and
(b) It is possible that there are a great many moons
and all such entities are half-pink and half-purple.
(a) and (b) arise from a very plausible epistemic activity.
One starts, he suggests, from some plausible intuitions
like
,
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(bi) It is possible that therehalf-pmk and half-purple
is a moon that is
and
is a second moon that
and the like. Furthermore, (bi) and (bii) are consistent
with one another. We can then see that (b) would follow
from (bi), (bii) and other similar claims. A similar
defense of the plausibility of (a) could be constructed.
Garcia summarizes the method used to defend (a) and (b) as
kinds of claims: (1) those known immediately by intuition
. . . and (2) logical principles enabling us to combine
these intuitions, such as the principle that 'if the state
of affairs S', then the state of affairs S and S' is pos-
sible. '"17
(C), then can be defended as follows. First of all we
have intuitions like
(ci) It is possible that rabbit R1 leads a miserable
life
(cii) It is possible that rabbit R2 leads a miserable
life.
(cn) It is possible that rabbit Rn leads a miserable
life (where n is some large number)
(cn+1) Possibly, rabbits are the only contingent,
amoral, conscious beings that exist.
In addition to these intuitions we have a logical principle
follows: "What we have in this line of reasoning are two
of affairs S is possible and is consistent with the state
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(Li) For any states of affairs S and S' if S is
affairs (S and S ' ) ^“ossi Sle
.
1 8 ' ° £
Finally, there is one element that Garcia does not specifi
tally mention; there are certain empirical claims one
holds, in this case,
(F) Rabbits are contingent, conscious, amoral beings
(ci)-(cn+l), (Li) and (F) serve as support for (C).
Since the primary bases for (C) are modal intuitions --
i.e. (ci)-(cn+l)
-- (C), too, is regarded as a modal
intuition by Gulesarian.
(6'), on the other hand, is not analogous to (a) and
(b), according to Gulesarian. Rather (6') is analogous to
the more dubious claim
(M ) It is possible that (M) necessarily, there is
something that is marsupial.
(M ), however, seems false; at the very best it is highly
implausible. Surely there are not marsupials in every
possible world; surely it is possible that there be no
marsupials. Since (6') is analogous to (
M
f
) and (
M
f
) is
false, it follows that (6') is probably false. And since
(6) Necessarily, there is something which is 00M
entails (6') in modal system S5, (6) is also probably
false. For our purposes this also shows that ( B 1 ) of
POGAS-B is false since (Bl) entails (6). So, Gulesarian
claims, the rational theist must reject the traditional
concept of God
.
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Garcia argues that Gulesarian's analysis is incorrect.
She suggests that neither (6) nor (6') is what the tradi-
tional theist claims to know intuitively. Rather, she
says, the traditional theist claims intuitive knowledge of
(G’) It is possible that there is a being, x, thatexists necessarily, and is essentially omniscient
omnipotent and morally perfect.
(We should note there that (G*) is entailed by and entails
(Bl) of POGAS-B.) (G
' ) , Garcia says, is analagous to (C).
(G * ) follows from (Li) and certain modal intuitions, namely
(i) It is possible that there is a being, x
,
that
exists necessarily
(ii) It is possible that x (as described in (i) is
essentially omnipotent
(iii) It is possible that x is essentially omniscient
and
(iv) It is possible that x is essentially morally
perfect
.
In order to use (Li), Garcia also needs to hold that
(F'1') Necessary existence, essential omnipotence,
essential omniscience and essential moral perfection
are consistent
.
is true. So from (Li), (i)-(iv), and ( F * ) we can infer
that (G'
)
is a plausible modal intuition.
It seems that Garcia's claim up to this point is
exactly correct. (G') can be defended in the same way that
(C) can be defended. The problem now is that two inconsis-
tent propositions seem to have the same degree of epistemic
warrant. What should a rational person do in this situa-
tion? There seem to be three options: first, one could
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believe both (C) and (C); second, one could reject one of
the two claims; and third, one could reject both (G') and
(C). The first option is untenable given that we have
acknowledged that (G’) and (C) are inconsistent. A ration-
al person should not knowingly accept inconsistent proposi-
tions. The third option seems unreasonable. There is
considerable epistemic warrant for both ( G
’ ) and (C), so it
is unreasonable to reject both ( G
’ ) and (C). The second
option seems to be the best alternative.
Garcia holds to a version of the second option. She
begins by making a distinction between "intrinsic possibil-
ity" and "possibility simpliciter
.
" She writes, "...our
intuitions pronounce only upon what I will call the intrin-
s_ic_ possibility or intrinsic impossibility of a proposi-
tion, upon whether or not it is conceivably true, taken
alone and in abstraction from other propositions. Even
here our intuitions can be mistaken, since it might be that
something that appears conceivable to us is in fact intrin-
sically impossible, although we do not see the hidden
contradiction within it. Further, not everything that is
intrinsically possible is possible simpliciter
,
that is,
possible all things considered . "^ Intrinsic possibility
is an epistemic concept; it is similar to the concept of
epistemic possibility. A wide variety of propositions --
not all of them modal propositions — will be intrinsically
possible. In fact, the only propositions that are not
intrinsically possible, it seems, are those which are obvi-
103
ously contradictory, for instant tkj, l t tance. There are round squares
and soie ba chelors are married. Clearly both (G’) and (C)
are intrinsically possible.
Since ( G
'
)
and (C) are inconsistent, however, they
cannot both be possible simplic i t er . Possibility simplici-
—
iS
’
for Garcla
> the same as what we have called meta-
physical possibility. We should note that (C) and (C) are
somewhat special cases. Ordinarily if two propositions are
inconsistent for instance
(7) Max is wearing only an entirely black shirt at t
and
(8) Max is wearing only an entirely white shirt at t
each can still be metaphysically possible. That is
^
bt is possible that (7) Max is wearing an entire-ly black shirt
and
) It is possible that (8) Max is wearing an en-
tirely white shirt
are consistent with one another. We have, however, shown
in POGAS-B that close analogues to ( G
’
)
and (C) are incon-
sistent
.
At least indirectly Garcia goes on to suggest a prin-
ciple on the basis of which one decides between (
G
T
) and
(C). She writes, "Based on modal intuitions alone, (C) and
(G ) have an equal claim to truth, since both appear in-
trinsically possible and the customary inference from "in-
trinsically possible" to "possible simpliciter " would apply
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to both equally."- 0 She continues later, writing, "We
often judge that certain claims are possible simpliciter on
the grounds that (a) they appear intrinsically possible and
(b) we can think of no other accepted truths that would
entail their impossibility simpliciter " 21 The principle
that Garcia suggests seems to be:
( Z* ) For any proposition P, if P is intrinsically
possible, and there is no other accepted proposition Qsuch that Q entails that P is impossible simpliciter,
then P is possible simpliciter
.
Clearly, however, ( Z * ) is false.
Consider the following proposition
(9) There will be a child born at 12:01 AM, EST
January 1, 2000 in Kronos
where, following Plantinga, Kronos denotes the actual
world. Either (9) or its negation
(9*) It is not the case that there will be a child
born at 12:01 AM EST, January 1
,
2000 in Kronos.
is necessarily true. Since (9) and (9*) are world indexed
propositions, they are either necessarily true or necessar-
ily false. Both (9) and (9*) are, however, intrinsically
possible and there is no accepted proposition which entails
that one of them is impossible. So from ( Z * ) we can infer
that both (9) and (9*) are possible simpliciter
,
which is
impossible. Thus ( Z * ) is incorrect.
Garcia's principle is better understood as an episte-
mic principle. She is indicating the conditions under
which it is rational for a person to hold that a certain
proposition is possible simpliciter . Since Garcia's prin-
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dPle 13 an e Pistemic principle, it must be relativized to
persons. Before offering a revision (Z*), there is one
crucial ambiguity that needs to be discussed. (Z*), fol-
lowing the language Garcia herself used, uses the expres-
sion "no other accepted proposition." This phrase can have
at least four interpretations. First, it can mean "no
other universally accepted proposition." Secondly, it can
mean no other widely (though not universally) accepted
proposition." Thirdly, it can mean "no other proposition
such that it is accepted by someone." And fourthly, it can
mean, for a person S, "no other proposition accepted by S."
The four interpretations yield four separate interpreta-
tions of Garcia's principle.
(Zl) For any proposition P and person S, if P isintrinsically possible for S and there is no other
universally accepted proposition Q such that Q entailsthat P is impossible simpliciter
. then it is rational
for S to believe that P is possible simpliciter
.
(Z2) For any proposition P and person S, if P is
intrinsically possible for S and there is no widely(though not universally) accepted proposition Q suchthat Q entails that P is impossible simpliciter
,
then
it is rational for S to believe that P is possible
simpliciter
.
(Z3) For any proposition P and person S, if P is
intrinsically possible for S and there is no proposi-
tion Q such that Q is accepted by someone and Q en-
tails that P is impossible simpliciter
,
then it is
rational for S to believe that P is possible
simpliciter
.
(Z4) For any proposition P and person S, if P is
intrinsically possible for S and there is no other
proposition Q entails that P is impossible simpl ici-
_t_e_r, then it is rational for S to believe that P is
possible simpliciter.
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we must look at the role
Before evaluating ( Z 1 )
-
( Z4
)
a (Z)-type premise plays in her argument. She wants to
conclude that it is rational for a person S, to believe
either (C) or (Gl) but not both. As she puts it, "...some-
one who opts for either [(C) or (O’)] is very intellectual-
ly responsible, is within his or her epistemic rights." 22
Her argument is as follows:
(10) (C) and (G * ) are inconsistent
(H) For any propositions P and Q and person S, if Sknows that P and Q are inconsistent, there it isirrational for S to believe both P and Q.
(12)
For any person S, if S knows that (C) and (G')are inconsistent, then it is irrational for S tobelieve both P and Q.
(13)
Jones knows that (C)
and for whom (C) and (G f )
and (G') are inconsistent
are intrinsically possible.
(14)
No other accepted proposition makes either (C)
or (
G
' ) impossible
(15) A (Z)-type premise
(16) It is rational for Jones to believe (C)
(17) It is rational for Jones to believe (G T )
Garcia claims that since both (16) and (17) are true, Jones
or anyone in his position -- can rationally believe
either (C) or ( G * ) ; it is an arbitrary choice for Jones.
If Jones chooses to accept (C) and reject (G f ) and Smith
chooses to accept (G') and reject (C), both Smith and Jones
have acted rationally.
My criticism of Garcia will be along two lines.
First, I will argue that each of (Z1)-(Z4) is either false
or will not function the way Garcia hopes it will in her
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argument. Second T m'ii
’ 1 Wl11 ar 8 ue Garcia's conclusion -
that (C) and (G) are equally rational — ls f a l se
.
We can move, then, to our criticisms of (Z1)-(Z4). 2 3
(ZD fails because it is too vague. Nearly every intrinsi-
cally possible proposition P ,U1 be such thac ±t
elieve that P i S possible s impl ic i t er Con s i rl a r- £or
example the proposition
in’ Kronosi'
Reaga " " 0t ele“ ed Ptesident in 1980
(P) is intrinsically possible for Smith. That is, consid-
ered in isolation (P) seems plausible; there is nothing
inherently contradictory about (P). Consider also
Kronos!"
ald Rea8a " “aS eleCted President in 1980 in
(Q) is in fact true and Smith knows Q. However, (Q) is,
presumably, not universally accepted. Some people may
never have even entertained (Q). Thus from (Zl) it follows
that it is rational for Smith to believe that (P) is pos-
sible Si mpliciter
. However (P) is not possible simplici-
— ‘ Slnce (P) is “orld-indexed, there is no possible
world in which it is true. Thus (Zl) is false.
(Z2) is also false. Consider Smith again. Smith is a
close confidant of the President and of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. From these friends Smith has
learned that
(R) The U.S. has no nuclear first strike capability in1985 in Kronos.
The president and joint chiefs show Smith all sorts of
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irref utable 6vid6ncp fnr- ^ d ^ j .(R) and he comes to know (R).
Consider, in addition,
1 98
5
?
i n hLs! 8 “ " UCl6ar Strlke ^ability in
(P) is also intrinsically possible for Smith. Furthermore,
(P) itself is widely held. There is no other widely held
proposition which entails that (P) is impossible. So by
(Z2) it is rational for Smith to believe that (P) ls pos-
sible simpliciter
. But it is not rational for him to
believe that (P) is possible simpliciter
.
. Because of the
inside information he has, it is rational for him to be-
lieve that (R) rather than (P) is possible simpliciter
.
More generally, rationality is not governed by popular
opinion. So ( Z 2 ) is also false.
(Z3) can be rejected because it is too general to be
of use in Garcia’s argument. Consider, for instance, an
eminently rational claim:
(P) People have landed on the moon in Kronos.
Suppose that Smith, having read about the exploits of Neil
Armstrong and other Apollo astronauts believes that (P) is
possible simpliciter
; it seems that it is indeed, rational
for Smith to believe that (P) is possible simpliciter
.
Furthermore, (P) i s clearly intrinsically possible for
Smith. However, suppose that there is someone, deep in the
jungles of the Amazon who rejects (P) as an outrageous lie
and instead accepts
(Q) No people have landed on the moon in Kronos.
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X s
(Q) entails that (P) i s impossible slmpllclter SQ the
antecedent of (23) is not fulfill. Thos (23) does not
field the desited result, namely, that it is rational for
Smith to believe that (P) i s possible simplicity This i
especially noteworthy because if ( 7 ^\^B) is used as premise
) of Garcia s argument, then neither (16) nor (17)
follows. Premise (14) must be adjusted to
sich^hat^ has been Accepted h
11" 6 15 3 pro P ositio " Q
that (o ^ impos;ibi: c s:^nciLrmeone and Q entaiis
and
( 14b ) It is not the case that- rh
such that n k there is a proposition Q
that PM Q accepted by someone and Q entails(G ) is impossible simpliciter
.
But both (14a) and (14b) are false. Clearly someone has
accepted (C) and (G ' ) (along with some other claims)
entails that (C) is impossible simpliciter
. Similarly,
someone has accepted (C) which (along with some other
claims) entails that (G
' ) is impossible simpliciter
. Thus
(14b), as well as (14a), is false. So if (Z3) is used as
premise (15) of Garcia s argument, the argument is unsound.
(Z4), finally, must also be rejected because it is
false. Consider Smith, who has ample evidence that
(Q) People have landed on the moon in Kronos
is true. He has studied the history of the space program,
interviewed astronauts who allegedly walked on the moon,
seen videotapes of alleged lunar landships and the like.
Yet, Smith obstinately refuses to accept (Q). Since
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(P) No people have landed on the moon In Kronos
intrinsically possible for Smith, and Smith does not
accept (Q), it follows from (24) that it is rational for
Smith to believe that (P) is possible simpliciter
. Yet
most certainly it is not rational for Smith to believe that
(P) IS possible simpliciter without any refutation of the
evidence for (Q). (Z4) would reward obstinate rejection of
evidence with the honorific title of rationality. So (Z4)
must also be rejected. Since each of the candidates [ ( Z 1 )
—
(Z4)1 for premise (15) of Garcia's argument fails, her
argument fails.
It seems, then, that Garcia does not have an argument
that yields (16) and (17). Suppose, however, that Garcia
could produce an argument which yields (16) and (17).
Nonetheless, her claim that if (16) and (17) are both true,
then it is within a person’s epistemic rights to choose to
believe either (C) or (G’) is false. Her claim seems to be
based on a more general epistemic principle such as
( E' ) For any proposition P and Q and any person S, if
it is rational for S to believe Q and it is not ra-
tional for S to believe (P & Q) , then S is epistemi-
cally permitted to choose either to believe P and
reject Q or to believe Q and reject P.
The consequent of (E'1') contains the somewhat unusual ex-
press ”S is epistemically permitted to choose" which is
our way of rendering Garcia’s expression "it is within a
person s epistemic rights". This expression can be under-
stood to mean that S does not act irrationally in making
her choice or that S does not violate the canons of ration-
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ality in making her choice. (E*) has a certain £rima facie
plausibility. It does seem that when confronted with
equally attractive, mutually exclusive alternatives, one is
permitted to choose arbitrarily among the alternatives.
Upon closer examination, however, we can see that (E*)
must be rejected because it is too vague. It is too vague
because the term "rational" in the antecedent is too vague.
Following Roderick Chisholm?* „e can distinguish a number
of terms of epistemic appraisal. Chisholm starts with the
primitive relation "more reasonable than." "More rea-
sonable than is a triadic relation among a person and two
doxastic attitudes. There is one primitive doxastic atti-
tude ~~
--
e 1 1
e
f or in Chisholm's terminology acceptance
. In
addition, a person can withold a proposition. A person S
withholds a proposition P just in case S neither accepts P
nor accepts the negative of P. Chisholm offers eight terms
of epistemic appraisal. 25 Of these eight, three are pe-
jorative terms:
(D4.1) A proposition P is gratuitous for a person S=df
accepting P is not more reasonable for S than
withholding P.
(D4.2) A proposition P has no presumption in its favor
for S=df accepting P is not more reasonable than for S
accepting not P.
(D4.3) A proposition P is unacceptable for S=df with-
holding P is more reasonable for S than accepting P.
If anyone accepted a proposition which was gratuitous,
had no presumption in its favor, or was unacceptable for
that person, then he or she would be acting irrationally.
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The next term is epistemically neutral; that is, it
does not deliver a verdict on a person’s rationality.
fat;r
)
for
P
S-S?
Slti ° n ? ^ Presumption in its
'
rh
accepting P is more reasonable for St an accepting not P
(D4.4) is epistemically neutral because in some cases it
may be rational to accept a proposition which has some
presumption in its favor, while in other cases it may not
be rational. For instance, consider an example that Chis-
holm uses:
(P) There is no life on Venus
(P) is, perhaps, more reasonable than its negation and so
has some presumption in its favor for some person, Jones.
However, it may be that it is more reasonable for Jones to
withhold (P) than to accept (P) since we have so little
knowledge of Venus. Thus (P) is unacceptable for Jones.
Hence it would be irrational for Jones to accept (P).
The final four terms are terms of approbation. Each
one indicates that a proposition has some positive episte-
mic status. In ascending order they are:
(D4.5) A proposition P is acceptable for S=df with-
holding P is not more reasonable for S than accepting
(D4.6) A proposition P is beyond reasonable doubt for
S=df Accepting P is more reasonable for S than with-
holding P.
(D4.7) A proposition P is evident for S=df(i) P is
beyond reasonable doubt for S and (ii) for every
proposition Q, if accepting Q is more reasonable for S
than accepting P, there Q is certain for S.
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A PrOP “ Sition P is certain for S=df P isbeyond reasonable doubt for G n,„don Q such that Q ls more reasonaUe fo^S^nT 31 "
(D4.5)-(D4.8) reveal different levels of epistemic warrant.
It is important to note the different levels of epi-
stemic warrant because they provide a basis for distin-
guishing different interpretations of the term rational.
Some philosophers, such as Descartes, have regarded as
rational only those propositions about which one is cer-
tain. Others allow greater latitude in the application of
the term rational, for instance, allowing that all proposi-
tions which are beyond reasonable doubt for a person are
rational fbr that person. Garcia, it seems, is one who
grants a greater degree of latitude in her understanding of
rationality, for neither (C) or (G
' ) is a certainty.
The wide range of rational beliefs causes problems for
(E ). For consider a situation in which a proposition P is
beyond reasonable doubt for Jones while Q is evident for
Jones. Thus each is a rational belief for Jones. However,
Jones recognizes that P and Q are inconsistent and thus it
is irrational for Jones to believe both P and Q. (E*)
tells us that Jones is epistemically permitted to choose to
believe either P or Q. However, it seems that Jones ought
to be required to believe the proposition with the higher
level of epistemic warrant. That is, Jones ought to be-
lieve the proposition that is evident.
POGAS-B is an actual cause of the sort discussed
above. While both (C) and ( G ? ) are both rational for some
114
person, they do not have the same level of epistemic war-
rant. The intuitions supporting (C) - that is, (ci)-(cn + l)
are of a higher epistemic value than those supporting
(G ) - that is, (i)-( iv ) . It is more plausible to claim
that it is possible for a rabbit to lead a miserable life
than to claim that is is possible that there is a being
which exists necessarily. Though both (C) and ( G
’ ) are
rational, (C) has a higher degree of epistemic warrant and
it is incumbent upon a rational person to choose (C) over
( G ' ) .
A more plausible version of ( E* ) is
(E) For any propositions P and Q and any person S, if
P and Q have the same level of positive epistemic
warrant for S and it is irrational for S to believe (P
& Q), then S is epistemically permitted to believe P
and reject Q or to believe Q and reject P.
Suppose that, somehow or other, Garcia shows that (C) and
(G ) have the same level of epistemic warrant. It seems
that here argument still fails because (E) is also false.
If two propositions have the same level of epistemic war-
rant and one cannot accept both of them, it seems most
reasonable to withhold each of them. Consider
(P) The first child born in 1900 AD in Kronos was
born in London, England
and
(Q) The first child born in 1900 AD in Kronos was
born in London, Ontario.
Smith has been told by ten reliable people that (P) is
true. So (P) is beyond reasonable doubt for Smith. How-
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aver, Smith has also been told by 10 equally reliable
people that (Q) is true. So (Q) is also beyond reasonable
doubt for Smith. Furthermore, Smith recognizes that it is
irrational to accept both (P) and (Q). From (E) it follows
that Smith is epistemically permitted to choose to believe
either (P) or (Q). However, the most reasonable thing to
do in this situation would be to remain agnostic; to with-
hold with regard to (P) and to withhold with regard to (Q).
In this situation Smith should wait for further evidence
before accepting either (P) or (Q). So it seems that (E)
IS false and that Garcia's solution to POGAS-B fails.
It seems, then, that Garcia's epistemic version of the
Thomistic response to POGAS-B fails. Either
It is possible that there are a great many con-tingently existing beings capable of being conscious
and all such beings are amoral and lead miserablelives, and that these are the only contingent beings
there are.
is more plausible than
(18) There exists a being that is necessarily God
® ^ and (18) are equally plausible and one ought to
withhold from both views. In either case Garcia's claim
that it is within a theist's epistemic rights to accept
(I®) is incorrect. So the theist does not yet have a
solution to POGAS-B.
We have seen two proposed responses to POGAS that can
be fairly characterized as Thomistic. They are not
Thomistic in the sense that they are attempts to interpret
116
what St. Thomas himself said. Rather, they are in the
spirit of St. Thomas's solution. A Thomistic solution, in
this sense, is one that attempts to solve POGAS by claiming
that certain states of affairs are impossible and hence
beyond the ability of even an omnipotent being to bring
about
.
The first such solution, Flint and Freddoso’s
solution, can be called a metaphysical solution. It claims
that POGAS can be solved by noting that some states of
affairs are temporally impossible and some are freely
impossible and hence cannot be brought about by God. Their
proposal effectively solves POGAS-C. Some future states of
affairs are rendered temporally impossible by actions that
have taken place in the past. However, their revised
definition of omnipotence does not effectively address
POGAS-B. States of affairs such as
S 6 : torturing innocent children
which may be such that they are necessarily morally
impermissible for anyone to bring about are neither
metaphysically nor temporally nor freely impossible.
Hence, even on Flint and Freddoso 1 s definition of
omnipotence and omnipotent being can bring about S6.
Finally there were some internal problems with Flint and
Freddoso s definition of omnipotence — particularly
involving the notion of controlling the truth value of
c o un t e r f ac t ua 1 s of freedom — which rendered it
unacceptable
.
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The second Thomistic solution was Laura Garcia's
epistemic version. Garcia did not try to prove that
necessarily morally impermissible states of affairs do not
exist. Rather she argued that it is rational to believe
that they do not exist. Her argument, however, failed
because of the use of a false epistemic principle. So it
seems that neither Thomistic solution adequately addresses
POGAS-B
.
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CHAPTER V
ANSELMI AN RESPONSES
In the previous chapter we saw how the Thomist re-
sponse to POGAS-B goes. In this chapter we will look at
H r e e Anselmian solutions to POGAS — B. These solutions are
"Anselmian" because they involve arguing that divine per-
fection involves limiting the states of affairs that an
omnipotent being can bring about. In the first section of
this chapter I will argue that this is the proper interpre-
tation of Anselm. In the second part of the chapter I will
present an Anselmian solution based on rejecting S5 as the
proper modal system. In the third part I will present and
evaluate a solution presented by Jerome Gellman. Finally,
in the fourth section I will present and evaluate a propos-
al made by Thomas Morris.
I
In Proslogion Chapter VII Anselm addresses POGAS. He
writes
,
"But how art thou omnipotent, if thou art not capable
of all things? Or, if thou canst not be corrupted,
and canst not lie, nor make what is true, false — as,
for example, if thou shouldst make what has been done
not to have been done, and the like — how art thou
capable of all things? Or else to be capable of these
things is not power, but impotence. For, he who is
capable of these things is capable of what is not for
his good, and of what he ought not to do; and the more
capable of them he is, the more power have adversity
and perversity against him; and the less has he him-
self against these.... So, then, when one is said to
have the power of doing or experiencing what is not
for his good, or what he ought not to do, impotence is
understood in the word power. For, the more he pos
sesses this power, the more powerful are adversity and
against' them^^
nSt hi " 3 " d the «”« Powerless is he
This passage is clearly in need of some interpreta-
Consider, for instance, the traditional Christian
belief that there is an extremely powerful, but wholly evil
being which is responsible for the the evil that people
endure; that is, consider the traditional belief that Satan
would appear that on Anselm's view such a being
would be impossible. For to be wholly evil would be to be
wholly impotent. If a being were wholly impotent it would
not have any power and would be nothing to fear. So we can
see that the meaning 0 f this quote from Anselm is not
entirely clear. The most important thing to note is that
Anselm indicates that there is a conceptual connection
between omnipotence and goodness. The fact that God is
Omni benevolent significantly influences what it means to
say that he is omnipotent.
An interpretation sometimes given to this passage is
that Anselm is claiming that certain states of affairs are
impossible. We will call this the standard interpretation.
One can understand how the standard interpretation of An-
selm comes about. The standard interpretation says that
Anselm solved POGAS by claiming that states of affairs like
those in premise (4) of POGAS-B are impossible. For in-
stance, Joshua Hoffman writes, "If God is both necessarily
omnipotent and necessarily omnibenevolent (as well as ne-
cessarily omniscient and necessarily existent), a less than
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optimal world is metaphysically or logically impossibl
„
.
"2
This interpretation arises out of the first two sentences
of Proslogion 7. Anselm seems to equate God's being cor-
~pted — 2°ils lyiny with God's making what is true,
false and Cod^ making what has been done not to have been
done. Each of these states of affairs is parasitic upon
God's bringing about other states of affairs, namely
(SI) Someone's being corrupted
( S 2 ) Someone's lying
(53) Someone's making what is true, false
(54) Someone s changing the past
(S3) and (S4) clearly seem to be impossible states of
affairs. Since on the standard view an omnipotent being
can be expected to bring about impossible states of af-
fairs, it cannot be expected to bring about (S3) and (S4).
Since Anselm seems to regard (SI) and (S2) as analogous to
(S3) and ( S4 ) , he must hold that (SI) and (S2) are, like-
wise, impossible states of affairs. So some contemporary
philosophers contend that an Anselmian solution to POGAS is
to hold that certain states of affairs are impossible. On
this view Anselm is not much differnt than Aquinas.
It seems, however, that this is an incorrect interpre-
tation. Anselm solves POGAS not by holding that certain
states of affairs are impossible but rather by holding that
some cases of actualization are not cases of someone exer-
cising power. This assertion needs to be explained. In
the second paragraph of Proslogion 7 Anselm seems to pre-
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sent an argument of this sort. Consider, first of all
statements
:
two
(1) An omnipotent being has the power to lie
and
(2) This man rests just as that man does.
For Anselm, if (1) and (2) are taken loosely> both ^
true. However, if taken literally both are false. (2) is
obviously false. I n (2) two men are said to be equi-
valent in one respect; this is the significance of the
expression "just as". One man, call him Smith, is said to
rest; that is, Smith is not doing anything. Of the other
man, Jones, it seems to say: Jones does (something). This
implies that Jones is doing something. Thus, taken liter-
aliy, (2) is false, for it says, in a somewhat verbose
paraphase
:
( 2 '*'
)
Smith and Jones are equivalent with regard to
activity; Smith is not doing anything and Jones isdoing something.
(2*) ls
’
for Anselm, clearly false. However, (2*) is also
not what a speaker or writer intends in uttering or in-
scribing (2). Anselm says that (2) is an example of words
that "...are improperly applied,"^
Similarly, (1) is an example of words improperly ap-
plied. To see that (1) is similar to (2) we offer this
(again verbose) paraphrase of (1):
(I'1') A being which lacks no power is capable of per-
forming an act which requires a lack of power.
(1*) is false just as _A being which i s blind i s capable o
f
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~ei ° 8 1S false * d") is an accurate paraphase of (1)
because, according to Anselm, to be capable of actions like
lying one must lack power. Recall his words "... to be
capable of these things is not power, but impotence."
Anselm is working with a different conception of omni-
potence. The Thomistic definition of omnipotence, which we
have been using, might be thought of as omni-capability,
that is, an omnipotent being is one who is capable of
bringing about any metaphysically possible state of af-
fairs. Anselm rejects the notion of omnipotence as omni-
capability
. Rather, he proposes a significantly different
understanding of omnipotence. Power, on his view, is not
to be understood as capability, but rather as control.
Anselm writes, "...the more truly art those omnipotent
since those art capable of nothing through impotence, and
nothing has power against thee." 4 An omnipotent being is
one which controls everything and is controlled by nothing.
( Anselmian omnipotence is very similar to the traditional
theological notion of sovereignty.) Nonetheless, an omni-
potent being may not be capable of everything, for some
capabilities are such that one has them only if one is not
in control in some way or because something else has con-
trol over one. With regard to lying, being corrupted and
the like Anselm writes, "For he who is capable of these
things is capable of what is not for his good, and of what
he ought not to do; and the more capable of them he is, the
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more power have advpr^it-v „ „ je ersity and perversity against him; and
Che less has he himself against these." 5
We can understand Anselm's conception of omnipotence
as one which involves control rather than capability. That
is, to remain somewhat colloquial, an omnipotent being is
one who controls all events rather than being one who can
things. There are, it seems, three individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions by which we can
explicate Anselm's notion of omnipotence. The first condi-
tion of omnipotence is
( 3) _If B is omnipotent, then for any state of affairs
’
.
B str °ngly actualizes S, then S is the appro-priate state of affairs.
Two comments need to be made with regard to (3). The first
is that we should note that (3) mentions only those states
of affairs which an omnipotent being strongly actualizes :
it does not include those states of affairs which an omni-
potent being weakly actualizes. Thus it is consistent with
(3) that an omnipotent being weakly actualize a state of
affairs which is not appropriate. The second comment is
that the notion of an appropriate state of affairs is a
vague one. Perhaps some examples will be of use in ex-
plaining it. Suppose that an omnipotent being were asked
to add up a set of figures -- for instance, 8 + 13 + 9 —
then report his or her answer. Suppose further that the
omnipotent being decided to answer truthfully. The being B
would bring about the following states of affairs:
(Sy) B's reporting that the sum is 30.
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B would not bring about
(S 8 ) B's reporting that the sum is 31.
Surely, (Sg) is a metaphysically possible state of affairs,
but it is not one that an omnipotent being could bring
bout in response to the above question. B could, of
course, bring about (Sg) in response to a different ques-
tion. While this notion of bringing about appropriate
states of affairs indicates a link between goodness and
power, it does not guarantee that an omnipotent being will
be morally perfect. For suppose that B decided to bring
about a great deception. He then might bring about
y oung
The earth ' S a PP ear ing very old even though it is
by creating fossils and other geological evidence for an
old earth in a relatively young planet. While it would be
immoral for a being to do so, it is still within the power
of an omnipotent being.
(3) does not, however, provide an individually suffic-
ient condition for omnipotence. For instance, all the
states of affairs which an inanimate object strongly actu-
alizes are appropriate states of affairs since an inanimate
object has no intentions and strongly actualizes no states
of affairs. A second necessary condition of omnipotence
then is
.
(4) If B is omnipotent, B is such that there are
states of affairs S which B can strongly actualize.
(3) and (4), however, do not provide jointly sufficient
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10ns tDr omni P ote nce. Consider the by now infamous
Mr. McEar, who for our purposes, has only one intention to
scratch his ear — and is capable of strongly actualizing
only one state of affairs -- namely, HcEar's left ear being
~ atChed ' McEar Elfins both necessary conditions of
omnipotence, but he is clearly not omnipotent. On the
standard capability view of omnipotence McEar is not omni-
potent because there are a great many things that he cannot
do, a great many states of affairs that he cannot bring
about. On the Anselmian control view of omnipotence, I
suggest, McEar is not omnipotent because a great many
things can .be done to him.
A third necessary condition of Anselmian omnipotence
is that an omnipotent being cannot be subject to the power
or capabilities of any other being. One might think that
to be subject to the power of someone else is to be subject
to change by that being. That is one might hold that:
(D19) A being B is subject to the power of another
being B* =df B* (directly or indirectly) changes B
is the proper of definition of being subject to the power
of another being. This, however, is false. For suppose
that B* brings about some state of affairs S, and B knows
that B' has brought about S. Then B changes from not
knowing that B has brought about S to knowing that B * has
brought about S. And the change in B is a result of some
action by B*.
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closer suggestion of what it means to be subject to
the power of another being is
A
power of another being B*
te of affairs S, such that
(D5.1) captures the sense of the Anselmian notion that an
omnipotent being is in control of all situations
the following state of affairs:
Consider
(S 1Q ) Smith's freely helping her neighbor.
An omnipotent being cannot strongly actualize (S 1Q ). How-
vent (S 1Q ) from obtaining. Thus any state of affairs which
obtains obtains because the omnipotent being allows it to
obtain. Note that the problem of evil still stands. We
can, then offer the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for omnipotence:
(D5.2) For any being B, B is omnipotent if (i) for
every state of affairs S, if B strongly actualizes S,then S is the appropriate state of affairs (ii) thereis some state of affairs S such that B can strongly
actualize S and (iii) for any contingent state of
affairs S, B can prevent S from obtaining.
If (D5.2) is the appropriate characterization of omnipo-
tence, then POGAS-B appears to be solved; for while (B2)
the claim that necessarily whoever is God is omnipotent
is true, (B7) the claim that an omnipotent being can
bring about any possible state of affairs — does not
follow. (05.2) does not make any claim that an omnipotent
being can bring about all states of affairs. Yahweh, then,
would not be required to be capable of bringing about some
ever, on the Anselmian view, an omnipotent being can pre
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necessarily morally impermissible state of affairs.
ii
In this section I will propose a solution in the
Anselmian spirit which does not use modal system 85
.
but
rather uses system T. It is an elaboration on some con-
cepts introduced by the radical omnipotence theorists. An
important pair of such concepts are those of relative
possibility and absolute possibility. Recall that in our
discussion of the radical omnipotence theory in Chapter III
we noted that in some modal systems, like T, not all worlds
are possible relative to one another. Some worlds are only
possible relative to other worlds. In order to state this
solution we need to revise some definitions. First, an
object x has a property P essentially in a world W just in
case x has P in every world W* such that x exists in W* and
W is accessible from W. Note that in an absolute sense, x
may have some of its essential properties contingently.
instance,
_b_e i n g a_ person could be an essential property
of Ronald Reagan in the actual world even though it is
absolutely possible for him to be a table. Note this
response involves a rejection of some very fundamental
modal concepts, though none so fundamental as the intui-
tions we saw rejected by the radical omnipotence theorist.
It involves saying that there are contingent necessities
and contingent possibilities. Second, x is omnipotent in W
just in case for any absolutely possible state of affairs S
either it is possible that x bring about S or if it is not
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possible that x bring about y it- h d8 x
’ H is possible that it is
possible that x bring about x.
Consider, then, three worlds in which God exists —
the actual world, wj
,
and w2 . Suppose wj is accessible
from the actual world, and w 2 is accessible from wj ; but „ 2
IS not accessible from the actual world. In the actual
world God is necessarily omnibenevolent
; that is, he is
omnibenevolent in all of the worlds accessible from the
ctual world. Furthermore, consider again premise (B4) of
POGAS-B which claims that there are some states of affairs
such that necessarily it is morally impermissible for any-
one to bring them about. An instantiation of (B 4 ) was the
state of affairs
S6: Innocent children being tortured.
According to this response to POGAS-B God does not bring
about S 6 in any possible world; that is, God does not bring
about S5 in any world accessible from the actual world.
There is, however, a world, perhaps it is w 2 , in which God
does bring about S5
; but as we noted earlier w 2 is not
possible relative to the actual world. God is, however,
omnipotent since there is a possibly possible world in
which he brings about S5 . Furthermore God is both neces-
s ^ i 1 y omnipotent and necessarily omnibenevolent. We keep
a conceptual connection between omnipotence and omnibenevo-
lence in that we know that w 2 is inaccessible because God
is necessarily omnibenevolent.
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flmtion of omnibenevolence now needs revision
as well. At this point one could easily object that God is
not really omnibenevolent because S 5 is not genuinely open
to him. If S 6 is not an element of a morally significant
set of alternatives open to God, then God is not omnibene-
volent simply because he chooses not to bring about S 6 . It
IS not something that he can do.
It is not clear that this objection is as strong as it
appears. The objection relies on the intuitions that go
along with the S5 modal system. Those intuitions tell us
that someone can bring about a state of affairs only if
that state of affairs is metaphysically possible. In ac-
cordance with the Anselmian type response, however, another
reply is possible. One might claim that a person can bring
about a state of affairs S only if either S is possible or
there is some possible state of affairs S* such that if P
brings about S*, then S is possible. The intuition is that
either S is possible (relative to the actual world) or
there is something that P can do to make S possible. A
morally significant set of alternatives for P is a set in
which at least one morally permissible alternative is open
to P and at least one morally impermissible alternative is
open to P. The states of affairs need not be possible.
This response also requires that we hold that God can
determine (at least to some extent) which states of affairs
are possible and which are impossible; in particular the
defender of this proposal will claim that God could change
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his character. He could change it so that he is not the
being than which none greater can be conceived. In this
feature it bears some kinship with the radical omnipotence
response. However, it need not be claimed that God deter-
mines which states of affairs are absolutely necessary and
which are absolutely impossible.
The Anselmian claim is, then, that God's character
determines which states of affairs are possible. However,
though God is essentially omnibene vo lent
,
he could choose
to be otherwise. If he changed his character, then it
would be possible that he bring about a morally impermis-
sible state of affairs. But to do so things would have to
be very different from how they in fact are. Thus God
chooses to make his sinning impossible.
We should recall that this Anselmian type solution
depends upon rejecting S5 as the proper modal system. The
rejection of S5 was not an a_d hoc maneuver used simply to
allow for a novel alternative solution. It is not, in the
words of Peter Geach, simply the work of "shyster logi-
cians among whom "technical ingenuity is mistaken for
rigour. Rather, it was based on upon problems raised for
S5 by the Four Worlds Paradox.
W. R. Carter has recently challenged FWP and Salmon's
rejection of the claim that accessibility between worlds is
transitive. If Carter's challenge succeeds, the Anselmian
type response to POGAS is much weaker. In the following
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section we will present Carter's challenge and try to show
that it does not succeed.
Carter argues that FWP arises because Salmon allows a
"threshold principle" for the rdentity of objects. I„ our
discussion in chapter III of the radical omnipotence theory
we attributed to Nathan Salmon two threshold principles -
(2) (or (2')) and (16). The threshold principle with which
Carter is concerned is (16) which says that an object can
be made from matter which is 98% the same as the matter
from which it is in fact made. Once one crosses the thres-
hold from 98% to less than 98% the original object can no
longer be made.
Carter argues against FWP by proposing a version of it
and then showing why that version does not really work.
Carter’s version of FWP involves a retired clockmaker named
Wilma who, according to Carter, "has time on her hands."
She has a number of spare parts to clocks lying around and
decides to make a clock. The clock that she constructs and
designates Ben' is made from clock parts c \ , C2 >...C]_qo*
After making Ben, Wilma still has some extra parts -- c^Ql*
c 1 02 > and c 10 3 - Coincidentally, ciqi and c \ , ciq 2 and C 2 ,
and c i 03 and C 3 respectively are functionally equivalent.
Two parts are functionally equivalent just in case one
part can be interchanged with the other and the clock will
continue to operate normally. In the actual world Ben is
made from the hunk of matter consisting of c\
,
C 2 ,...ci 00 »
let us call this hunk of matter hunk A. According to (2),
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Ben could have been made from a hunk of matter consisting
o£ c 3 ’ C 4.---Oioo, c !
o
l , c 10 2 since that hunk of matter --
call it hunk B — is 98% the same as hunk A. Let us
designate the world in which Ben is made from hunk B as Wb.
Furthermore, according to (2) Ben could have been made from
a third hunk of matter - call it hunk C - which consists
of Cl, c 2 , c 1 03 > c 4 > . . . c i oo , since hunk C is also at least
98% the same as hunk A. Now we can see the problem. Let
"Ben" refer to the object made from hunk A in the actual
world, "Ben b " refer to the clock made from hunk B in world
Wb, and "Ben
c
" refer to the clock made from hunk C in world
Wc. From Chapter Ill's threshold principle (2) we know
that
(5) Ben = Be n
^
and
( 6 ) Ben = Ben c
are true. But from (16) and the fact that hunk B and hunk
C are not made from at 98% the same matter we know that
(7) Ben^ ^ Ben c
is true. But since identity is transitive we know from (5)
and (6) that
( 8 ) Ben^ = Ben c
ought to be true. Clearly (7) and (8) contradict one
another. So far we have Carter's version of FWP
.
Salmon's solution to a problem like the above is to
reject S5 and claim that (7) is not true because Wc is not
i
l
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
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possible relative to Wb. Since Wc is not possible relative
to Wb the antecedent condition of Chapter Ill's threshold
principle (16) can never be fulfilled and hence (7) cannot
be inferred
.
Carter objects to Salmon's solution by proposing the
following situation. He writes, "Let us consider a world
(Wd) concerning which it is stipulated that Wilma's con-
struction of a clock involves parcel C, but not stipulated
that the clock that is constructed is Ben. Is world Wd
possible from the vantage point of Wb? Surely it is.
Nothing about Wb makes it the case that it is there impos-
sible for Wilma to employ parcel C in the construction
Process.
"
7 We can carefully state Carter's objection using
a symbolization similar to the one we used earlier: 'Cxyi'
means M x is a clock built from matter y in world i', 'Rxy'
means 'x and y stand in the relation such that one object
could be made from either x or y\ and 'Aij' means that
’world y is accessible from world x'. Where 'a' refers to
hunk A, ’ b ' refers to hunk B, 'c' refers to hunk C, ’ w '
refers to the actual world, ’ w^, ’ refers to Wb, ' w c ' refers
to Wc
,
and w^
' refers to Wd we know that Carter holds that
the following relations hold among the various hunks of
matter and possible worlds:
( 9 ) Rab
(10) Rac
(11) ~Rbc
(12) Aw a w£,
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(13) Aw a w c
and
( 1 A ) Aw d w d .
In addition he holds that
(15) ( Ex ) Cxcw d
is true. (15) is the symbolization of Carter's claim that
some clock is made from hunk C in Wd. Carter goes on to
claim that Wc and Wd are " indiscernibie atom for atom,
quark for quark." That is, where "Ixy" means "world x and
world y are physically indiscernible", he holds that
(16) Iw c w d
is true. Carter continues by endorsing a principle that he
says is "immensely plausible" and that Salmon also seems to
endorse, namely the thesis that physically indiscernible
worlds are identical; that is
O 7 ) (i)( j)(Iij ^ i = j) .
From (16) and (17) we can infer
( 18 ) w c = w d .
But from (18) and (14) we can infer
(19) Aw d w c
the claim that Wc is accessible from Wd
.
(19), however, is
precisely the claim that Salmon denies in his solution to
FWP. Thus Carter thinks that he has shown that Salmon's
solution to FWP fails if one accepts three premises —
(14)
, (15) and (17) .
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A response by Salmon to Carter will, then, begin by
examining those three premises. (14) and (15) seem unob-
jectionable. Surely if Ben were made from hunk B, it would
nonetheless be possible that Wilma make a clock from hunk
C. We know from (16), however, that the clock that she
makes is not Ben
.
The problem with Carter’s objection lies in (17), the
thesis that physically indiscernible worlds are identical.
Informally Salmon's response to Carter is that the world in
which Doug is made from hunk C is not, from world w c , an
accessible world. Even though there is a world in which
Doug is made from hunk C, that world is not a genuinely
possible world. Carter assumes that all worlds are pos-
sible relative to one another.
More precisely Salmon's response is as follows. Car-
ter quotes Salmon as endorsing (17) when Salmon writes,
'This principle would require that any two genuinely possi-
ble worlds exactly alike at the level of matter and struc-
ture must also be exactly alike at least in all their
physical-object facts."® Without worrying about exactly
what Salmon means by "physical-object facts" we can see
that perhaps (17) is from Salmon's perspective incompletely
stated. Salmon mentions "genuinely possible worlds." This
might be taken to mean "worlds that are possible relative
to one another. If so, then (17) ought to be revised to
(17') (i)(j)[Aij CD (
I
i j O i = j ) ] .
The question that then arises is whether or not Wd is
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accessible from Wc
. Salmon can show, from his assumptions,
that Wd is not possible relative to Wc
. Suppose that we
stantiate (15). Let us call the clock made by Wilma in
Wd "Doug" since it needs to be some arbitrary object; „e
do not assume that Doug is the same clock as Ben. We will
symbolize Doug as 'd\ The question, then, is whether or
not, from the vantage point of Wb
,
Ben is identical to
Doug. We can see that they are not identical. From thres
principle (1 ) W e know that in any world accessible
from Wd in which a clock is made by Wilma from hunk C that
clock will be Doug. That is
(20) Cdcw d D ( i ) [ Aw d i -o( x) (Cxci d = x)].
We know, however, from threshold principle (16) and (11)
that Ben d is not identical to Doug. That is
(21) b* 4 d
is true where 'b*' refers to Ben b . We know by hypothesis
that the antecedent of (20) is true, so by modus ponens and
universal instantiation we can infer
(22) Aw d w c d(x)(Cxcw c => d = x)
Suppose, for reductio, that the antecedent of (22)
( 23 ) Aw d w c
is true. From (23) and (22) by modus ponens and universal
instantiation we can infer
(24) d = b*.
But (24) contradicts (21), so (23) must be false, given
Salmon's assumptions. Since (23) is false, we do not have
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the antecedent of (17') and we cannot infer that Wc and Wd
are identical. So Carter's objection does not work. Thus
at this point there is no objection to show that this
Anselmian type interpretation is incoherent. The Anselmian
type interpretation does require a different set of intui-
tions regarding the nature of metaphysical possibility and
necessity, but so those intuitions have not themselves been
shown to be internally inconsistent. Those intuitions are
inconsistent with S5 type intuitions, but that is to be
expected
.
Less formally the dispute between Carter and the
defender of Salmon is this. Carter holds that any objects
made from exactly the same physical stuff according to
exactly the same plan in different worlds are identical
objects. Really there is only one object which exists in
both worlds. The defender of Salmon, on the other hand,
holds that objects made from the same physical stuff ac-
cording to the same plan in different worlds may be di-
stinct objects provided that the objects exist in worlds
which are not accesible relative to one another. Further-
more, the defender of Salmon argues that Carter fails to
recognize this because his thinking is colored by S5 pre-
suppositions. If these presuppositions are rejected Car-
ter's objection fails.
Others have proposed Anselmian type solutions
to
POGAS-B, the most notable recent example
being Peter Geach
in Providence and Evil . Geach suggests
that we distinguish
140
between two separate properties omnipotence and almight.i-
A " alml 8hty being is one which has power over every-
thing although it is not capable of bringing about every
contingent state of affairs. An omnipotent being is one
which can bring about every metaphysically possible state
of affairs. Geach's notion of almightiness is very similar
to the Anselmian notion of omnipotence discussed above.
One can see, however, that a difficulty arises for the
Geach-Anselm solution. The Geach-Anselm solution holds
that there are some things of which God is incapable (be-
cause of his necessary omnbenevolence)
. This conflicts
with our characterization of omni benevolence
. Omnibenevo-
lence requires that a being be faced with a set of morally
significant alternatives and then make the proper choice
from among the alternatives. The Geach-Anselm solution,
however, seems to eliminate the possibility of God facing
any morally significant sets of alternatives. Hence, God
cannot be omnibenevolent
. Thus the Geach-Anselm solution
fails if we accept the traditional definition of omnibene-
volence. As we shall see in the next chapter, however,
there are some internal problems with necessary omnibenevo-
lence
.
One additional note is relevant at this point. The
proposed Anselmian solution to POGAS-B raises an important
and interesting topic for the philosophical theologian.
One of Anselm s most important contributions to philosophi-
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cal theology is his identification o£ perfect£on and the
nature of God. The traditional view o£ ^ has ^ ^ a
Perfect being is one which is essentially omnipotent, omni-
scient and omni bene vol e„ t . While the Anselmian would ac-
cept this language, he/she would do so with a decidedly
different understanding of omnipotence. An important ques-
tion, then, is whether a perfect h P ino •r be g is omnipotent or (to
use Geach's terms) almighty. While this is « •6 J xx un an important
issue it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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Jerome Gellman, in "Omnipotence and Impeccability," 9
adopts a genuinely Anselmian solution to POGAS-B. He de-
fines omnipotence as follows:
(D5.3) is omnipotent if and only if:
(1) x can bring about any state of affairs that it is
/os
1
^
lly P osslbl-e for x to bring about; where
(3) There is no state of affairs, S, such that (a) itis logically possible for x to bring about S, and (b)the bringing about of S by any agent, y, entails animperfection in y; and
(3) There is no state of affairs, S, such that (a) itis logically impossible for x to bring about S, and(b) that it is logically impossible for x to bring
about S entails an imperfection in x. ^
The first clause of (D5.3) eliminates problems with states
of affairs like
:
(S) God's uttering a sentence uttered only by Reagan.
The second and third clauses of (D5.3) are the interesting
ones for our purposes. The second clause tells us an
omnipotent being is not an omni—capable being. There are
states of affairs that it cannot bring about. The third
clause tells us that there are a great many things that an
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omnipotent being can bring about; this clause eliminates
concerns with Mr. McEar. If „ e assume that lt ls an lmper _
fection to be subject to someone else's power, then it is
dear that (D5.3) is Anselmian in the sense noted earlier
in this chapter
.
It is the second clause which seems to provide the
solution to POGAS-B. Presumably, doing something which is
morally impermissible is imperfect. Thus (B4) implies that
there is some states of affairs, S, such that anyone, x.
Who can bring about S is imperfect. So no omnipotent
being, B, could bring about
(
^
6 ) Innocent children being tortured
So God cannot bring about (S 6 ). Similarly, an omnipotent
could not bring about
(S) Someone's believing that 9 x 7 = 64
because doing so implies an imperfection. Anyone who
brings about (S) is imperfect in knowledge. So while (S)
is a metaphysically possible state of affairs, an omnipo-
tent being cannot bring it about.
The primary difference between Gellman's proposed
solution to POGAS-B and the proposal previously attributed
to Anselm is that Gellman builds the notion of goodness
into the definition of omnipotence.
Gellman's proposed solution also is subject to the
same criticism as the proposed Geach - Anselm solution. If
a being brings about a morally impermissible state of
I
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affairs, then that being is imperfect. If a being B is
omnipotent, then there is no alternative, A, open to B such
that B's bringing about A implies that B is imperfect. So
no morally impermissible state of affairs is open to B. So
is never faced with a morally significant set of alterna-
tives and is omnibenevolent. We see again that an Anselm-
ian type solution to POGAS-B also demands an adjustment in
our understanding of omnibenevolence.
IV
Thomas Morris takes a different tack in "Perfection
and Power " 11 He suggests, first of all, that POGAS-B is
not a unique problem. Similar problems arise with regard
to omnipotence and other attributes of God. With regard to
POGAS-B he writes, "...[I]f there is such a problem in the
concept of God relating to omnipotence, it is not one
exclusively raised by impeccability
... [A]ny normal human
being can think of something he has never thought of be-
fore. But if God is necessarily omniscient, he cannot
possibly think of something that he has never thought of
before. Morris also suggests that other attributes such
as omnipresence cause similar problems.
These sorts of problems, he suggests, can be solved by
appeal to the concept of perfection. Appealing to the
Anselmian notion of God as perfect being, Morris claims
that God has perfect power. At this point it appears that
Morris regards "having perfect power" and "being omnipo-
tent as synonymous. He says that we must explain perfect
i
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power by noting three claims. He writes, "First, there
and can be no independent, externally determined con-
straints on divine power. Secondly, the internally deter-
mined structure and scope of God's abilities to act (those
parameters of divine action set by his own nature and
activity) are not, and cannot be, such that he lacks any
possible activity or power it is intrinsically better to
have than to lack. And finally, God is the sole source and
continuous support of all the power there is or could
be." 13
Using the terminology which we have already developed
we will try to clarify Morris's three principles. Perhaps
the first claim means.
(Ml*) Necessarily, if x is omnipotent, then it is notthe case that there is some state of affairs S, suchthat necessarily x brings about S.
(Ml-), however, does not adequately account for Morris's
claim. Morris would want to claim that there are some
states of affairs which Yahweh necessarily brings about but
which are not 'externally determined.' Let us say that:
(26) C is a constraint on being B's power iff C is a
state of affairs such that if C obtains, then there is
a state of affairs S such that B cannot bring about S.
Let us say further that in the above definition S is con-
strained by C. We are now in a position to define an
external constraint on a being's power.
(27) C is an external constraint on B's power iff C is
a constraint on B's power, and it is not the case that
the individual essence of B entails that C obtain.
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Finally, we need to explain the expression "the individual
essence of B entails that C obtain." An individual essence
E entails a state of affairs S iff necessarily, if E is
instantiated, then S obtains.
Morris’s second claim regarding perfect power is the
most important claim. I shall take his expression "the
internally determined structure and scope of God's abili-
ties to act" to mean "internal constraints on God’s pow-
er. He acknowledges that there are internal constraints
on God’s power; that is, God’s essence does entail some
state of affairs C and C is such that there is some state
of affairs. S such that necessarily if C obtains then God
cannot bring about S. However, these internal constraints
are not such that "he lacks any ability or power it is
intrinsically better to have than to lack. "15 Morris’s
second claim, then, states a necessary condition of perfect
power
.
(M2) If x has perfect power, then there x lacks no
possible ability or power that it is intrinsically
better to have than to lack.
Morris does not explain what he means by "intrinsically
better. Perhaps it is best at this point to leave this
notion of intrinsic betterness as an undefined primitive.
Morris s third claim is that "God is the sole source
and continuous support of all the power there is or could
be. "15 We will understand this to mean
(M3) Necessarily, God weakly actualizes every state
of affairs which obtains and which God does not
strongly actualize.
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Using these three assumptions Morris proposes a solu-
tion to POGAS-B. Specifically, he writes, "The theist with
a clear view of omnipotence will just deny that the impos-
sibility of God's going somewhere he has never been before,
thinking Of something for the first time, scratching his
eft ear, or doing evil entails or in any way signals
God's lacking some ability or power it is intrinsically
better to have than to lack." 16 That is, Morris specifi-
cally claims that POGAS-B and related problems do not
violate (M2). Presumably, he also thinks that POGAS-B and
related problems do not violate (Ml) and (M3).
There are three criticisms that we will raise against
Morris's proposed solution. The first criticism is that
his proposal depends upon a vague and ill-defined concept,
namely the concept of "intrinsic betterness." Morris
claims that the ability to scratch one's left ear is not an
ability that it is intrinsically better to have than to
lack. Thus even though God cannot scratch his own left ear
since God has no ears — this in no way shows that God
is not omnipotent. The concept of intrinsic betterness,
however, seems to be one which is best understood in rela-
tive terms. For a being without ears, it is not intrinsi-
cally better to have the ability to scratch one's ears than
to lack that ability. For a being with ears, on the the
other hand, (particularly ears that itch) it is intrinsi-
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one's ears than
can, bet ter to have the ability to scratch
to lack that ability.
Consider another example which is less trivial than
the example involving ear scratching. Consider the ability
to learn necessary truths. This is an ability than God
does not have since God knows all necessary truths eternal-
ly. Since God is omniscient, the ability to learn neces-
sary truths is not an ability it is intrinsically better to
have than to lack. On the other hand, for beings which are
not omniscient, but which are capable of knowing things, it
is intrinsically better to be able to learn necessary
truths than to lack that ability. Consider yet another
example. The ability to breath through gills rather than
with lungs is intrinsically better to have than to lack for
a life form which spends its entire existence underwater.
Yet for a life form which exists in a non-aquatic environ-
ment the ability to breath with lungs is intrinsically
better to have than to lack. It seems that the value of
various abilities depends upon the attributes than an ob-
ject has.
The general claim that some abilities are intrinsical-
ly better to have than to lack is itself suspect. Abili-
ties or powers seem to acquire value for extrinsic reasons.
An ability is valuable because it allows one to achieve a
certain end which is regarded as valuable. The ability to
run fast and to jump high is not especially valuable if one
is a CPA, but it is valuable if one is an NBA player.
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Similarly the ability to understand IRS rules is valuable
if one is a CPA, but is less valuable if one is an NBA
player. The value of abilities is essentially tied to the
circumstances and goals of an individual. To speak of some
abilities being intrinsically better to have than to lack
is to speak in an inappropriate way. It seems, then, that
Morris's proposed solution depends upon an ill-chosen con-
cept and hence must be rejected.
Perhaps then the real issue is about which attributes
are intrinsically better to have than to lack rather than
about which abilities it is intrinsically better to have
than to lack. Perhaps Morris would want to claim that if
there are certain attributes which it is intrinsically
better to have than to lack -- let us call them intrinsi-
caHy good attributes -- then perhaps there may be some
abilities which correlate with these intrinsically good
attributes and which are intrinsically better to have than
to lack. That is, perhaps Morris is committed to the fol-
lowing principle.
(M4) For any being B if B is a perfect being, then
for any attribute Q such that Q is an intrinsically
good attribute then B has Q, and for any ability A
such that A enhances Q, B has A.
We introduce the relation of enhancement as an undefined
primitive. A couple of examples will help to give a sense
of what we mean by enhancement. Suppose that having fin-
gets is an intrinsically good attribute. The ability to
move one's fingers would then enhance the attribute having
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lingers. It would make one's fingers more useful. Simi-
larly suppose that having knowledge is an intrinsically
good attribute. Several abilities would enhance the attri-
bute of having knowledge. For instance, the abilities to
remember, to communicate, and to observe would all enhance
knowledge because they would provide one with more know-
ledge
.
Perhaps, then, Morris wants to claim that a perfect
being has all the intrinsically good attributes. Further-
more, he might claim, a perfect being does not lack any
ability which enhances an intrinsically good attribute.
This revision, however, is also unsuccessful. For consider
the property
(P) having knowledge.
An ability which enhances (P) is
(A) the ability to learn necessary truths.
According to our revision, if God is a perfect being, then
God has (P). And if God has (P), then God has ability (A).
However, if God has ability (A), then God is not omni-
scient, since the ability to learn entails that there are
some propositions that one does not know. If God is not
omniscient, then God is not perfect and hence we have a
contradiction. Thus (P) is not an intrinsically good at-
tribute.
Traditionally, however, (P) is just the sort of attri-
bute which one wants to regard as intrinsically good. This
150
revision of it
suggests that (M4) is incorrect and that a
is needed. Consider the following revision:
any^attributeh^such that C)
S
^
p e r f e c 1
.
be 1 n § - th en for
attribute (i) B has Q to the maximal ^egree^nd § (ii
)
for any ability A such that A enhances Q, if B needs Amaintain the maximal degree of Q then B has A.
(M5) needs to be explained. The first clause indicates
that a perfect being must have intrinsically good attri-
butes to the maximal degree. Some properties are absolute;
either one has that property or one lacks it. For in-
stance, one is either pregnant or not pregnant. There is
no middle ground where one is partially pregnant. On the
other hand. some properties are such that objects can have
them to varying degrees. An obvious example would be heat.
Some objects are hotter than others. Among such properties
are the properties of knowledge
, goodness
.
justice
,
power
and the like, properties frequently included in the concept
of God. Different objects can vary in the degree of know-
ledge they possess. One might have no knowledge; a second
might know some propositions; and a third might be omni-
scient. For those intrinsically good properties which can
be had in degrees, a perfect being must have them to the
highest possible degree.
A second part of (M5) which needs to be explained is
clause (ii). Certain abilities may be needed in order to
ma i n t a i
n
having intrinsically good properties to the high-
est degree. For instance, an omniscient being would need
the ability to learn new things as they become true. That
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is, consider
,
(28) Kristen Lee exists.
Prior to October 11, 1986 (28) was false. However,
since Kristen Lee was born on October 11, 1986, (28) is
tree after October 11, 1986
. An omniscient being would
need the ability to learn that (28) is true or it would
cease to be omniscient.
We suggest that (M5) captures the intent of Morris's
second claim regarding perfect power. (M5) is not without
problems -- namely, it involves the rather vague notion of
intrinsically good properties — but, for our purposes, it
is sufficient as an explication of Morris's claim. Let's
turn now to Morris's claim that POGAS-B is not any differ-
ent from a number of other problems which arise for the
theist with regard to omnipotence. Informally put the
claim is that there are many possible actions which a
perfect being cannot perform precisely because of its per-
fection; these same actions can be performed by other
beings, but they can be so performed only because these
other beings are imperfect. Morris suggests that we recog
nize this situation with regard to other of God's attri-
butes such as omniscience and accept that this does not
indicate any inconsistency between omnipotence, say, and
omniscience. There is, then, no reason to treat the paral
lei case of omnipotence and omnibenevolence any different-
ly.
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In this section we will show that POGAS-B is signifi-
cantly different from other alleged problems which arise
among God's attributes. An argument which parallels POGAS
B regarding omniscience would look like this.
(29)
There is a being B such that necessarily B is
(30) Necessarily, for any
is omnipotent.
(31) Necessarily, for any
is omniscient
.
being x, if x is God, then x
being x, if x is God, then x
(3 2
)
Therefore, there is a being B such that
sarily B is omnipotent. neces-
(33)
Therefore there
ly B is omniscient.
is a being B such that necessari-
(34)
then
about
Necessarily, for any being x if x is omnipotentfor any possible state of affairs S, x can bring
*
(35) Necessarily, for any being
then for any state of affairs S
knows that S obtains.
x, if x is omniscient,
if S obtains, then x
At this point the argument is an exact parallel of POGAS-B.
However, difficulties arise in finding a plausible premise
which, paralleling (B4) of POGAS-B, yields a contradiction.
One possibility might be
(36 ) There is a state of affairs S such that neces-
sarily if S obtains, then for every being B, B does
not know that S obtains.
Informally (36 ) says that there are some states of affairs
that are necessarily unknowable. This is intended to par—
sllcl the claim in POGAS— B that there are some states of
affairs such that necessarily it is morally impermissible
for any being to bring them about.
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Two problems arise with regard to ( 36 f ) . First, it is
hard to make sense of the suggestion that there are some
states of affairs (or propositions) which are necessarily
unknowable by anyone. What might such a state of affairs
soon as we might suggest one, we can think of
conditions under which it would be knowable by someone.
Premise (B4) of POGAS-B, on the other hand, has more plaus-
ibility to it. It is at least conceivable that there be a
state of affairs such that it is morally impermissible for
anyone to bring it about. A second problem which arises
for (36’) is that it is not at all the sort of premise that
Morris himself suggests.
Morris suggests that the problem arises because a
human being, unlike an omniscient being, can "...think of
something he has never thought of before." 17 This claim
could mean several things. First, Morris might be
suggesting that
(36 ) There is a state of affairs S such that neces-
sarily if it obtains at t, then there is a stretch oftime from t to some time t' such that no being B knows
that S obtains, and that following t' there is a being
B that comes to know that S obtains.
Informally, (36' ') suggests that there are some states of
affairs that necessarily are unknowable for a time and then
are knowable. Like (36.'), (36”) is also implausible.
There is simply no reason to think that it is true. Any
example for a temporarily unknowable state of affairs S
would be such that it is possible that S be known at all
times. (36 ') also can be rejected because it does not
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correspond to the sort of situation that Morris is
suggesting
.
Morns seems to be thinking of something like this.
Suppose that on June 1, 1985, Jones suddenly realizes that
players 1^1984^ ^ avera § e height of NBAin 1984 is higher than the U.S. nationalaverage height in 1984. 1
obtains. There has been a duration of time during which
(N) has obtained and during which (N) is knowable. Howev-
er, Jones simply has never entertained (N). Prior to June
1, 1985, however, Jones had the ability to entertain (N).
He had the ability to bring about
(T) thinking about (N) for the first time.
God, on the other hand, does not have the ability to bring
about T. Since states of affairs are eternal everlasting
objects, (N) exists at all times. Furthermore, either
( N * ) (N)'s obtaining
or
(N") (N)'s failing to obtain
obtains at all times. If ( N
' ) obtains, then God thinks
about (N). Similarly if (N") obtains, then God thinks
about (N). So, God thinks about (N) at all times. Hence
God cannot bring about (T). One might, therefore, suspect
that there is an inconsistency between omniscience and
omnipotence. Morris apparently regards this as parallel to
POGAS. He also holds that since theists have not found the
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alleged inconsistency between omniscience and omnipotence
troublesome neither should theists find POGAS troublesome.
A first response, of course, might be that since POGAS
is troublesome then the alleged inconsistency between omni-
science and omnipotence should also be troublesome. We
should not, however, be too quick to accept the claim that
omniscience and omnipotence are inconsistent.
We need to look more closely at state of affairs (T).
(T) is somewhat ambiguous. We must distinguish five inter-
pretations of (T),
( T 1 ) ( N )' s being thought about for the first time.
(T2) ,(N)' S being thought about for the first time by
a human being. J
(T3) Someone's thinking about (N) for the first time.
(T4) Jones s thinking about (N) for the first time.
(T5) God s thinking about (N) for the first time.
(Tl) is an impossible state of affairs, if there is an
everlasting being who is necessarily omniscient and one
holds that there is no beginning to time. As noted above
an everlasting omniscient being thinks about (N) at all
times. And if there is no beginning to time, there is no
time t such that (N) is first thought about at t. Another
way of putting this is that for anytime t there is some
time, t
,
prior to t such that (N) was thought about at t'
.
If time has a beginning, then (Tl) is a possible state of
affairs, but it is not one which Jones can bring about. At
the first instant of time God brings it about. So one
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cannot conclude that omniscience and omnipotence are incon-
sistent on the basis of (Tl).
( T2 ) does not Provide a basis for claiming that omni-
science and omnipotence are inconsistent either. (T2) is
clearly possible and is such that an omnipotent being can
bring it about. (T2) may also be such that prior to June
1, 1985, Jones can bring it about. So again there is no
inconsistency between omniscience and omnipotence.
Similarly, (T3) provides no basis for claiming an
inconsistency between omniscience and omnipotence. (T3) may
need some clarification to distinguish it from (12). In
(T2) the major quantifier is a universal quantifier ranging
over times; in (T3) the major quantifier is an existential
quantifier ranging over persons. Suppose Jones believes
that (N) obtains, and then brings it about that Smith
thinks about (N) for the first time. (Perhaps Jones tells
Smith that he believes that (N) obtains and Smith responds,
I never thought about that before.") In this case Jones
has brought about (T3), though he has not brought about
( T2 )
.
( T3 ) , however, is a state of affairs that God, as
well as Jones, can bring about. So (T3) does not provide a
basis for claiming that omniscience and omnipotence are
inconsistent
.
Neither does (T4) or (T5) provide a basis for claiming
that omniscience and omnipotence are inconsistent. (T4) is
clearly a state of affairs which either God or Jones can
bring about. (T5) is similar to (Tl) in that if there is a
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beginning to time, (T5) is possible and God can bring it
about. Whereas if there is no beginning to time, (T5) is
an impossible state of affairs and hence the inability of
God to bring about (T5) is no indication that God is not
omnipotent. Thus no interpretation of (T) provides a basis
for the claim that omniscience and omnipotence are incon-
sistent
.
It is not only with regard to omniscience and omnipo-
tence that there is no parallel to POGAS-B. Consider
another alleged parallel, the problem of omnipotence and
omnipresence. Recall Morris's words: "...we ordinary
humans can go places we have never been before. But then
it seems that we can do something God cannot do, for if God
is necessarily omnipresent he cannot possibly go somewhere
he has never been before. The situation then is this.
Jones, let us suppose, has never visited the crab nebula.
But, by some stroke of good fortune, NASA selects Jones to
explore the crab nebula. Upon Jones' arrival at the crab
nebula according to Morris,
(J) inhabiting the crab nebula for the first time
obtains. Jones brought about (J), but God, being omnipo-
tent, cannot bring about (J). Once again there seems to be
an inconsistency between two of the attributes of God.
Our response to this problem is exactly the same as
our response to the previous problem. We need to distin-
guish five interpretations of (J).
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tile
the Crab nebula ' s beln 8 inhabited for the first
Mme h
the Crab nebula ' s being inhabited for the firsttim by a person
(J3) someone’s inhabiting the crab nebula for thefirst time
(J4) Jones' inhabiting the crab nebula for the firsttime
(J5) God’s inhabiting the crab nebula for the firsttime
As in the previous example, (J2), (J3) and (J4) are all
states of affairs which an omnipotent being can bring
about. Thus (J2), (J3), and (J4) provide no basis for the
claim that omnipotence and omnipresence are incompatible.
( J 1 ) has some parallels to (Tl). If the crab nebula
(or the space occupied by it) has always existed then (Jl)
is impossible. Since God is necessarily eternally omnipre-
sent, he has always inhabited every space, including the
crab nebula. So there is no first time that the crab
nebula is inhabited. If space was created, then, there was
a first time at which the crab nebula was inhabited. So if
(Jl) is possible, God can bring it about. Also if God were
to create another inhabitant of the crab nebula simultane-
ous with his creating space, there would be another being
which brought about (Jl).
Similar considerations apply to (J5). If the crab
nebula is eternal, then (J5) is an impossible state of
affairs and hence is not something an omnipotent being
should be required to bring about. If the crab nebula is
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not eternal, then (J5) is brought about simultaneous with
the creation of the crab nebula. So God can bring about
(J5)
’
if(J5) is a Possible state of affairs. So none of
(Jl) through ( J5 ) provide any basis for claiming that there
is an inconsistency between omnipotence and omnipresence.
Morris’s third example involves "...that notorious
weakling of philosophical lore, Mr. McEar, who is capable
of scratching his left ear but essentially incapable of
performing any other task (not entailed or required by the
capacity to scratch) ...» 19 Morris claims that Mr. McEar
...would seem to have a capacity or ability not had by an
essentially incorporeal being much as God." 20 Morris is
proposing, it seems, that we consider the following state
of affairs:
(Me) one s own left ear being scratched by oneself.
McEar can bring about (Me), while God cannot bring about
(Me). (Me), however, is susceptible to three interpreta-
tions.
(Mcl) X's left ear of being scratched by X
(Mc2) McEar's left ear being scratched by McEar
(Mc3) God's left ear being scratched by God
(Mcl) is a schema in which X can be replaced by the name of
some individual object. (Mcl) type states of affairs are
clearly possible, if the object considered has a left ear.
Suppose, however, that we are considering an animal, Max,
with only one ear, then
(Mcl*) Max ’ s left ear being scratched by Max
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is an impossible state of affairs. Thus neither God nor
Max could bring about (Mcl*). So (Mol) type propositions
do not provide a basis for claiming that God incorporeality
is inconsistent with his omnipotence.
Nor does (Mc2) or (Mc3) provide a basis for claiming
that incorporeality and omnipotence are inconsistent. Both
God and McEar can bring about (Mc2), while neither can
bring about (Mc3) since God has no ears. Thus (Mc3) is an
impossible state of affairs.
The situation is not the same in POGAS, however, POGAS
does not parallel the other problems which Morris proposes.
Consider the state of affairs which we regarded as being
necessarily morally impermissible, namely
(S 6 ) Innocent children being tortured.
According to Morris, it is possible for Jones to bring
about (S^), but, since God is omnibenevolent
,
it is not
possible for God to bring about (S^). This problem, howev-
er, cannot be solved in a way which is analagous to the
solutions to the other problems.
(
^
6 ) Is not ambiguous like (T) and (J) are but perhaps
we can distinguish these interpretations of (S^), namely
(S-^) babies being tortured
( 5 2 ) Jones's torturing baies
(5 3 ) God's torturing babies
(Sj) clearly seems possible. There are no conditions that
would render it impossible. Thus an omnipotent being can
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bring about (Sj). However, an omnipotent being's bringing
about ( Sl ) is inconsistent with that being's being omnibe-
nevolent. So (Sj) does provide a basis for claiming that
omnipotence and omnibenevolence are inconsistent. In the
cases involving omniscience and omnipresence, the alleged
inconsistency arose not because of an ability to know or to
be present somewhere. Rather the alleged inconsistency
arose because of a claim to temporal priority. Similarly,
in the case of Mr. McEar, the problem is not with God's
power, but with whether or not he has ears. In POGAS,
ere is no other circumstance to render (S-^) impossible.
It simply is possible and is also morally impermissible.
Thus POGAS-B remains a problem. It is not parallel to
other alleged inconsistencies among the divine attributes.
In this chapter we have seen a number of Anselmian
type proposed solutions to POGAS-B. A proposed solution is
Anselmian, in this sense, if it holds a being can be omni-
potent despite there being many possible states of affairs
which that being cannot bring about. We suggested one
solution in this spirit which rejected the contemporary
standard of modality, S5. This solution is not intended as
an interpretation of Anselm in Proslogion 7. Rather it is
intended as a suggestion about how a contemporary philoso-
pher might try to elaborate Anselm’s insight.
We also looked at a number of other Anselmian type
proposed solutions to POGAS-B. Consideration of these
proposals, especially those by Jerome Gellman and Thomas
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Morris, revealed a problem with the notion of necessary
omnibenevolence. In the next chapter we elaborate this
problem and look at how some philosophers have tried to
solve it
.
Finally, in this chapter we saw that POGAS-B is signi-
ficantly different from other puzzles which arise regarding
the attributes of God. Morris's suggestion that POGAS-B is
not significantly different from a puzzle about an omnipo-
tent, incorporeal being being unable to scratch its ear was
rejected
.
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CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF NECESSARY OMN I BENEVOLENCE
A problem related to POGAS-B needs to be considered.
Thxs related problem we shall call the problem of necessary
omnibenevolence or PONO. It seems that if one holds that
God is necessarily good, then no matter what revisions are
made in the definition of omnipotence problems will still
arise for the traditional conception of God. In this
chapter we will, first, see how PONO arises. Secondly, we
will look at Thomas Morris's proposed solution to PONO, and
we will argue that his solution exacts a heavy cost for the
traditional theist. Thirdly, we will look at a proposed
solution by Eleanore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. I will
argue that Stump and Kretzmann's proposal is unacceptable
because it relies on a very dubious assumption and because
it does not seem to solve POGAS-B.
I
PONO can be stated without much difficulty. Consider
once again our definition of omnibenevolence.
(Dl.9) P is omnibene volen t =df (i) There is a com-
plete morally significant set of alternatives open to
P, and (ii) for every complete morally significant
set, S, of alternatives open to P, P brings about a
member of S only if it is morally permissible for P to
bring about that member of S.
(Dl.9) requires that an o m n ibe n e vo le n t being be faced with
at least one set of morally cinnifirant alternatives. A
set of morally significant a was def ined as
f o 1 lows
:
open' to a p^oTf*^ ( i )
"
“ i'sT ' of ?i terna“»«
° Pen
T a , person P ’ (ii) Ac least one membe r
T
Tt
1
V
s 1
abouTsl /r iS /° rally P erm i ssHle for P to bhng’
’
nc
^ ( 1X1 ) at least one member of S, s2 is
about s2?
^ 15 n0t m ° rally Permissible for P to’bring
Clauses (ii) and (iii) are of particular importance. We
can see by the following argument, however, that (D1.9) is
inconsistent with the claim that any being is essentially
omni benevolent
.
(1) If Yahweh is omnibenevolent
,
then there is somemorally significant set of alternatives open to him.
(2) If there is some morally significant set of
a ternatives open to Yahweh, then there is a state of
a fairs si such that Yahweh can bring about si and itis morally permissible for Yahweh to bring about si.
(3) If there is some morally significant set of
alternatives open to Yahweh, then there is a state of
affairs s2 such that Yahweh can bring about s2 and itis not morally permissible for Yahweh to bring about
(4) Yahweh is necessarily omnibenevolent.
(5) If Yahweh is necessarily omnibenevolent, then
Yahweh is omnibenevolent.
(6) Therefore, Yahweh is omnibenevolent.
(7) So there is a state of affairs s2 such that
Yahweh can bring about s2 and it is not morally per-
missible for Yahweh to bring about s2.
(8) If a being B can bring about a state of affairs
S, then there is a possible world in which B brings
about S
.
(9)
So there is a state of affairs s2 such that there
is some possible world W in which Yahweh brings about
s2 and it is not morally permissible for Yahweh to
bring about s2 in W.
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anb xt is n °t morally permissible for Bto bring about S in W, then B is not omnibenevolent in
y^Lh Theref0re ’ there is a possible world in whichi anwe h is not omnibenevolent.
( 12 ) So Yahweh is not necessarily omnibenevolent.
Premises (1) - (3) simply follow from the definitions of
omnibenevolence and morally significant sets of alterna-
tives. Premise ( 4 ) is one of the claims of the traditional
concept of the nature of God. (5) is true by the defini-
tion of necessity, and (6) follows from (4) and (5) by
mod_us £o nens
. ( 7 ) follows from (6), ( 1 ) and ( 3 ) by modus
£onens and hypothetical syllogism. (8) states a necessary
condition for bringing about a state of affairs. (9)
follows from ( 7 ) and (8) by substitution. ( 10 ) follows
from the definition of omnibenevolence, and (11) follows
from ( 9 ) and ( 10 ) by modus ponens
. Finally (12) follows
from (10) by the definition of necessity.
II
Morris tries to solve this problem by modifying the
definition of omni bene volence . He begins his proposal by
calling our attention to a distinction between following a
rule and acting in accordance with a rule. If a person
follows a rule, then one consciously recognizes the rule
and freely abides by it. That is, one has an alternative
which is not in accordance with the rule, but one chooses
to act as the rule instructs. In order to follow a rule,
one must have freedom with regard to that rule. Other
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actions are simply done in accordance with a rule. These
" 8y ^ aCC1 ° nS d0ne o£ necessity, or they may be actions
done by chance
.
Consider an example. Suppose that some innocent per-
son is trapped in an elevator in which the oxygen content
is rapidly dwindling. There is, however, an emergency
ventilation system which can be turned on and will restore
a safe level of oxygen to the elevator. Suppose that there
is a health code rule that says that if someone is trapped
in an elevator, then one must push the appropriate button.
If a person recognizes the health code rule and pushes the
button, then that human being has followed the rule. If a
chimpanzee were to randomly push that button, it would be
acting in accordance with the rule. Similarly, if a main-
tainence worker, not realizing that anyone was trapped,
happened to push the button, thinking that it activated an
exterior lighting system, that maintainence worker would
have acted in accordance with the rule. Furthermore, if
some being were compelled to push the button, she would
have acted in accordance with the rule rather than followed
it. The various actions may be empirically indistinguish-
able, but they do have different metaphysical statuses.
After making this distinction, Morris distinguishes
between two forms of "axiological goodness." The first
form of axiological goodness is what we would call moral
goodness. It involves following one's moral duties or
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performing acts of supererogation. This is the form of
axiological goodness which is applied to human beings. On
the other hand, there is a second, and higher, form of
axiological goodness which we can call metaphysical good-
ness. According to Morris, if one is metaphysically good,
one, has literally speaking, no moral duties. Morris
writes, Because of his distinctive nature, God does not
share our ontological status. Specifically, he does not
share our relation to moral principles — that of being
bound by some of these principles as duties ." 1 God does,
however, act in accordance with moral principles. So, as
Morris notes, human beings are able to predict God’s behav-
ior. He writes, "... we know that if God says that he will
do A_, then he will do
_A ."
2 Similarly we know that he will
communicate truthfully, act justly and the like. Metaphys-
ical goodness also allows a being to perform acts of super-
erogation. Moral principles only describe divine behavior,
they do not impose duties on the divine agent. The duty
model of goodness which applies literally to human beings
applies only analogically to God.
One of the virtues of this position is that it recog-
nizes the ontological difference between human beings and
God and reflects that difference in the way that creatures
as opposed to the creator relate to moral principles. The
duty model of goodness is applicable both to human beings
and God but only by analogy. A second virtue is that we
can solve the problem of necessary goodness. Since meta-
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physical goodness need not require free choice (as simple
moral goodness does), the first premise of the argument
false. ( 1 ) said, If Yahweh is omnibenevolent
,
then there
is some morally significant set of alternatives open to
Yahweh. If (1) is false, then no contradiction arises from
assuming that Yahweh is necessarily omnibenevolent.
There are, however, some disadvantages to Morris's
solution. The first is that his solution seems ad hoc; it
seems that it is proposed solely as a solution to PONO.
Secondly, this solution is problematic because it creates a
number of additional problems for traditional Christian
theism. One problem is that it makes an already difficult
doctrine - namely the doctrine of the incarnation — even
more difficult. Moral goodness is probably the easiest
property of God to understand in thinking about the incar-
nation. One can understand that a human being might be
omnibenevolent. However, if, as on Morris's view, God is
not good in the same way that human beings are good, then
the incarnation becomes even more difficult to understand.
A second problem is that it causes trouble for the
free will defense as a response to the problem of evil.
The logical problem of evil claims that there is an incon-
sistency between the existence of evil and the existence of
a God which is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
An influential response to the problem of evil has been the
free will defense. One of the major tenets of the free
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defense is that in order to create a world in which
there is such a thing as metaphysical goodness, it seems
that it is possible that God create beings which are meta-
P ysically good. If Morris's solution is correct, however
it does not seem that God is required to create a world in
Which there is the possibility of evil in order to create a
world in which there is good. 3
Perhaps we can see this more clearly by looking at an
influential contemporary discussion of the problem of evil.
The most vigorous recent proponent of the free will defense
is Alvin Plantinga. The problem of evil says that
(13) God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibene volent
is inconsistent with
( 14 ) There is evil
.
Plantinga
' s strategy is this: "Now one way to show that a
proposition £ is consistent with a proposition £ is to
produce a third proposition r_ whose conjunction with £ is
consistent and entails £. ,,Zf Plantinga continues by writ-
ing: "The heart of the Free Will Defense is the claim that
it is possible that God could not have created a universe
containing moral good ... without creating one containing
moral evil. Immediately, however, Plantinga and the Free
^iii Defense must contend with an objection, one offered by
J. L. Mackie.^ The objection goes like this
:
(15) There is a possible world, Alpha, in which all
significantly free beings are omnibenevolent
.
where a being is significantly free just in case there is
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some morally significant
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set of alternatives open to it.
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is also assumed to be true. From (13) and (16) it follows
that
:
(18) God can bring about Alpha.
is true. From (13), (17) and (18) we can infer
(19) .It is not morally permissible for God to bring
about any possible world which contains moral evil.
From (1A), however we know that
(20) God did bring about a possible world containing
moral evil
is true and hence from (19) and the definition of omnibene-
volence that
(21) God is not omnibenevolent
is true. (21), of course, is inconsistent with our initial
claim, (13). So (13) and (1A) remain inconsistent.
Plantinga
' s response to Mackie's objection does not
deny that Alpha is indeed a possible world. Rather, Plan-
tinga s strategy is to reject (16). Plantinga asks, "Was
is within the power of an omnipotent God to create just any
logically possible world? This is the important question
for the Free Will Defense, and a subtle question it is."^
Plantinga proceeds with a subtle and elaborate response to
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this question eventually concluding that there may be pos-
sible worlds which even an omnipotent God cannot bring
about. (We need not delve into the details of his response
for the purposes of our discussion.) Plantinga claims that
a conjunction of
(22)
God brings about a world containing moral good
and
(23) Every essence suffers from transworld depravity
is possible where transworld depravity is characterized as
(24) An essense E suffers from transworld depravity ifand only if for every world W such that E entails theproperties j_s
_significantly free i
n
W_ and always does
——— if- there is a state of affairs T andan action A such that
(1) T is the largest state of affairs God strong-ly actualizes in W,
(2) A is morally significant for E's instantia-
tion in W
and
(3) if God had strongly actualized T, E’s instan-
tiation would have gone wrong with respect to A
solves Mackie's version of the problem of evil. It is
possible that every possible being (individual essence)
that God could have created is such that there is some set
circumstances in which that being would have sinned.
Although Alpha is a possible world, it is possible that
Alpha is not a world that God could have brought about.
As long as we are considering only moral goodness,
Plantinga's response to Mackie's objection is successful.
However, Morris's proposal creates problems. Mackie can
restate his objection. Surely, one might hold
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is true. If the (25) ls true then God CQuld a
in which there is good, but there is no evil. And given
that he did not do so, it seems that God is not omnibenevo-
lent. Plantinga cannot respond to (25) with the conjunc-
tion of (22) and (23) because the notion of transworld
depravity is irrelevant to this case. A metaphysically
good being is not required to be significantly free. Thus
a metaphysically good being need not find itself in any
circumstances in which it must choose between good and evil
and in which it goes wrong. Metaphysically free beings are
of a higher order than morally good beings and are simply
good by nature.
We noted earlier Plantinga's claim that "...the heart
of the Free Will Defense is the claim that it is possible
that God could not have created a universe containing moral
good ... without creating one containing moral evil." 8
Perhaps we can summarize our objection to Morris as fol-
lows. According to Morris moral goodness is but one kind
of axiological goodness. While it is true that it is
possible that God could not have created a world containing
moral goodness without creating a world containing moral
evil, the Free Will Defense does nothing to show that God
could not have created a world containing axiological good-
ness -- namely, metaphysical goodness -- and containing no
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moral evil or any axiological evil. Thus Morris's solution
to PONO cuts the heart out of the Free Will Defense.
I suspect that Morris would not find the above objec-
tion compelling. He would probably respond by claiming
that the above objection relies on a single false premise,
namely, (25). He would probably claim that God cannot
create beings which are metaphysically good. Only God can
have the property of metaphysical goodness, because of his
higher ontological status. This response, however, also
seems somewhat ad hoc. At the very least Morris's solution
to PONO requires of the theist a new solution to the prob-
lem of evil. The theist must now try to show either that
it is impossible for God to create beings that are metaphy-
sically good, or to show that it is somehow better to have
both moral goodness and metaphysical goodness exhibited.
An additional problem arises for Morris's solution to
PONO; it does not provide a solution to POGAS-B. POGAS-B
must be revised taking into account the new definition of
omn i be ne v o 1 e nc e which applies to being which is metaphysi-
caHy good. However, a being which is metaphysically good
seems to have fewer alternatives open to it than a being
which is morally good. Consider for example two beings
Carol and Connie. Carol is morally good (perhaps even
omnibenevolent
,
though not essentially so) while Connie is
metaphysically good. Suppose both Carol and Connie are in
the same circumstances, they are faced with a child about
to drink from a bottle of sulfuric acid. Carol has a
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number of alternatives open to her. She can bring about
any of the following states of affairs:
(Si) the child's being told to stop
the
1
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Carol can bring about any of (Si) - (Siii). She is morally
good so we can evaluate her moral status by seeing which
state of affairs she chooses to bring about. Connie, on
the other hand, being metaphysically good cannot bring
about (Sm) because it is morally impermissible for her to
bring it about. It is not within her power to bring about
(Sm). Thus even if Morris's solution to PONO is success-
ful, it does not provide a solution to POGAS-B. Metaphysi-
cal goodness clearly conflicts with the traditional Thom-
istic definition of omnipotence.
Ill
A second sort of response to PONO is offered by Norman
Kretzmann and Eleanor Stump in a paper entitled "Absolute
Simplicity." 9 The purpose of the paper is a defense of the
traditional claim that God is simple. In Stump and Kretz-
mann s view the most formidable objections to the doctrine
of simplicity arise in connection with God's acting freely.
It is sometimes claimed that a simple being cannot perform
anything freely; all of its actions would be done of neces-
sity. It is at this point that PONO and POGAS arise be-
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cause it seems that a prerequisite of omnibenevolence is
free choice among morally significant alternatives. The
to these problems proposed by Stump and Kretzmann
is not directly linked to the doctrine of simplicity; that
is, theirs is not a solution open only to those who also
accept the claim that God is simple. Thus we need not
delve into the details of their defense of simplicity.
Stump and Kretzmann do not make a claim of originality
for their solution to POGAS-B and PONO. Rather they are,
they say, reviving a view presented by Thomas Aquinas.
Stump and Kretzmann summarize their position by noting that
PONO and PQGAS arise ”... by adding to perfect being
theology the familiar assumption that a free will is essen-
tially an independent, neutral capacity for choosing among
alternatives ." 10 They propose to solve the problem by
arguing, following Aquinas, that the will is "... fundamen-
tally neither independent nor neutral ." 11 In the termino-
logy that we have been using, Stump and Kretzmann will
argue that moral goodness does not depend upon choice among
morally significant alternatives. Their solution is simi-
lar to Morris's in that God is not required to have choice
in order to be considered morally good. Their solution is
different from Morris's in that they allow that choice
among morally significant alternatives is not required for
human beings to be good either. They do, however, acknow-
ledge that human beings frequently are faced with morally
significant alternatives.
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Stump and Kretzmann propose to solve PONO by appealing
the will and its connection to goodness. Furthermore,
Stump and Kretzmann want to continue to hold that a free
will that free choice — is essential to goodness.
Stump and Kretzmann define the will as "... a self-direct-
ed, rational wanting of the good..." 12 The primitive term
m their characterization of will seems to be the notion of
wanting
. If x wants y then x has an inclination toward y.
x hopes to acquire or to achieve y. Following Aquinas
Stump and Kretzmann first of all claim that
(26) Human beings want what is good
is necessarily true. (26) describes an essential charac-
teristic of human beings. Stump and Kretzmann then distin-
guish two different kinds of wanting the good.
The first kind of wanting the good is an instinctive
wanting of the good. It is not governed by the intellect.
Stump and Kretzmann give two examples of this sort of
wanting, namely the instincts to seek for food and shelter.
Presumably one could add to this other examples such as the
instinct of fighting for survival or an instinct for sex.
The object of the wanting is, in all of the cases, some-
thing that is good.
The second sort of wanting is one that is governed by
the intellect; it is a rational wanting of the good. The
intellect is a faculty separate from the faculty of wanting
(or appetite). In particular what this means for Stump and
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Kretzmann is that the intellect directs one's wantings
toward certain intermediate goals which will lead one to
the good. For example, borrowing from Aristotle, if health
IS the good that one wants, the intellect may direct one to
want to eat no meat because the intellect presents meat as
a detriment to one's health.
Stump and Kretzmann take (26) to be necessarily true.
That, however, seems to raise a problem for them. If a
person necessarily wants what is good and can only do what
he or she wills, then it seems that the will is not free.
For the will must do what it perceives is good. Thus the
will is not free. It is necessitated. Stump and Kretzmann
need to discuss how it is that the will is free. Freedom
of the will they sometimes call self-directedness
. They
write that the will is free because it can act independent-
ly of the intellect. So although it is a faculty that is
directed by the intellect it is also a separate and inde-
pendent faculty. The independence of the will from the
intellect -- and hence the freedom -- of the will is char-
acterized by three capacities. The will has the capacity
(in human beings) '.
.
. (1) to choose among alternatives
presented as equally good, (2) to refrain from pursuing a
subsidiary end presented as good, and (3) to direct the
intellect s attention . " ^ If the will has any of these
three capacities then it is free.
Evil comes about in two basic ways. First, the intel-
lect can present to the will as good something that is bad.
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Then acting on this incorrect information, the will does
something that is in fact bad, even though it intends to do
something that is good. For instance, the intellect may
present drinking sulfuric acid as something that is good;
perhaps the sulfuric acid is in a Coke bottle and the
intellect does not perceive the nature of the contents.
The will then directs the person to drink the contents of
the Coke bottle and the person is harmed. The will has
done something wrong. Secondly, the will of a person can
fail to do something that is presented to it by the intel-
lect as good. This, according to Stump and Kretzmann, is
because
... the will of any temporal, imperfect entity is
capable of leaving its potentialities unactualized." 14
Goodness does not come, then, as a result of choices be-
tween good and evil. If the will is presented with two
alternatives one of which is presented as bad or evil, the
will cannot choose it. So the account of omnibenevolence
that is presented in Chapter I and which involves morally
significant alternatives is completely misguided. We can
su 8§6 s t then three claims to use in this proposal.
(27) A being is good at a time t if and only if there
is no alternative action A open to it with a higher
value than the action which it wills at t.
(28) A being is omnibenevolent if and only if it is
good at all times.
(29) A being is necessarily omnibenevolent if and
only if it is omnibenevolent in every possible world
in which it exists.
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According to Stump and Kretzmann it is clear that God
is omnibenevolent. Since God is omniscient there is no
possibility of his bringing about some moral evil because
intellect has misrepresented some evil as a good.
God's intellect could not present anything to him incor-
rectly. Furthermore, God is an atemporal, eternal being.
Hence, God has no unactualized potential. Therefore, God
cannot bring about moral evil by failing to bring about
something which the intellect has presented as good. Since
God is atemporal, all of his actions are done in the eter-
nal present. God does everything simultaneously. So God
cannot do moral evil.
There are three problems with Stump and Kretzmann's
response to PONO. The first problem is that Stump and
Kretzmann's proposal depends on the controversial notion
that God is atemporal. Many philosophers would reject
their proposal simply because of this assumption. It is
beyond the scope of this essay to discuss this issue in any
depth. Suffice it to say that depending on the claim that
God is outside of time is a liability for Stump and Kretz-
mann
' s proposal
.
The second problem for Stump and Kretzmann's proposal
is that it rests upon premise which is either false or
vacuous because it is not falsifiable. Following Aquinas,
Stump and Kretzmann assert that (26) is necessarily true.
Yet it seems that some people do not want what is good.
Some people seem to be self destructive. Initially (26)
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to be false. There seem to be cases in which people
choose to do something evil simply because it is evil. For
instance, a young man, Randall, may choose to burglarize a
neighbor's home as an act of rebellion against his father.
His reason for doing so is that he knows that his father
objects. He knows that his actions will hurt his father.
Stump and Kretzmann might hold that Randall might be-
lieve that the the good which will result from his action
(namely, his own pleasure at hurting his father) will
outweigh the evil results of his action. Thus in reality
Randall conforms to the claim made in (26).
Suppose, however, that Randall knows that his attitude
is wrong. Furthermore, he knows that he will feel guilty
about his behavior. It seems possible that there will be
no good results from Randall's actions. He may simply want
that which is evil.
If such a situation is possible, then (26) is not
necessarily true, as Stump and Kretzmann claim it is.
Furthermore, it seems likely that there may be people such
as Randall, in which case (26) is false. Stump and Kretz-
mann might still hold that Randall thinks that hurting his
father is somehow worthwhile, that hurting his father is
somehow good. Such a claim, however, would seem to make
(26) unf alsif iable
; there is no evidence which can count
against it
.
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A third problem with Stump and Kretzmann's proposed
solution is that their view of free will seems to be a
quasi-compatibilist one. For the most part an omnibenevo-
ient being's choices will be compelled. It can do whatever
it wills, but it can only will that which its infallible
intellect presents to it as the best among alternatives.
The omnlbenevolent, omniscient being will make choices only
if it is faced with alternatives of equal value which are
not exceeded in value by any alternatives. This is a
quasi-compatibilist view because while there are some gen-
uine free choices, many "free" choices are determined.
This quasi-compatibilism causes one major problem, it
does not allow Stump and Kretzmann to solve the Thomist
version POGAS-B. Stump and Kretzmann do not suggest any
alternative definition of omnipotence. If D4 (or even
Flint and Freddoso's more careful D4b) is correct, then an
omnlbenevolent being cannot be omnipotent. One of Flint
and Freddoso's conditions of adequacy for a Thomist defini-
tion of omnipotence is that "...no being should be consid-
ered omnipotent if he lacks the kind of power which it is
clear an omnipotent agent ought to possess." 15 Stump and
Kretzmann s omnibenevolent being, however, could not bring
about a great many states of affairs. Those states of
affairs to which there are more valuable alternatives for
the omnibenevolent being to bring about. So there is still
a conflict between omnipotence and omnibenevolence. By
183
itself, then
, Stump and Kretzmann's proposed solution to
POGAS-B is inadequate.
In this chapter, then, we have seen that besides
POGAS-B, there is a problem with the notion of necessary
omnibenevoience
. It seems that, given D1.9 - our defini-
tion of omnibenevoience
— it is impossible for any being
to be necessarily omnibenevolent
. But the traditional
conception of God requires that God be necessarily omnibe-
nevolent. The major problem is that D1.9 requires that a
being properly choose between morally significant alterna-
tives in order to be considered omnibenevolent. However,
if morally significant alternatives are open to a being,
then that being chooses a morally permissible action in
some possible world. If a being chooses some morally
impermissible alternative in some possible world, then that
being is not necessarily omnibenevolent. We also looked at
two proposed solutions to PONO. Thomas Morris’s solution
suggests that there are two types of goodness that can be
attributed to beings, moral goodness -- which requires
choice among morally significant alternatives -- and meta-
physical which does not require such choices. Morris holds
that God is metaphysically, rather than morally, good.
Thus God need not choose among morally significant alterna-
tives. This proposal was rejected because it is a
d
hoc, it
raises significant problems for the theist in solving the
problem of evil, and it does not, assuming a Thomist defi-
nition of omnipotence, solve POGAS-B.
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second proposal is made by Eleanor Stump and Norman
Kretzmann. They suggest an alternative definition of free
will which is basically a compatibilist definition of free
will. Their solution also depends on a dubious assumption
about human nature - that beings always seek what is good
and on a dubious assumption about God — that God is
atemporal
. Thus Stump and Kretzmann's proposal is also
rejected. In the following chapter we will attempt to find
understanding of omnipotence and omnibenevolence which will
solve both POGAS-B and PONO.
an
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CHAPTER VII
A PAIR OF MORE PLAUSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In the final chapter of this essay we shall look at
two more solutions to POGAS-B and PONO. In the first
section we shall present and evaluate a clever and attrac-
tive proposal by Thomas Morris. In the second section I
will suggest a solution that combines Anselmian definition
of omnipotence with a broader definition of omnibe-
ne vo lence .
One attractive solution to both POGAS-B and PONO is
suggested by Thomas V. Morris in a paper entitled "Proper-
ties, Modalities and God ". 1 i n this section of this essay
we shall present Morris's proposed solution. Secondly, we
shall discuss a purported advantage of his proposal. Fi-
nally we whall argue that it is not clear that Morris's
argument has the advantage that he says it has.
In order to understand Morris's solution, we need to
understand a number of concepts of which he makes use. He
suggests that there are modalities other than necessity and
possibility that need to be examined. He suggests that we
need to examine beyond whether or not entities have proper-
ties necessarily or contingently. He writes, "...I want to
suggest that there are other modalities of property exem-
whose examination can throw some light on the-
istic claims about the nature of God. 2
Morris suggests several definitions. The first mode
of property of exemplification is that of being a temporary
property. He writes, "It often happens that an individual
begins 4 to have a property, exemplifies it for a while, and
then ceases to have it. Let us call any such property
exemplification the having of a temporary property." 3 An
example of such a property would be the property wearing a
r_e_d s hirt
. We will define it a bit more precisely as
follows
:
(D7.1) P is a temporary property of x =df There is atime t such that at t x begins to have P and there is
a time t such that t is before t', and x has P fromto to t and at t f x ceases to have P.
Morris notes that not all properties are temporary
properties. He writes, "It may happen ... that an indivi-
dual has a property which it cannot cease to have. Let us
refer to such a case as one of an enduring property." 4 An
example of an enduring property would be the property
having uttered one s first sentence
. Once you have uttered
your first sentence, then it can never be that case that
you have never uttered a sentence. We can define this
property more precisely as follows:
(D7.2)P is an enduring property of x =df There is a
time t such that (i) at t, x has P and ( i i ) for any
time t
,
such that t is prior to t'
,
if x exists at
t '
,
then at t ' x has P.
Morris also identifies a third modality of property
exemplification. He writes, "Likewise, it is conceivable
that an object have a property which it cannot have begun
to have. We shall call this an immemorial property." 3 For
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example
, the property be^ a virgin is an immemorial
property. We can define this modality more precisely as
follows
:
time
3
1 such P
ro P ert Y of x =df There is a
prior tn f f
1 f ° r ever y time t’ such that t’ is
i a tM p eX1St K ^ o' th6n at X has P and' ) ot , x does not have P.
In addition Morris introduces two other concepts. Any
property which is both immemorial and enduring for a person
is immutable for that person. More precisely
V s an ±™mutahle property of x =df For anytime t, if x exists at t, then at t, x has P.
Any property which is either enduring, immemorial, or im-
mutable for a person is a stable property. A precise defi-
nition would simply involve, the disjunction of (D7.2),
(D7.3), and (D7.4).
Morris also distinguishes between strong and weak
versions of those modalities of property exemplification.
Any entity which exists at all times — that is, any ever-
lasting entity -- can have strongly stable properties. An
entity which is not everlasting can only have weakly stable
properties. He writes, "A property can be immemorial,
enduring or immutable in either a weak or a strong sense.
A property is weakly enduring for an individual just in
case that individual has the property, and there can be no
-LLme dur ing the individual ' s existence when it will have
ceased to have that property. It is strongly enduring just
in case it is exemplified and there can be n o time at which
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the individual
definition of
ceases to have it." 6 Morris offers simiiar
weakly and strongly immemorial properties and
are
weakly and strongly immutable properties.
This final distinction is not required and hence not
especially useful. There are not separate senses of these
modalities of property exemplification. Rather, there
number of different ways in which objects exist through
time. Some objects may exist at all times. Others may
have no beginning, but have a time at which they cease to
exist. Still others may have a beginning, but no ending.
And yet others may have both a beginning and an ending.
Given that objects do not exemplify properties at times at
which they do not exist, the distinction between weak and
strong senses of these modalities of property exemplifi-
cation can be dispensed with. For the definition of an
enduring property, for instance, will be the same for both
temporally finite objects and a temporally infinite ob-
j e c t s .
Using these modal concepts we can state Morris's pro-
posed solution to POGAS-B. Morris suggests that the tradi-
tional theist may wish to give up (B3), the claim that
necessarily God is omni benevolent
.
(Clearly, this proposal
also solves PONO)
. Rather the theist should note the
following
:
(N) Omnibenevolence is an immutable property of God.
More precisely (N) says:
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(N*) Necessarily for any beins x if <-
k
t and a world w' such that x i!
X
”.
l
.
there 13 a time
and omnibenevolent at t in w
S
°^ ni
^
cient
’ omnipotent,
w, x is omnibenevolent at t in v?
n 3117 ^
Morris offers two arguments for (N*). Since the two
arguments are substantially similar, we will consider only
one of them. The argument is a reductio
. so we assume
(1)
Yahweh is God in world until time t*
o r
(1) (t)[(t < n ) fb Gjst]
is true, where 'Gxyz' means 'x is God in world y at time
Z ’’ ' j
' is a constant referring to Yahweh, 's' is a con-
stant referring to a world w,, and '„' is a constant refer-
ring to a time t
. We also assume
(2) Yahweh sins at t^ in w-^
or
( 2 ) S j s n
where ’Sxyz’ means 'x sins in a world y at time z\ A
third assumption is
(3) If.
a
being sins at any time in a world, then that
eing is not God after that time in that world
or
(3) (x) (w) ( t ) ( Sxwt 5 ( z) [ ( t < z) Z> Gxwz ] } .
From (2) and (3) we can infer
(4) Yahweh is not God after t' in w^
or
(4) (z) [ (n < z) 3 ~G j sz ] .
That is, we are imagining a world in which there is a being
who is God for a time, sins and thereby ceases to be God.
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argues that such a world is impossible. He proceeds
by asking us to consider a time, t*-l, immediately prior to
t • From (1) we know that
(5)
Yahweh is God at t*-l in
or
( 5 ) G j sa
is true, where 'a' is a constant referring to t*-l. From
the traditional understanding of God we know that
(6) Necessarily, whoever is God at any time in aworid is omniscient at that time in that world
o r
(6) (x) (w) ( t) [Gxwt ( z ) (Tz Kxzwt )
]
is true, where 'Kwxyz' means 'w knows proposition x in
world y at time z ant 'Tx' means ' x is true.' Furthermore,
Morris notes that God does nothing unintentionally. That
is
,
(7) For any state of affairs S, the being B, who isGod in a world w at a time t actualizes S in w at t if
and only if there is a state of affairs S'which in-
volves B's intending to actualize S in w at t such
that B actualizes S ' in w at a time immediately prior
or
(7) (w)(x)(y(z) { [ (Sy & Gxwz) D Axywz] 3> {(Ez') Pz'z
& ( Ey
' ) [ ( Iy ' xywz & Axy'wz']}}
is true, where 'Sx' means 'x is a state of affairs',
Itwxyz means t is a state of affairs which involves w's
intending to bring about x in world y at time z' , and 'Pxy'
means x is a time immediately prior to y'
. In order to
make Morris's argument work we need to add a definition of
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sinning
, namely
inly if
t>
B
1
a
8
f
B
t
1 " 3 ln 3 W ° rld " at at time 11 if and
such iLf atuallzes a State of affairs S in w at t
about S in w at 1“ permissibla f °r B to bring
o r
(8)
(w) (x) (z) (Sxwz 3 (Ey)[(Sy & Axywz) S ~Mxywz]).
From (2) and (8) we can infer
oh,- .
Yabweh actualizes in at t* a state of affairsch it is not morally permissible for him toactualize
or
(9) (Ey)[(Sy & Ajysn) & Mjysn].
Let us instantiate (9). We will assume that torturing
ranatent £jvildren is the state of affairs which Yahweh
brings about at t'\ That is,
(10) Yahweh tortures innocent children at t* in w, andit is not morally permissible for him to do so at tin w
^
or
(10) (Sb & Ajbsn) & ~Mjbsn
is assumed, where b is a constant referring to the state
of affairs torturing innocent children
. From (1), (7), and
(10) we can infer that
(11) There is a state of affairs S which involves
Yahweh's intending to torture innocent children at t*
in w^ and Yahweh actualizes S at t ‘ — 1 in w
^
or
(11) (Ey)[(Sy & Iyjbsn) & Ajysa]
is true, given that t -1 is the time immediately prior to
t . A final assumption that Morris makes is that it is not
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morally permissible to intend to sin. He writes, "Given
intentions to sin are just as much worthy of blame as
the act or acts intended, an intention to sin is itself a
sin -.7 So the last assumption in Morris's argument is
(12) If a being B actualizes a state of affairs S' ata txme t in a world „ that involves B's in ending toactualize a state of affairs S at a later time ?' In w
to^ctlLillValV’'- 13 " OC morall y Permissible for B
a
^ ^ 1 n w
> then it is not morallvpermissible for B to bring about S' at t in w.
or
(12)(w)(x)(y)(y
' )( z )(
Mxy
' wz
' } o ( Axy wz &
5
* ) { [ ( S y & I y x y
1
Mxy wz
)
wz ) & Axywz] &
From (10), (11), and (12) we can infer
o r
(13) Yahweh actualizes a state of affairs at t*-l in
!l SU<
r'
h
^
hat
^
is not morally permissible for Yahwehto actualize that state of affairs at t" in w
x
(13) (Ey)(Ajysa & Mjysa).
From (8) and (13) we can infer that
(14) Yahweh sins at t‘ in w
^
or
(14)
is tr ue
.
(15)
o r
(15) (x) [ (a < x) D ~ G j s x
]
is true. From (15) and the knowledge that t is after t -1
we can infer
(16) Yahweh is not God at t in w^
or
S jsa
From (14) and (3) we can infer that
Yahweh is not God in w-^ after t —
1
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(16) Gjsn.
(16), however, contradicts our original assumption that
Yahweh is God until t*. Since one could develop completely
isomorphic arguments for times prior to t*-l one can con-
clude that Yahweh was always sinful in Wj. So Morris
ludes that a being cannot have the property being God
for a time and then lose that property by sinning. Being
God_ is an immutable property. So (N*) is true.
It should be noted that this argument is meant to
apply only to whatever being has the property being God.
Morris does not assume that all sentient beings act only on
the basis of prior intent. However, since whoever is God
is omniscient, that being will know what he will do in the
future. And Morris assumes that knowing that you will
bring about a state of affairs S in the future is the same
thing as intending to bring about S.
Furthermore, Morris's last assumption is made with the
understanding that God is the being under consideration.
(12) is clearly not unversally true. The intention to sin
is sinful only if one knowingly intends to sin. That is,
suppose a person P intends to bring about a state of af-
fairs S. In addition, assume that it is morally wrong for
P to bring about S. However, P does not know that it is
wrong to bring about S, and P is not in any relevant way
being epistemically negligent. Surely, in such a case, P
195
does not do anything morally wrong by intending to
ualize S.
act-
On the other hand, if P knous thac it ls morally „ rong
to actualize S and nevertheless intends to actualize S,
then P's intention is morally wrong. This sort of consid-
eration, of course, need not detain Morris since whoever is
God, being omniscient, knows which actions are morally
permissible and which are not morally permissible. So
prior to any action whoever is God knows whether or not his
intended action is morally permissible.
Morris claims that this result, (N»), is an attractive
one with regard to POGAS-B. It is attractive because it
allows one to drop the traditional claim that necessarily
God Is omnibenevolent without sacrificing a primary motiva-
tion behind the traditional claim. A primary reason for
claiming that necessarily God is omnibenevolent is that the
theist is concerned about God's dependability. If God is
necessarily omnibenevolent, then he is necessarily depend-
able, that is, he will keep all of his promises; he will
always act justly and the like. If one gives up necessary
omnibenevolence as an attribute of God, then one does solve
POGAS-B and PONO. However, one also introduces an element
of uncertainty in that it is now possible for God to sin.
If it is possible for God to sin, then God may not be
dependable. The concern with dependability is an epistemic
concern. Since metaphysically it is possible that God sin,
for all we know, this may be a world in which God does sin.
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Metaphysical possibility raises a problem of epistemic
possibility
.
Morris claims that this epistemic concern -- this
concern with God's dependablity - can be dealt with by
noting that omnibenevolence is an enduring property. If
God is sinless, then he cannot cease to be sinless. Since
one cannot lose the property of sinlessness (if one is
omniscient), a sinless, omniscient being is perfectly de-
pendable. So PONO and POGAS-B are solved and one can still
be confident that God is dependable.
Morris's solution, however, is unacceptable. If there
is a being which necessarily is God, and if sinlessness is
a necessary condition of divinity, as (2) suggests, then
either God is necessarily omnibenevolent or Morris's solu-
tion is epistemically deficient. Recall that in arguing
for (
N
v
) Morris writes, "Let us suppose ... there is a
possible world Ws in which an individual who in that world
is God, say Yahweh, sins at some time t and thereby loses
_t_h_e s tatus o_f deity which he has enjoyed up until t."® It
seems clear from this quotation that Morris holds that
sinlessness is a necessary condition of divinity. This
necessary condition of sinlessness can hold either neces-
sarily or contingently. Suppose that it holds necessarily.
That is, suppose that Morris believes that
(17) Necessarily, if a being B is God, then B is
sinless
or
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( 17) (w)(x) (Gxw Z2> ~S xw )
where Gxy means 'x is God in world y' and ’Sxy'
meanS '* Sins in world y
'
(We will dispense with temporal
indices at this point because they would needlessly compli-
cate the argument. Unfortunately for Morris, from (Bl) -
the assumption someone is necessarily God — and (17)
can infer
sinlels
6re ^ 3 bein§ SUch that nece ssarily it is
o r
we
(18) (Ex)(w)(~Sxw)
Clearly, Morris does not hold (17) to be true, for it
yields another version of POGAS. Perhaps, then, he is
committed to the contingent claim
(19) If a being B is God in the actual world, then Bis sinless in the actual world
o r
( 19 ) ( x ) ( Gxe ~Sxe )
where T e' is a constant referring to the actual world.
But Morris offers no reason for thinking that (19) is true
If sinlessness is not an essential property of God, then
either (19) is true or
(20) If a being B is God in the actual world, then B
is not sinless in the actual world
or
( 20 ) ( x ) (Gxe Sxe
)
is true. Morris seems to think that (19) is true, but he
does not say why.
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In order to know that (19) is true in the actual
world, we must know not only that a certain being, say
Yahweh
,
is God, we must also know that there is some period
of time at which Yahweh is sinless tu„ f. 1 he first requirement,
knowing that Yahweh is God, is difficult, but it is a
difficulty that arises for the traditional theist and for
Morns. The second requirement -- knowing that there is a
period of time at which Yahweh is sinless - is more diffi-
cult to meet than the first requirement. And it arises
only for Morris, not for the traditional theist.
The reason that this second requirement arises for
Morris and not for the traditional theist is clear. Once
the traditional theist determines that Yahweh is God, it
follows that Yahweh is omnibenevolent
,
since God is essen-
tially omnibenevolent
. If Yahweh is omnibenevolent, then
he is sinless and dependable.
However, once Morris determines that Yahweh is God, he
must determine whether or not there is a period of time
during which Yahweh is sinless. If there is such a time,
then Yahweh is always sinless and hence dependable. That
is, (19) is true. On the other hand, if there is no such
period of time, then Yahweh is never sinless and hence is
not dependable. That is, (20) is true. This second epis-
temic requirement cannot be fulfilled in a way satisfactory
to Morris, however. In some cases one can determine wheth-
er Yahweh has sinned. There may be some action one can
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positively attribute to Yahweh which is morally „ r 0 ng. I„
that case we know that Yahweh is not sinless; we know that
(20) is true.
On the other hand we cannot determine that Yahweh is
sinless for a period of time. The method for determining
that Yahweh is sinless is by observing his actions. Sup-
pose that we observe that Yahweh has not committed any
observable sin from the beginning of time to time t. (The
epistemic problems with making this observation are large,
but we will suppose that we could make such an observa-
tion.) This observation does not guarantee that Yahweh is
sinless throughout that period. Yahweh’s overt sin may yet
be in the future. If that is the case, Yahweh has always
sinned because of his knowledge that he intends to sin.
Such intentions are protected by priveleged access. We
cannot know what Yahweh's intentions are. Of course, Yahweh
can tell us that his intentions are never to sin, but we
have no way of knowing whether he telling the truth. So
for any period of time during which Yahweh appears to be
sinless, we cannot know what his intentions are and hence
cannot know whether he is really sinless during that per-
iod. We cannot know, then, whether (19) is true as Morris
assumes
.
Morris’s solution to P0N0 and POGAS-B, then, loses
some of its attraction because of this epistemic diffi-
culty. It requires not only that one establish that Yahweh
is God (as the traditional view does), but also that one
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establish that there is
Yah we h is sinless, which
a period of time during which
that traditional view does not
require. While the first requirement is difficult to ful
fill, the second is impossible.
II
Both PONO and POGAS-B can be solved within the con-
fines of the traditional concept of God. The solution can
achieved by adopting an Anselmian type understanding of
omnipotence and bv modifying our understanding of omnibene-
volence. The solution will avoid the problems attributed
to earlier solutions. That is, it will solve both POGAS-B
and POGAS-C
. It does not undercut the free will defense
against the problem of evil. And it does not call into
question whether or not God is worthy of worship.
We will begin by modifying our definition of omnibene-
volence. Thomas Morris, Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann
all respond to PONO by trying to allow that a being be good
without being faced with any morally significant choices.
While the particular solutions that they propose fail,
their insight is correct. The heart of PONO is that our
understanding of omnibenevolence requires morally signifi-
cant choices in order to regard a being as either good or
bad. I suggest, first, that we make a distinction between
impeccability and omnibenevolence.
(D7.5) A being B is impeccable at t =df For any state
of affairs S, if B brings about S at t or if B has
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As ( D 7
. 5 ) indicates, impeccability is sinlessness.
Many entitities may be impeccable. A rock and a computer
may both be impeccable. A rock is impeccable because it
does not bring about any states of affairs. Hence it
vacuously satisfies the antecedent clause in the definien-
dum of (D7.5). A computer is impeccable because it does
not f reely bring about any states of affairs. Hence, it
cannot be held morally responsible for those states of
affairs that it brings about. The perfection of God de-
mands that God be necessarily impeccable. Necessary impec-
cability is not problematic because it does not require a
being to make morally significant choices.
We also need to revise our definition of omnibenevo-
lence. In particular we need to enlarge our definition of
morally significant sets of alternatives. In order to see
that it is legitimate to enlarge this definition consider
an example. Suppose that your paper girl comes to your
door to collect payment for your subscription to the daily
newspaper. Your bill is six dollars. Suppose furthermore
that there is an armed police officer with your paper girl
and he is authorized to execute you if you fail to pay your
bill. Furthermore, the police officer is aware that you
are able to pay your bill. In this case, practically
speaking you have no choice but to pay your bill. To do
your duty and pay your bill in this circumstance is not
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especially praiseworthy. You could act choose to do what
wrong in this case, so we learn nothing about your
character from your action.
However, suppose that you choose not only to pay the
bill, but also to give the girl a tip. So you give her a
ten dollar bill and tell her to keep the change. This is
not required of you. No harm will come to you if you fail
to tip. Your service will not suffer; the policeman will
not pistol whip you, etc. You simply choose to be gener-
ous. We do learn something about your character in this
situation. The paper girl will be grateful in a way that
would not be grateful if you had simply paid your bill
You not only did what was morally permissible (which was
unavoidable) but you did what was supererogatory. Hence,
you are good in the sense of being praiseworthy, despite
the fact that you could not have done what was morally
impermissible
.
Similarly, we can lay blame on a person even if that
person had no morally permissible alternative. Suppose
that on Saturday Max has only $100 and has a $200 debt to
Karen. He has promised that he will pay off the debt that
day. Inevitably, Max will break his promise, which is
morally impermissible. However, if Max pays none of the
debt and instead uses the $100 to buy several copies of The
Complete Poems of Leonard Nimo
y
we would think him a bad
person for doing so. It does not matter that he had
morally permissible alternative.
It is clear from these examples that sets of alterna-
tives can be morally significant even in cases where all
the alternatives are permissible or none of the alterna-
tives are permissible. Let us distnguish, then, three
types of sets of morally significant alternatives
n!tn'!e =
S 13 3 Se
£
° £ Dlorall >' significant mixed alter-
open to p
Pe
(iil th~
d£ 1
'
) S 1S 3 Set o£ elternatives
> ( 11 ) ere is a state of affairs SI snrh
and\iL) S the
rally permissible ? to bring about SI
it is not
13 3 State of af fairs, S2, such that
morally permissible for P to bring about S2.
(D7.6) is the same as our original definition of a set of
morally significant alternatives.
(D7.7) S is a set of morally significant good alter-
nn!
1V
!
S
p
P
/
n
.s° l
=df (i) S is a set of alternatives
open to P ( 11 ) For any state of affairs X which is anelement of S; it is morally permissible for P to bring
about X, (in) there is a state of affairs, y, suchthat it is praiseworthy for P to bring about y and(iv) there is a state of affairs, Z, such that it is
not praiseworthy for P to bring about Z.
Not all sets of good alternatives open to a person are sets
of morally significant good alternatives open to that per-
son. It may be that all the alternatives are of equal
value. Such is the case in Stump and Kretzmann's account
of omni bene vo 1 ence
.
For the sake of symmetry we can also include
(D7.8) S is a set of morally significant bad alterna-
tives open to P =df (i) S is a set of alternatives
open to P (ii). For any state of affairs X, which is
an element of S, it is not morally permissible for P
to bring about X, (iii) there is a state of affairs,
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y, such that it is
and (iv) there is
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blameworthy for P to bring about ystate of affairs, Z, such that itto bring about Z
.
order to define omnibenevolence we need to add one other
set of definitions.
and
mixed
)
altprnat-
C ° nl
^ lete Set o£ morall y significanternatives open to P =df (i) S is a set nf
(ii) P
y
m ui?
n
h
f 1Cant mixed alternatives open to P and
\ ) st bring about some element of S.
(D7 10) S is a complete set of morallygood alternatives open to P =df (i) S
moraily significant good alternativesin) P must bring about some member of
significant
is a set of
open to P and
S
.
An analogous definition could be offered of a complete set
of morally significant bad alternatives open to a person
but is not necessary for our purposes.
We are now in a position to offer a revised definition
of omnibenevolence.
(D7.ll) P is omn i be ne vo 1 e n t =df
(i) (a) There is a complete set of morally significant
mixed alternatives open to P and (b) for every com-plete set, S, of morally significant mixed alterna-
tives open to P, P brings about a member, y, of S onlyif it is morally permissible for P to bring about y:
or
(ii) there is a complete set of morally significant
good alternatives open to P such that P brings about a
member, y, of S such that it is praiseworthy for P to
bring about y;
and
(iii) P is impeccable.
The primary connective in (D7.ll) is the "and" between
clauses (ii) and (iii). The "or" between clauses (i) and
(ii) should be understood inclusively. God need not be
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regarded as necessarily omnibenevolent
. It seems that in
the Christian tradition God is not regarded as necessarily
Omni bene vo lent. It is often held that God could have
chosen not to redeem anyone. He could have simply left all
sinners to be condemned. In doing so he would do that
Which is morally permissible. However, he would not have
acted in a praiseworthy manner. He would only have acted
correctly. He would have acted justly toward everyone and
so would have been impeccable. In the actual world, God
does show grace by redeeming some people and hence is to be
praised for his action.
If (D7-.5) and (D7.ll) are used and we continue to hold
to a Thomistic definition of omnipotence, POGAS-B is not
solved. It is clear that, if God is necessarily impec-
cable, then he does not bring about states of affairs such
as
S 6 torturing innocent children
in any possible world. However, as we noted earlier, there
seem to be some metaphysically possible states of affairs
such that necessarily it is morally impermissible for God
to bring about. Since these states of affairs are pos-
sible, God does bring them about in some possible world, on
the Thomist view. Thus POGAS— B remains.
POGAS-B can be avoided, however, by combining (D7.5),
(D7.ll) and an Anselmian definition of omnipotence. Recall
that Anselmian definitions of omnipotence acknowledge that
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there are some states of affairs which an omnipotent being
cannot bring about. We will adopt the Geach-Anselmian
definition of omnipotence. Since the Geach-Anselmian defi-
nition of omnipotence does not require that a perfect being
be able to bring about all metaphysically possible states
of affairs, POGAS-B does not arise. One can acknowledge
that necessarily, God is omnipotent.
This solution has a number of advantages. First, it
is consistent with the traditional view that God is a
p rfect being. This view acknowledges, however, that per-
fection, in the case of power, may involve limitations. In
many respects this seems intuitive. Consider an example.
Suppose that Max is evaluating two items of computer soft-
ware. Each piece of software is supposed to perform simple
arithmetic. Max discovers that with software A whenever he
puts in two numbers, X and Y, and asks for the sum of these
numbers, the software yields the correct answer Z. No
matter what numbers Max starts with, software A yields the
correct answer. On the other hand, software B only yields
the correct answer 95% of the time. B can bring about
states of affairs that A cannot bring about. Yet we would,
all else being equal, no doubt regard A as being more
powerful than B. We would also regard A as being better
than B. So the perfection of a being may limit the power
of that being.
The way in which perfection limits power is connected
to what one involves in the concept of perfection. In the
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above example
,
the value of the computer software is deter-
mined by its accuracy. Similarly, the power of a perfect
being Will be limited by the other properties which we
include in the concept of perfection. Traditionally, know-
ledge and moral perfection have been included in the list
of such properties. So a perfect being will not have the
power to be ignorant of something; nor will a perfect being
have the power to act in morally impermissible ways.
A second advantage of this solution is that it is not
subject to the criticisms raised against other proposed
solutions to POGAS. Let us consider those criticisms.
First, it allows that God has free choice, though only
among good alternatives; omnibenevolence is clearly con-
nected to this free choice. Thus the traditional free will
defense against the problem of evil stands unchanged. Un-
like Morris's solution to PONO which attributed to God a
different type of goodness from that which is attributed to
humans, this solution univocally attributes goodness to
both God and human beings.
A second criticism which this solution avoids is the
criticism involving God's worthiness of being worshipped.
One of the characteristics of the God of the Judeo-Chris-
tian tradition is that it is a being which is worshipped by
people. It is often held that God must be worthy of wor-
ship if people are to act responsibly in worshipping him.
If God is not worthy of worship, then it is wrong for
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people to worship him. It is beyond thee scope of this
dissertation to elaborate what the conditions for being
worthy of worship might be; however, it seems that a being
is worthy of worship only if it acts in a genuinely free
way. If its actions are determined, then there is no
reason to be grateful to a being for what it did. It
simply did what it had to do. The Stump and Kretzmann
proposal was criticized because it made God's actions de-
termined. (If there was any choice, it was among equiva-
lent actions.) If God's actions are determined (or quasi-
determined), then God is not praiseworthy on the basis of
his actions. However, since God acts freely, and may
choose to do what is supererogatory, it is possible that
God is praiseworthy on the basis of his actions. The fact
that this solution avoids this criticism is not decisive.
Supererogatory actions are a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for praiseworthiness.
One might ask how this proposal is different from
Morris s proposed solution to PONO. There are two major
differences. The first is that Morris did not propose any
alternative to the Thomist understanding of omnipotence.
Thus, his solution to PONO would not double as a solution
to POGAS-B. Secondly, our solution does not require that
the sort of goodness attributed to God be ontologically
distinct from the sort of goodness attritubed to human
beings. Morris distinguished moral goodness from axiologi-
cal goodness and claimed that moral goodness is an attri-
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bute of human beings while axiological goodness is attri-
buted solely to God.
In the solution proposed here, one type of goodness is
attributed to both God and humans. It is true that one of
the ways of achieving goodness
— namely choosing the moral-
ly permissible alternative among mixed alternatives — is
not open to God. This, however, is not a serious limita-
tion. There are other parallel ways in which God's perfec-
tions distinguish him from human beings. For instance,
human beings can come to know propositions in a couple of
ways. Sometimes people come to know some propositions
directly. Perhaps this happens as a result of sensory
experience. While looking at a great white heron, Connie
comes to believe the proposition There j_s a great white
heron
—
£ront °1 HL£- She does not infer this proposition
from any other proposition or propositions. Connie's
ground for belief is her perception. On other occasions,
however, people come to believe propositions as a result of
inferences from other propositions. Since God is omni-
scient he always knows every true proposition. Since he
always knows every true proposition, he cannot know any
propositions on the result of inferences. For knowing a
proposition, P, as the result of inferences implies that at
one time one did not know P. So an omniscient being cannot
come to know propositions in all the ways that a human
being can come to know propositions. Similarly an impec-
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cable being cannot come to be benevolent in all of the ways
that a human being can come to be benevolent.
An objection that might arise to this proposed solu-
tion is that it implies that God is not required to choose
the best among the alternatives open to him. Some have
held that this is inconsistent with God's being perfect.
For instance, David Basinger suggests that any theist
should be committed to the following principle : 9
(DB) A creator would necessarily wrong someone (vio-late someone s rights), or be less kind to someone
a do fee
omn:Lb
';
nevolen t moral agent must be or manifest
„
“ character if he knowingly created a worldin which he had not chosen to do what he could haveone to maximize the quality of life for all inhabi-tants therein
.
On the the proposal presented above Yahweh would not be
omni benevolent because he does not always choose the best
among the alternatives open to him. According to the
proposal above, Yahweh may knowingly create a world in
which he does not maximize the quality of life for all
inhabitants therein. According to (DB), then, Yahweh is
less kind than an omnibene volent being must be. So if (DB)
is correct, the proposal made above is incorrect.
Before addressing the question of whether or not (DB)
is correct we need to note a number of things about (DB).
First, a significant part of the motivation for (DB),
according to Basinger, is that it is a moral principle
which holds for all morally responsible beings; it applies
to God as well as to human beings. Basinger writes, "I
agree with George Schlesinger ' s contention that we should
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apply as far as possible human ethical standards in our
appraisal of Divine conduct' since 'we have no other no-
tions of good and bad except those appertaining to human
situations. '"10 I also agree with Schlesinger
' s contention,
(and, in fact, have made use of it earlier in this essay).
He continues, it seems clear to me that we as humans
generally do believe that we would do what we can to maxi-
mize the quality of life for others, especially when those
'others' are children which have brought into existence." 11
Second, another significant part of Basinger's motiva-
tion for (DB) is that he believes that (DB) is a necessary
condition for God’s being worthy of worship. He writes,
Accordingly, my question to those ... who would have the
theist deny [(DB)] is the following: Why should theists
desire to worship, or expect nontheists to respect the
concept of, a being who appears not to feel obligated to
act as morally as some humans?" 12
Third, given that God is omnipotent and omniscient, it
seems that all of God's actions will be morally obligatory
for him. There will be no acts of supererogation or of
largesse for God. The only time that there would be any
morally permissible choice for God would be when there are
alternatives of equal value and which are such that there
are no alternatives of higher value.
Fourth, this problem is not unique to my proposed
solution to POGAS and P0N0. This is a problem which has
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troubled Christian theists for centuries. For many thelsts
Seem C ° have wanted to maintain that God can be both omni-
benevolent and also selective with regard to whom he shows
grace. That is, God is just in punishing those who have
sinned. But he also is permitted to save some of the
Sinners from punishment. Presumably he could save all of
the sinners, but he chooses not to do so. Many Christian
theologians and philosophers have maintained that this
decision is compatible with God's being perfect. Others
have seen an incompatibility here. The reason for noting
this point is to show that my proposal is not unique in
raising this question. It is a significant question, but
it is a different issue than POGAS and deserves to be
addressed separately. Giving a full and complete discus-
sion of possible answers to this question is beyond the
scope of this essay. Nonetheless, I will briefly respond
to the proposal made by Basinger and in doing so sketch
what I think is an appropriate approach to the larger
question
.
Basinger believes that (DB) is a moral principle that
applies to all morally responsible agents, but clearly this
is false. Consider the following counterexample. Suppose
that my father is playing chess with me and has the upper
hand. It appears to me that he is following a standard
strategy and that on the next move I will be in an unten-
able position. My father also realizes this. He knows
that after his next move I will resign because the game is
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unwinnable
moves
--X
• However, he knows that he has two possible
and Y-- which will yield the same result. X is
the standard move and is the one that I expect. Y is a
brilliantly innovative move which is completely unexpected
by me. My father also knows that I am a good loser and
that I enjoy learning new chess strategies, even if I am
unable to combat them. If he makes move Y, I will be
forced to resign, but I will be surprised by his move and
will be filled with awe and wonder. If he makes move X, I
will be forced to resign as I expected. So it seems that
if my father chooses move Y, my quality of life will be
improved
.
Suppose, furthermore, that my father is aware of this;
he knows that I will lose more enjoyably if he uses move Y
than if he uses move X. However, given that I am a good
loser, I will not be particularly hurt by losing as a
result of move X. According to (DB) my father would some-
how wrong me — or manifest a defect in character -- if he
chose X. But surely that is too strong. In making move X,
my father does not cheat me in any way. Nor does he pa-
tronize me by letting the game go on longer than it needs
to. Given that I am a good loser he does not even make me
angry or upset by defeating me in a very expected manner.
It does not seem that he wrongs me in any way. He simply
chooses a good, but not the best, alternative. So it seems
that (DB) is false when applied to human beings. Thus
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given Basinger’s first consideration - that ethical con-
cepts and principles must apply i n the same way to both
humans and God — it seems that +- k(DB) must be rejected as a
moral principle governing God's activity.
A version of Basinger's principle may be correct if we
are thinking about situations in which an individual is
faced only with a set of bad alternatives. In such a
situation one is morally obligated to try to minimize the
evil that is done in a situation. Similarly, if one is
faced with a set of mixed alternatives one is obligated to
choose one of the good alternatives (though not necessarily
the best one). However, in a situation in which one faced
only with good alternatives, it seems that any of the
choices is acceptable.
To choose a better action from among a set of a good
alternatives is like giving someone a gift. Suppose that a
student asks a professor if she can borrow a book. The
professor can agree to lend the student the book. Suppose
that this is the minimally decent thing to do. However,
the professor could also choose to give the student the
book. If the professor just lends out the book, the stu-
dent has no grounds for complaint. If the professor gives
the student the book, the student has no grounds for saying
Why didn t you give me a better gift? Why didn't you give
me all of your books?" If the person has moral claim on
something, if they have a right to it, then it is not a
gift when they receive it. Receiving an object 0 as a gift
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entails that one did not have any right to o to begin with.
I£ “ 13 possible humans to genuinely give gifts, then
(DB) is false.
Furthermore, if human beings and God are similar in
important moral respects, then one would think that if it
is possible for human beings to give gifts it also possible
to give gifts. So it seems that we must reject
(DB). No morally responsible agent is required to always
do his/her best.
Some of the confusion regarding (DB) arises, I think,
because of the connection that Basinger sees between (DB)
and God's being worthy of worship. God's actions may
fulfill sufficient conditions for worshipping him, but they
do not seem to be required by any necessary conditions for
worshipping him. Perhaps we can refine that claim some-
what. Impeccability may be a necessary condition of a
being s being worthy of worship. However, impeccability is
not a sufficient condition for being worthy of worship.
But a being need not always do what is best in order to be
impeccable. Thus one can reject (DB) and still not violate
one of the necessary conditions of being worthy of worship.
It seems that we have a satisfactory solution to both
POGAS-B and PONO. This solution retains much of the tradi-
tional concept of God, with some needed revisions. The
proposal has two parts. First it holds that power need not
be understood in terms of capability, but rather is best
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understood in terms of sovereignty or independence. An
omnipotent being is one which has control over all other
beings and which is such that nothing has control of it.
Secondly, God is necessarily impeccable and is omnibenevo-
lent in our revised sense of omnibenevolence. God some-
times acts graciously. However, this need not be an essen-
tial property of God. So God is trustworthy and dependable
because one knows that he is sinless. Moreover, he may
very well reveal himself to be gracious. This conception
God is the conception that it is characteristic of the
Judeo-Christian tradition. So it seems that there is a
conception of God which is relevantly similar to the tradi-
tional conception of God and which is logically coherent.
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CHAPTER VIII
SOME CONCLUDING, SUMMARY COMMENTS
The Problem of Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin
is, we have seen, a genuine problem, given one fairly
common understanding of the nature of God. That common
conception includes four important claims. Firstly, it
holds to a Then, istic conception of omnipotence; a being is
omnipotent just in case it can do all that is logically
possible. This definition can be refined in various ways
as we have seen, but even Flint and Freddoso’s careful and
complex definition of omnipotence is clearly in the
Thomistic tradition.
Secondly, this common conception of the nature of God
holds that omnibenevolence requires free choice between
morally significant alternatives. Thus, on this view, God
must, if he is omnibenevolent, must be faced with morally
significant alternatives.
Thirdly, this common conception of the nature of God
holds that there is some being which is necessarily God.
And finally there is an assumption that there are some
states of affairs such that it is necessarily morally
impermissible for anyone to bring them about. That is,
some actions are always wrong.
We saw in Chapter I that these assumptions do indeed
yield a problem for the theist committed to all of them.
This problem we identified as POGAS-B. We also saw in
Chapter I that rejection the last of the above assumptions
dissolves the problem; that is, we saw that POGAS-A is not
really a problem for the theist. However, we also saw in
discussion of Gulesar ian
' s modal problem of evil that
there is some plausibility to this last assumption.
In Chapter II we saw that rejection of the third
assumption also dissolves the problem. If different
beings have the property of being God in different
possible worlds, then POGAS-B does not arise.
In Chapters HI, IV, and V we looked at some attempts
to solve POGAS-B by revising the definition of
omnipotence. In Chapter III we looked at the radical
omnipotence theory. While the radical omnipotence theory
does solve POGAS-B, the intellectual cost of accepting the
radical omnipotence theory is far too high. In Chapter
IV, we looked at revisions of the Thomistic approach to
PoGAS-B. The first proposal, by Flint and Freddoso,
involves an insightful discussion of the Thomistic
definition of omnipotence. We saw, however, that their
proposal does not solve POGAS-B and suffers from some
internal difficulties. The second proposal, by Laura
Garcia, is an epistemic proposal. It, too, was rejected
because of internal difficulties. In Chapter V we looked
at several Anselmian type proposals regarding omnipotence.
Rather than regarding omnipotence as omnicapability, the
proposals regard omnipotence as complete independence. A
being is omnipotent just in case there is nothing which
can control it and it can control every other being. The
proposals too were unsuccessful as solutions to POGAS-B
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because of an independent problem which „e noted regarding
omnibenevolence. This problem we called the Problem of
Necessary Omnibenevolence or PONO. PONO simply shows that
on the accepted understanding of omnibenevolence it is
impossible for any being to be necessarily omnibene vo len t
.
PONO is the subject of Chapter VI. I n this chapter we
stated PONO carefully and then discussed two proposed
solutions. The first of these, by Thomas Morris, we
rejected for a number of reasons including the fact that
it cuts the heart out of the free will defense to the
problem of evil. We also rejected Morris's solution and
the second solution, proposed by Stump and Kretzmann,
because, given a Thomistic account of omnipotence, neither
successfully solves POGAS-B.
In Chapter VII we looked at two last solutions to
both POGAS-B and PONO. First we looked at a proposal by
Thomas Morris that argues that POGAS-B is really no
different from other uncontrover sial oddities that arise
in understanding the nature of a perfect being. We argued
that POGAS-B is significantly different from the cases
that Morris suggests.
Finally, also in Chapter VII, I suggested that
perhaps the most plausible solution to POGAS-B and PONO
involves accepting an Ansel mian type understanding of
POGAS-B along with a revised understanding of omnibenevo-
lence. The revised understanding of omnibenevolence al-
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that alternatives can be morally significant if there
IS a choice among good alternatives as well as if there is
choice among good and evil alternatives. If one revises
both the traditional understanding of omnipotence and the
traditional understanding omni bene vo lent e , then both
POGAS-B and PONO can be solved.
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